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 I 
Preface 
 
“This world is of a single piece; yet, we invent nets to trap it for our inspection. Then we 
mistake our nets for the reality of the piece. In these nets we catch the fishes of the intellect 
but the sea of wholeness forever eludes our grasp. So, we forget our original intent  
and then mistake the nets for the sea. 
 
Three of these nets we have named Nature, Mathematics, and Art. We conclude they are 
different because we call them by different names. Thus, they are apt to remain forever 
separated with nothing bonding them together. It is not the nets that are at fault  
but rather our misunderstanding of their function as nets.  
They do catch the fishes but never the sea,  
and it is the sea that we ultimately desire.” 
 
Martha Boles, Universal Patterns, 1992 
 
This doctoral dissertation aims to enrich our understanding of how the business firm can take 
responsibility for its value creation activities in a complex, demanding and continuously 
changing environment. In particular, this dissertation elaborates on the interlinkages of 
fragmented sustainability governance and the business firm as well as the multiple internal 
structural units a firm can use to respond to changing sustainability expectations in its 
environment. While this goal might seem straightforward and reasonable at first glance, the 
difficult question remains how to do so. Which scientific discipline(s) should be employed? 
Which theories and conceptual constructs ‘out there’ might help achieve this endeavor? Which 
methods and research instruments offer promising tools to reach the postulated aim of this 
dissertation?  
Starting with my own, personal opinion, I strongly believe that the success of this dissertation 
builds upon an interdisciplinary and open-minded research approach, including theories and 
methods from different scientific disciplines such as business and management research, 
political science and social sciences. In fact, this way of doing research is tightly linked to the 
tradition of the School of Business, Economics and Society, where I wrote this doctoral 
dissertation. More precisely, the school is famous for its interdisciplinary research approach 
which combines business and economics research with the humanities and social sciences, 
coined in the term ‘Nürnberger Schule’. During my time as a doctoral student and researcher, I 
truly profited from this holistic approach of doing research – which allowed me to think freely 
and act beyond scientific disciplines and borders. Therefore, I feel thankful and honored to 
contribute my (small) share to the continuation of this interdisciplinary research tradition at the 
School of Business, Economics and Society at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-
Nürnberg.  
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 1 
1 Introduction 
In times of severe sustainability challenges resulting from business conduct, companies are 
increasingly expected to take responsibility for negative effects related to their value creation 
activities (Busse, Schleper, Weilenmann, & Wagner, 2017; Carter & Easton, 2011; Foerstl, 
Reuter, Hartmann, & Blome, 2010; Harms, Hansen, & Schaltegger, 2013). In this dissertation, 
the responsibility a business firm has for the harmful social, ecological and economic effects 
stemming from its value creation activities is subsumed under the notion of value chain 
responsibility (VCR). Taking value chain responsibility is already a challenging and continuous 
endeavor. Yet, to complicate matters further, the external environment in which companies are 
running their value creation activities and VCR efforts is complex and challenging. In more 
detail, this dissertation focuses on two phenomena in the firm’s environment which 
considerably affect its VCR activities: the fragmentation of sustainability governance and the 
changing VCR expectations of stakeholders.  
Fragmented sustainability governance describes how the regulatory environment in which firms 
operate their business and conduct VCR activities is increasingly shaped by multiple and 
different governance actors (such as NGOs and companies) and governance instruments (such 
as voluntary sustainability standards and schemes). This fragmentation of the ‘rules of the 
game’ for businesses can have ambivalent consequences for the company’s capability to take 
VCR. 
Regarding the latter, changing VCR expectations of stakeholders describe how stakeholders 
draw attention to detrimental social, ecological and economic issues affiliated with the firm’s 
value chain operations and thus demand action from the firm to resolve precisely these issues.  
Both phenomena have in common that they a) require the firm to draw attention to changes in 
its external environment and b) potentially result in or call for internal changes within the firm, 
e.g. regarding the way a firm manages its business operations and addresses sustainability 
challenges. Against this background, the overall objective of this paper-based dissertation is to 
expand our understanding how companies can take value chain responsibility in environments 
shaped by complexity, fragmented sustainability governance and changing stakeholder 
expectations.  
In order to do so, the four individual papers of this dissertation provide distinct contributions 
for academia and corporate practice: Paper I provides a mapping of the scholarly literature on 
the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance, sheds light on different facets of this 
phenomenon and illustrates management practices to deal with fragmented sustainability 
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governance. Paper II elaborates on explanatory factors that help us understand the 
fragmentation of sustainability governance in the empirical case of the global gold sector. Paper 
III explores how companies as potential governance makers and takers affect and are affected 
by fragmented sustainability governance. Paper IV sheds light on changing stakeholder 
expectations and how they might impact the internal structural and functional organization of 
the firm to take VCR. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: First, Section 2 provides the 
conceptual foundations of this dissertation and explains how the four individual papers are 
tightly interlinked. In more detail, Section 2 introduces the notion of value chain responsibility, 
clarifies the employed understanding of sustainability governance and its fragmentation and 
highlights changes in stakeholders’ VCR expectations. Second, Section 3 provides a summary 
of each of the four papers and integrates the key findings of the individual papers. By doing so, 
Section 3 also elaborates on managerial implications stemming from the findings. Third, 
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks and outlines promising avenues for further 
research. In Section 6, the reader can find an extended abstract of this dissertation. The four 
individual papers that jointly build this dissertation can be found in the Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10, 
respectively.   
 3 
2 Conceptual Background and Connecting Elements 
The four individual papers of this doctoral thesis advance our understanding of how the 
business firm can cope with sustainability challenges related to its value creation activities and 
thus take value chain responsibility. Therefore, the element of corporate value chain 
responsibility resembles the first and overarching connecting element of the individual 
contributions within this dissertation. Yet, taking value chain responsibility does not take place 
in a vacuum. Instead, this dissertation emphasizes that aspects of VCR take place in a value 
chain context characterized by complexity and constant change. More precisely, all four papers 
address changes in the firm’s external environment and how they relate to internal aspects and 
tasks within the business firm. In more detail, this dissertation highlights how two elements 
considerably change the firm’s environment when a) running its business operations and b) 
aiming to take value chain responsibility: the fragmentation of sustainability governance (Paper 
I, II & III) and the complexity of stakeholder expectations (particularly Paper IV).  
The following sections provide a conceptual background on value chain responsibility, 
complexity in a business environment context, and the elements of fragmented sustainability 
governance and stakeholder expectations which jointly build the foundations of this 
dissertation. In order to display the conceptual foundations of this dissertation, Figure 1 
illustrates the interlinkages between value chain responsibility and environmental complexity 
(particularly referring to fragmented sustainability governance and the complexity of 
stakeholder expectations).  
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Figure 1 Depiction of the connecting elements of this dissertation and their interlinkages. The respective analytical 
focus of each paper is indicated in italic 
 
2.1 The business firm and its value chain responsibility  
As its point of departure, this thesis argues that in today’s world, it is not sufficient for the 
business firm to optimize and further expand its value creation activities. How come? Corporate 
decisions and business conduct at one company in the value chain can potentially lead to 
negative (and oftentimes unintended) social, ecological and economic consequences for 
employees, business partners and third parties both upstream and downstream the firm’s value 
chain (Letizia & Hendrikse, 2016; Schrempf-Stirling & Palazzo, 2016; Svensson, Ferro, 
Hogevold, Padin, & Sosa Varela, 2018). This becomes particularly important considering the 
globalization of corporate business activities, the increasing interconnectedness and 
interdependencies of value chain activities as well as the acceleration of global transformations 
such as climate change which threaten the very existence of humankind. 
Against this background, companies are now increasingly pressured by external and internal 
stakeholder groups to take responsibility for such negative and harmful social, ecological and 
economic effects affiliated with precisely these value creation activities (Busse et al., 2017; 
Carter & Easton, 2011; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Foerstl et al., 2010; Harms et al., 2013; 
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Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). In order to maintain its license to operate, the business firm therefore 
needs to incorporate and address the manifold expectations to take responsibility for the 
aforementioned unwanted external effects affiliated with its value creation operations.  
In corporate practice and academia, the notion of sustainability challenges gained popularity to 
inter alia subsume the harmful social, ecological and economic effects linked to business 
activities (see Elkington, 1998). For the sake of simplicity, sustainability challenges are 
understood in the remainder of this dissertation as those challenges that impede humanity to 
successfully follow sustainable development pathways. 
The observation that companies should take responsibility and be accountable for conceivable 
negative effects affiliated with their business activities is certainly not new. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that multiple conceptual and theoretical approaches exist to coin the responsibility 
of the business firm (van Marrewijk, 2003). Amongst them, concepts like corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), corporate responsibility (CR) and corporate sustainability (CS) are 
employed and oftentimes used interchangeably. To complicate matters further, individual 
concepts like CSR are not monolithic but instead developed over time and include a ‘wide range 
of beliefs’ as well as further conceptualizations and operationalizations (see Latapí Agudelo, 
Jóhannsdóttir, & Davídsdóttir, 2019).  
However, it is not the intention and purpose of this dissertation to engage in the definitional 
debate on how to frame, conceptualize and define the responsibility of the business firm. Given 
the complexity of pinning down the notion of corporate responsibility, this dissertation and its 
four individual papers follow a somewhat pragmatic understanding of the responsibility a 
business firm has for its value creation activities along its value chain. More precisely, the 
notion of value chain responsibility (VCR) represents the first read thread of this dissertation 
and is a common element of all four papers. In more detail, all four papers focus on the 
responsibility of the business firm in a complex and changing environment. In particular, Paper 
III & IV explicitly employ the term VCR.  
In this dissertation, value chain responsibility is understood as the responsibility of a business 
firm and its value chain partners to address harmful sustainability impacts along the extended 
value chain, including both upstream and downstream actors and parts of the chain. 
Furthermore, VCR is used throughout this dissertation because of its following three main 
features and particularities compared to other concepts in the realm of business responsibility 
and sustainability.  
First, as the name suggests, value chain responsibility has a clear focus on the firm’s value 
creation activities along its oftentimes complex and globalized value chain(s). This is important 
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because many value chains today span several countries and regulatory contexts and do not 
belong to a single jurisdictional environment. The notion of VCR thus draws our attention inter 
alia to the aspect of (sustainability) governance for steering value chain activities and taking 
responsibility and the question who creates and provides the ‘rules of the game’ for these value 
chains.  
Furthermore, given the value chain focus, VCR also comes along with a strong value creation 
component, most prominently in the form of manufacturing and providing goods via global 
value chains. In this context, so-called focal companies are particularly in the spotlight of VCR, 
as they a) determine key product features and shape the organization and business conduct of 
the respective value chain and b) are oftentimes held responsible for negative sustainability 
effects along the entire chain (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). Following this line of thought, VCR 
suggests that companies are in principle capable to influence the business conduct in the value 
chain and bring about positive change along the chain (Philipps & Caldwell, 2005). Given this 
strong value chain and value creation focus, VCR leaves aside neighboring aspects of corporate 
responsibility such as corporate philanthropy, as long as it has no direct link to the capability 
of the firm to run its value creation operations with its partners in the value chain. 
Second, value chains or networks evidentially consist of various actors who need to cooperate 
in order to successfully run their joint value chain operations. The concept of VCR thus 
emphasizes that responsibility both upstream and downstream the value chain refers to all value 
chain actors. Therefore, the success of VCR depends on the cooperation of relevant value chain 
actors and does not only focus on the individual responsibility or sustainability of a single firm.   
Third, value chain responsibility takes the entire (or ultimate) value chain into account, thus 
including both upstream and downstream parts of the chain. This is particularly important 
because, by doing so, various stakeholder groups along the value chain and their respective 
expectations on the business firm gain relevance for the firm (Philipps & Caldwell, 2005). VCR 
hence shows some fruitful linkages to stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison, 
& Wicks, 2007; Philipps & Caldwell, 2005).  
In a nutshell, the concept of value chain responsibility resembles a helpful semantics to frame 
different aspects of corporate responsibility. Yet, business activities and therefore also VCR 
practices do not take place in isolation. Instead, the business firm is embedded in an external 
environment which is characterized by complexity and constant change. The following section 
therefore carves out how and why the firm’s environment experiences changes in complexity.  
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2.2 Business management and value chain responsibility in light of 
complexity and changes in the external environment 
This section serves to briefly reflect on the notion of complexity in a business context and the 
observable changes in the firm’s external environment. Unsurprisingly, aspects of complexity 
and neighboring concepts are widely discussed in the business management literature. This 
includes, but is not limited to, aspects like ambiguity, uncertainty, contradiction or simultaneity 
(Burnes, 2005; Hall & Rowland, 2016; see Lane & Down, 2010; Skaržauskiene, 2010). 
Essentially, corporate managers need to deal with these aspects on a daily basis when running 
their value creation activities. Imagine a European automotive company and its business 
managers who are simultaneously dealing with multiple tasks and decisions: the organization 
and successful operation of a deep, multi-tier and supranational value chain with diverse value 
chain partners (complexity) as well as the commitment to the powertrain system(s) of the near 
and far future, requiring the selection between gasoline, diesel, natural gas, electric drive or 
hydrogen (uncertainty and ambiguity). To complicate matters further, precisely these managers 
also need to recognize and respond to various internal and external expectations from 
stakeholder groups. Therefore, it became a sort of conventional knowledge in business 
management practice and literature that one key task (and likewise a key challenge) of 
management refers to handling complexity and multiplicity. This is inter alia addressed in 
different literature streams of business management such as studies of the firm as an 
organization, entrepreneurship studies, strategy development, supply chain management or 
management roles, education, and training. Hence, in a nutshell, it is a key challenge of 
conventional business management to deal with aspects of complexity. Furthermore, the firm’s 
environment is naturally characterized by complexity and constant change.  
But what happens if we add aspects of sustainability and responsibility to the equation? Or put 
differently, how does the expectation to take value chain responsibility alter our understanding 
of dealing with complexity in a business management context? As a key read thread, this 
dissertation elaborates on changes in the firm’s environment linked to novel or changing 
sustainability or value chain responsibility aspects and their potential consequences and 
interlinkages to internal practices within the firm.  
Sustainability – by itself – is already a complex and multifaceted term, concept or idea (Hjorth 
& Bagheri, 2006; Nabavi, Daniell, & Najafi, 2017; A. Williams, Kennedy, Philipp, & 
Whiteman, 2017), especially because it focuses on multiple dimensions, manifold stakeholders 
as well as on inter- and intragenerational aspects (Porter & Derry, 2012). And yet, business 
managers and companies are increasingly expected to deal with sustainability topics or 
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challenges (Porter & Derry, 2012; S. Young & Nagpal, 2013). Following this observation, one 
can argue that sustainability is likely to increase the already high level of complexity the 
business firm and its managers need to handle. Taking VCR thus becomes an ever more 
challenging endeavor. Recall the aforementioned example of the automotive company: In times 
of increasing sustainability challenges and responsibility expectations from stakeholders on the 
business firm, the automotive company does not only need to handle the existing level of 
complexity (value chain organization/selection of powertrain system). In addition, it suddenly 
needs to cope with topics and issues which were previously not ‘on the radar’ of the firm, such 
as the usage of conflict minerals further down at a distant sub-supplier in the value chain or the 
negative social and environmental effects caused by the usage of high-tech and seemingly 
‘green’ or sustainable powertrain components like lithium batteries in electric vehicles (Thies, 
Kieckhäfer, Spengler, & Sodhi, 2019).  
In order to deal with new and increasingly demanding and complex sustainability topics and 
challenges, the business firm naturally needs a regulatory environment to provide guidance for 
the business firm in the form of laws, standards and guidelines to successfully operate its value 
chain activities and take value chain responsibility. Yet, it remains some sort of paradox that 
precisely the regulatory environment or governance for complex sustainability challenges can 
in turn be complex, multifaceted and to some degree fragmented. To illustrate this, the 
following sections introduce the notion of governance and carve out the aspect of governance 
fragmentation in a VCR context.  
 
2.2.1 Sustainability governance as a prerequisite for value chain responsibility 
The regulatory environment can substantially impact the firm’s ability to a) successfully engage 
in value creation processes and b) successfully take value chain responsibility. Therefore, the 
following section briefly introduces the notion of governance to frame this regulatory 
environment.  
Similar to the aforementioned debate on framing the responsibility of the business firm, the 
notion of governance is likewise hard to pin down, as governance is ubiquitously and sometimes 
inconsistently used in the academics and corporate practice (see Welch, 2013). In more detail, 
the actual definition and understanding of governance are closely linked to the respective 
analytical level. For instance, “corporate governance refers to the rules and practices by which 
the firm is directed and controlled internally” whereas “industrial governance is required to 
coordinate the inter-organizational dynamics of […] global value chains” (Bair & Palpacuer, 
2015, p. S1, emphasis in original). Again, it is not the purpose of this dissertation to engage in 
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the definitional debate on framing governance. Instead, this dissertation refers to the notion of 
governance in an explicit value chain and value chain responsibility context. 
Therefore, this dissertation builds upon the argument that, in order to successfully address 
sustainability challenges and take VCR, an adequate regulatory environment is required (Mena 
& Palazzo, 2012; Voß & Bornemann, 2011). Governance in this dissertation thus primarily 
refers to such a regulatory environment and is considered an important prerequisite and enabler 
to allow the firm to successfully take its value chain responsibility. Considering the level of 
analysis, governance in this dissertation takes into account regulatory mechanisms both within 
the firm as well as on a value chain and global level. Overall, this dissertation and its individual 
papers follow the overarching definition of governance introduced by Williamson (2010). 
According to Williamson, governance can be understood as “the means by which to infuse 
order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” (2010, p. 674, emphasis in 
original). Building on this understanding of governance, sustainability governance is then 
understood in this dissertation as “the means to provide a regulatory environment (order) that 
enables actors to mitigate or minimize sustainability challenges (conflict) and thus allow 
sustainable development pathways for all (mutual gain)” (Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019, 
para. 16).  
As an important note, one has to emphasize that the distinction between general governance to 
set the regulatory ‘rules of the game’ for business firms and sustainability governance is 
sometimes blurry. Paper I elaborates on this distinction and suggests that sustainability 
governance is specific due to three reasons: It covers the “simultaneous consideration of 
multiple sustainability dimensions that are relevant for the business firm”, is shaped by the 
contributions and “involvement of different stakeholder groups” and emphasizes the 
interlinkages between the value chain responsibility of the business firm and the necessary 
regulatory environment as a prerequisite (Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019, para. 18). 
Throughout this dissertation, sustainability governance and its linkages to VCR play an 
important role explicitly in Paper I, II and III and to a lesser extent also in Paper IV.  
Coming back to the notion of complexity, one has to note that governance is often characterized 
by some sort of multiplicity or fragmentation. In order to shed some light on the complexity of 
governance to address sustainability challenges and topics, the following section focuses on the 
emergence and consequences of the fragmentation of sustainability governance. 
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2.2.2 The fragmentation of sustainability governance as a common ground for Paper I, 
II and III 
Traditionally, governance was associated primarily or almost exclusively with governmental 
governance. Thus, nation states and their respective governmental bodies and institutional 
arrangements were supposedly the ‘default actors’ to set the regulatory environment where 
companies operate their value creation activities and eventually fulfill their value chain 
responsibility obligations (de Bakker, Rasche, & Ponte, 2019; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 
2009). Put differently, an implicit division of labor was assumed: While governments were the 
ones to set the ‘rules of the game’ for business actors, companies were considered as apolitical 
actors that merely aimed to thrive within the provided regulatory framework.  
Yet, in light of globalized and ever more complex and intertwined value creation activities, this 
former division of labor becomes increasingly blurry. In fact, today’s governance for 
companies, their value creation activities and their potential fulfillment of VCR expectations, 
is considerably characterized by so-called governance gaps or voids, where governments are 
either not capable or willing to provide the respective regulatory guidance for companies and 
their value creation partners (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Rasche, 2012; Santoro, 2010; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2008; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 2014; Whelan, 2012). Consequently, governments 
as public governance actors find it difficult to provide governance mechanisms and instruments 
to a) steer corporate business conduct and b) foster sustainability and VCR (Abbott, 2012; 
Biermann & Pattberg, 2008; Bush, Oosterveer, Bailey, & Mol, 2015; Chkanikova & Lehner, 
2015; Smith & Fischlein, 2010).  
Given this development, new and oftentimes private governance actors emerged. This includes, 
but is not limited to, business firms as novel governance actors, civil society organizations, 
unions or multi-stakeholder initiatives (de Bakker et al., 2019; Grabs, 2018; Holzscheiter, Bahr, 
& Pantzerhielm, 2016; Johnstone, 2019; Ruggie, 2004; Schouten & Bitzer, 2015; Zeyen, 
Beckmann, & Wolters, 2016). Over the last 30 years, numerous additional governance actors 
(Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2013; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006) appeared in different 
industrial sectors (Riisgaard, 2011; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011) and now “increasingly 
participate in the formulation and implementation of rules in policy areas that were once the 
sole responsibility of the state or international governmental organizations” (Scherer et al., 
2006, p. 506). In more detail, this emergence of new governance actors also included the 
creation and implementation of novel (and mainly voluntary) governance instruments such as 
sustainability certifications, codes of conduct, sustainability labels and standard(s) systems 
(Auld, 2014; Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Reinecke, Manning, & von Hagen, 2012). Therefore, 
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global (sustainability) governance in today’s world is characterized by a multitude of different 
public and private governance actors and a variety of binding, voluntary, formal and informal 
mechanisms of governance (Boström, Jönsson, Lockie, Mol, & Oosterveer, 2015; de Bakker et 
al., 2019; Derkx & Glasbergen, 2014; Johnstone, 2019; Marx, 2017).  
Against this background, the notion of fragmentation of sustainability governance is 
increasingly employed by scholars (Acharya, 2016; Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 
2009; Fransen & Conzelmann, 2015; Gupta, Pistorius, & Vijge, 2016; Heidingsfelder & 
Beckmann, 2019; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013) and to some extent business practitioners to 
describe and subsume the multiplicity, mere quantity and diversity of governance to steer 
business conduct and the ability to take VCR. In fact, this fragmentation of sustainability 
governance can be witnessed in multiple commodity sectors (Fransen, 2011; Heidingsfelder, 
2019; Schouten & Bitzer, 2015; Turcotte, Reinecke, & Hond, 2014). Furthermore, the topic of 
sustainability governance fragmentation is gaining attention in different scientific fields, 
including inter alia political science, law, social sciences and business research (Heidingsfelder 
& Beckmann, 2019).  
Companies can likewise be engaged as governance actors in shaping the regulatory 
environment for business behavior and value chain responsibility. This observation is anchored 
in the wider scholarly discussion on the political role of the firm (e.g. Kobrin, 2009; Pies, 
Beckmann, & Hielscher, 2014; Rasche, 2012; Scherer et al., 2009; Whelan, 2012). In more 
detail, the first three papers of this dissertation (Paper I, II & III) follow the distinction of 
companies as governance takers and makers in the context of sustainability governance 
(Beckmann, Hielscher, & Pies, 2014; Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger, & Wood, 2014; see 
Jinnah, 2017; Scherer et al., 2014; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 
In their (traditional) role as governance takers, companies first and foremost aim to achieve 
their value creation purpose in an effective and efficient manner within the given governance 
environment (Beckmann et al., 2014; Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). Here, companies 
can be affected by fragmented sustainability governance when aiming to optimize their value 
creation activities and taking value chain responsibility.   
In their (novel) role as governance makers, companies are proactively engaged in finding, 
creating and enforcing governance mechanisms (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Pies et al., 2014; 
Scherer et al., 2014; van Oosterhout, 2010). This can e.g. be achieved via individual or 
collective corporate self-regulation (Beckmann et al., 2014; Néron & Norman, 2008; Rasche, 
2012). Here, companies can presumably contribute to a further multiplicity and diversity 
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(fragmentation) of governance, because they represent governance actors and provide 
additional governance instruments and mechanisms.  
In a nutshell, companies, in their dual role as governance makers and takers, can affect and be 
affected by fragmented sustainability governance. Therefore, they need to find management 
approaches to deal with this challenging and multifaceted situation.  
 
As an important note, I want to emphasize that this doctoral thesis aims to treat the notion of 
fragmentation first and foremost as a “descriptive term” (Pattberg et al., 2014, p. 9f). This is 
worth mentioning because some scholars (and potentially some of the readers of this 
dissertation) might associate a negative connotation with the term fragmentation. On the 
contrary, this dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced and multifaceted picture of the term 
fragmentation in different contextual settings. In order to do so, it is advisable to embrace the 
notion of fragmentation with an open mindset.  
Within this dissertation, the fragmentation of sustainability governance is a key feature of the 
first three papers (Paper I, II & III). In more detail, although they share common ground, all 
three papers shed light on slightly different shades of the fragmentation of sustainability 
governance. The following three sections therefore introduce the respective conceptualization 
of fragmentation in Paper I, II and III.  
 
Exploring fragmented sustainability governance in Paper I 
Paper I explores the phenomenon of governance fragmentation in three ways: the 
interdisciplinarity of the research on fragmented sustainability governance, the diversity of the 
phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance and the toolbox of management 
approaches to cope with effects of fragmented sustainability governance.  
The first paper of this dissertation maps and synthesizes the scholarly knowledge on fragmented 
sustainability governance with a particular focus on the business firm in environments of 
fragmented governance. In more detail, Paper I offers a meta-analysis of the available academic 
literature on the topic of fragmented sustainability governance. In fact, the topic of fragmented 
sustainability governance is discussed in various scholarly disciplines which might impede 
mutual learning between scholarly discourses and corporate practitioners (Heidingsfelder & 
Beckmann, 2019). Therefore, Paper I introduces a mapping and synthesis of the multifaceted 
and interdisciplinary academic literature on fragmented sustainability governance 
(interdisciplinarity of the research on fragmented sustainability governance).  
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Additionally, Paper I treats sustainability governance fragmentation as a multifaceted 
phenomenon and derives an encompassing synthesis of different types and configurations of 
fragmentation (diversity of the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance). 
Furthermore, Paper I also sheds light on the multiple and diverse management instruments to 
deal with fragmented sustainability governance (toolbox of management approaches). 
 
Exploring fragmented sustainability governance in Paper II 
Paper II focuses on the various drivers and mechanisms that help us understand the emergence 
of fragmented sustainability governance in a single industrial sector. In more detail, Paper II 
elaborates on different factors that explain the fragmentation of sustainability governance in the 
global gold sector. By doing so, Paper II focuses on the variety of different explanatory factors 
that can explain the emergence and potential continuance of fragmented sustainability 
governance in a single commodity sector.  
 
Exploring fragmented sustainability governance in Paper III 
Paper III puts the business firm with its dual role as a governance maker and taker in the 
spotlight of our attention and elaborates how companies can affect and are affected by 
fragmented sustainability governance. As a conceptual guidance, the third paper refers to the 
three different stages of rule-finding, rule-setting and rule-following (Pies, Beckmann, & 
Hielscher, 2010; Pies et al., 2014) to analyze the interlinkages of companies as governance 
makers and takers in light of fragmented sustainability governance. Essentially, Paper III 
introduces three novel conceptualizations of fragmented sustainability governance: 
fragmentation as multiplicity of discourses and worldviews in the rule-finding stage, 
fragmentation as specialization of the content of governance in the rule-setting stage and 
fragmentation as dissipation of governance and resulting challenges in the rule-following stage. 
 
2.2.3 Complexity and stakeholder expectations in Paper IV 
Paper I, II and III have in common that they explicitly focus on the fragmentation of 
sustainability governance as a major source of change in the firm’s environment. In contrast, 
Paper IV focuses on the importance of changing, diverging and overlapping stakeholder 
expectations in the firm’s environment and how they eventually influence the internal 
management of the business firm. In more detail, Paper IV looks at aspects of complexity in at 
least three ways: the complexity of stakeholder expectations in the firm’s environment, the 
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separation of corporate structures in the context of value chain responsibility and the 
specialization of corporate functions to take VCR. 
Using an evolutionary systems theory perspective, the paper elaborates on the complexity of 
the firm’s environment and its importance for the firm’s ability to achieve its value creation 
purpose and take VCR. More precisely, this environment is characterized by various 
stakeholder groups (e.g. referring to customers, governments, value chain partners, NGOs, the 
media and many more) with oftentimes diverging expectations on the business firm. As the 
term value chain responsibility emphasizes, companies need to find responses to varying and 
sometimes even conflicting stakeholder expectations.  
Shifting our attention to the internal organization of the business firm, Paper IV argues that the 
two corporate functions sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) and trade compliance 
(TC) with their respective organizational structures both deliver contributions to the firm’s 
capability to take VCR and thus respond to stakeholder expectations in the firm’s environment. 
Yet, this structural separation of corporate functions to take VCR can presumably decrease the 
firm’s ability to take VCR in an effective and efficient manner. Paper IV thus focuses on the 
separation of corporate structures in the context of value chain responsibility (see Worren, 
2016) and the specialization of corporate functions to take VCR (see A. Schneider, Wickert, & 
Marti, 2017).  
 
In a nutshell, the preceding sections illustrated how aspects of complexity in the firm’s 
environment (particularly fragmented sustainability governance and changing stakeholder 
expectations) are connected to the concept of value chain responsibility. The following section 
provides a more detailed overview of the four individual papers.  
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3 Introduction to the Four Papers, Key Findings and Managerial 
Implications 
This section first serves to introduce the four individual papers of this paper-based dissertation 
in greater detail. Then, in a second step, I carve out the key findings of the four individual 
papers, integrate them and derive implications for business practitioners. In order to integrate 
the findings, I take the perspective of business management and introduce a conceptual 
framework to support my argumentation. The derived implications for the scholarly community 
and further research suggestions are presented in more detail in the subsequent Section 4.  
 
3.1 Presentation of the four individual papers of this dissertation 
This subsection briefly introduces all four papers of this dissertation and displays the motivation 
and research gap of the respective paper, the targeted research question(s), the unit(s) of 
analysis, the contribution as well as the research design and methodology of each paper. In 
order to illustrate the different foci area, Figure 2 puts the four contributions into perspective 
and contrasts their respective units of analysis.  
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Figure 2 Depiction of the four individual research papers and their respective unit(s) of analysis (depicted in italic) 
 
3.1.1 Paper I: A governance puzzle to be solved? A systematic literature review of 
fragmented sustainability governance 
 
Paper I: Motivation and research gap 
If a company aims to take VCR and/or simply operate its value creation activities in an 
environment of fragmented sustainability governance, the business firm and its employees need 
rigorous knowledge and guidance how to do so. One way to acquire such guidance is to consult 
the scholarly literature. Yet, which scholarly discourse(s) can be consulted to find out more 
about fragmented sustainability governance and its interlinkages with the business firm? In fact, 
the topic of fragmented sustainability governance and its potential interlinkages with companies 
are covered by various scientific disciplines (Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019).  
So far, scholars and corporate practitioners are lacking a comprehensive mapping of the 
academic knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance and its interlinkages with the 
business firm. Although some scholarly contributions exist (Isailovic, Widerberg, & Pattberg, 
2013; Pattberg, Widerberg, Isailovic, & Dias Guerra, 2014), a comprehensive synthesis and 
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mapping of the literature on fragmented sustainability governance is not available. This might 
hinder mutual learning both within the academic community (potentially between scientific 
disciplines) as well as between the scholarly community and corporate practitioners. 
Eventually, business managers are struggling to find adequate scholarly guidance on how to a) 
understand the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance and b) deal with 
fragmentation of governance in daily business operations.  
 
Paper I: Research questions 
Against this background, the first paper addresses the following four research questions: 
RQ(I)1: What is the state of interdisciplinary research on fragmented sustainability governance, 
including its development over time, applied methodologies and occurring journals?  
RQ(I)2: What are the most influential publications on fragmented sustainability governance and 
to which research disciplines can they be assigned? 
RQ(I)3: What types of fragmented sustainability governance can be derived from the scientific 
literature?  
RQ(I)4: What are approaches to manage the fragmentation of sustainability governance and 
how can these approaches be categorized? 
 
Paper I: Units of analysis 
This paper focuses on two units of analysis: First, on a meta-level, the research questions RQ(I)1 
and RQ(I)2 target the body of academic literature on fragmented sustainability governance. 
Second, the following research questions RQ(I)3 and RQ(I)4 dive deeper into existing scholarly 
articles and focus on the actual content of the available publications on fragmented 
sustainability governance.  
 
Paper I: Contribution 
By answering the four introduced research questions, Paper I provides three distinct 
contributions. First, it provides a thorough and encompassing mapping of the available 
scholarly knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance, particularly with regard to the 
role of business. This includes a descriptive analysis of the development of the research, the 
leading journals and applied methodologies as well as the identification of influential 
publications and contributions from different scientific disciplines. Second, a more fine-grained 
characterization of the multifaceted phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance is 
developed. Different types and configurations of fragmentation are depicted in a conceptual 
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framework. Third, the first paper identifies and clusters management approaches to deal with 
fragmented sustainability governance which has received little scholarly attention so far (Gupta 
et al., 2016). By doing so, the paper delivers valuable contributions for the scientific community 
(in terms of mapping and synthesizing the scholarly knowledge on fragmented sustainability 
governance) and guidance for corporate practitioners (in terms of a ‘map’ to navigate the 
scientific contributions and a more nuanced characterization of governance fragmentation and 
management practices to cope with it).  
Moreover, the systematic literature review also serves as an important foundation of scholarly 
knowledge which supports the remainder of this doctoral thesis, particularly considering the 
research conducted in Paper II and Paper III. Naturally, a great amount of additional scholarly 
references was identified and used throughout this dissertation. This applies particularly to 
Paper IV.  
 
Paper I: Research design and methodology 
The first paper combines a systematic literature review (SLR) (Denyer & Tranfield, 2009; 
Garkisch, Heidingsfelder, & Beckmann, 2017; Shabir & Rosmini, 2016) with a citation network 
analysis (CNA). The SLR builds on six scholarly databases and includes 134 peer-reviewed 
journal articles published between 2002 and 2017. The approach of a systematic literature 
review was chosen in order to identify and map the available knowledge on fragmented 
sustainability governance and its interlinkages with the business firm in a rigorous, transparent 
and reproducible way. The citation network analysis represents a bibliometric analysis that 
neatly complements the SLR approach and sheds light on the (missing) interlinkages between 
the identified journal articles (Colicchia & Strozzi, 2012; Kim, Colicchia, & Menachof, 2018; 
Wetzstein, Feisel, Hartmann, & Benton, 2018). Furthermore, the actual contents of the 134 
identified articles provide an encompassing data set for the following qualitative content 
analysis, using the software MAXQDA to support the structured content analysis (Macpherson 
& Holt, 2007; Pittaway & Cope, 2007). 
 
3.1.2 Paper II: Private sustainability governance in the making – a case study analysis 
of the fragmentation of sustainability governance for the gold sector 
 
Paper II: Motivation and research gap 
The first paper in this dissertation maps the scholarly literature on fragmented sustainability 
governance and synthesizes existing journal articles with regard to different configurations of 
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fragmentation and management tools to deal with fragmentation. Yet, given the nature of this 
meta-analysis of the literature, Paper I does not cover the phenomenon of governance 
fragmentation in a specific and empirical context. Building on the contributions provided by 
Paper I, Paper II therefore draws our attention to the emergence and persistence of fragmented 
sustainability governance in one specific industrial sector: the global gold sector. By doing so, 
Paper II dives deeper into the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance and its 
consequences for the business firm in a specific context. Although numerous studies focus on 
companies and sustainability challenges in the gold sector (see e.g. Andrews, 2016; Childs, 
2008; Mudd, 2007), little is known about sustainability governance to address these challenges 
and its (potential) fragmentation (Marques, 2016; Mori Junior, Sturman, & Imbrogiano, 2017; 
Vogel, 2018; S. B. Young, Zhe, & Dias, 2014). 
In more concrete terms, Paper II sheds light on the question why sustainability governance is 
fragmented in the global gold sector in the first place – a question which is highly relevant for 
both scholars and corporate practitioners. Regarding the scholarly community, Paper II expands 
our understanding of different factors that can explain the emergence of fragmented 
sustainability governance in an industrial sector. Therefore, the study builds on and expands 
existing literature that offers explanations on how and why fragmented governance emerges in 
industrial sectors (e.g. Reinecke et al., 2012; Smith & Fischlein, 2010; Turcotte et al., 2014; 
von Geibler, 2013). Regarding the latter, corporate practitioners and managers can strongly 
benefit from a more profound understanding of the factors that might contribute to fragmented 
governance in a single industrial sector – because companies are potentially affected by 
governance fragmentation when operating their business and taking VCR. In order to 
accomplish this, Paper II provides an exploratory empirical study in the global gold sector. 
 
Paper II: Research questions 
In order to elaborate on the emergence of fragmented sustainability governance in the empirical 
case of the gold sector, Paper II targets the overarching research question:  
RQ(II)0: How can we explain the emergence of the fragmented sustainability governance for 
gold? 
In more detail, the three consecutive research questions are used to answer the overarching 
research question:  
RQ(II)1: What is fragmented sustainability governance?  
RQ(II)2: Which types of general factors can explain the emergence of fragmented sustainability 
governance? 
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RQ(II)3: How do general factors for fragmentation and gold-specific factors influence the 
fragmentation of governance for gold? 
 
Paper II: Unit of analysis 
As its unit of analysis, Paper II directs its attention to the organizational field of actors (see 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In more detail, this includes the interlinkages, relationships and 
internal composition of eleven sustainability schemes and their respective organizational 
entities which are engaged in shaping sustainability governance for gold. 
 
Paper II: Contribution 
As the fragmentation of sustainability governance can lead to manifold challenges (Bitzer, 
Francken, & Glasbergen, 2008; Held & Young, 2013; Hospes, van der Valk, & van der Mheen-
Sluijer, 2012; Smith & Fischlein, 2010; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013) for companies that operate 
in a sector characterized by fragmentation, both scholars and business managers profit from a 
profound understanding of the reasons and drivers behind governance fragmentation. As a first 
contribution, Paper II derives four general factors from the literature that help explain the 
fragmentation of governance. Second, the study delivers a holistic analysis of the development 
and reasons behind the fragmentation of sustainability governance in the gold sector. Third, a 
conceptual framework is introduced which includes both general factors for fragmentation and 
specific factors derived from the empirical results. Therefore, the second paper refines and 
contextualizes drivers of fragmentation in the case of the gold sector. Fourth, the paper critically 
reflects to what degree the gold-specific drivers of fragmentation could be used to research 
industrial sectors beyond the case of gold. Overall, Paper II expands the scholarly knowledge 
on drivers of governance fragmentation and provides explanations for why business managers 
face a fragmentation of governance in the case of gold – thus serving as a prerequisite to find 
management answers to deal with this phenomenon.  
 
Paper II: Research design and methodology 
The second paper entails an encompassing literature review on explanatory factors that help us 
understand the emergence of fragmented sustainability governance in industrial sectors in 
general. This literature review purposefully refers to different scientific disciplines (such as 
business and economics, political science, environmental studies and law) and inter alia uses 
the findings of the systematic literature review in Paper I as its point of departure. Furthermore, 
Paper II entails a case study (Siggelkow, 2007; Sousa & Voss, 2001; Voss, Tsikriktsis, & 
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Frohlich, 2002; Yin, 2009), building on 26 semi-structured and in-depth interviews with 
distinguished experts from different stakeholder groups in the gold sector as well as further 
supplementary documents. The interview data and the supplementary documents were analyzed 
with a multistage qualitative content analysis (abductive coding).  
 
3.1.3 Paper III: Investigating the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability 
governance – using empirical evidence from the gold sector 
 
Paper III: Motivation and research gap 
The preceding Paper II advances our understanding of the drivers of governance fragmentation 
in the specific case of the global gold sector. However, Paper II does not explicitly focus on the 
interlinkages between companies and the multifaceted phenomenon of fragmented 
sustainability governance. Therefore, the third paper of this dissertation puts the focus on the 
business firm and its interlinkages with fragmented governance. In more detail, Paper III is 
grounded on the observation that governance to address sustainability challenges and guide 
business operations is nowadays increasingly provided by novel actors beyond governments as 
the ‘default’ governance setters (de Bakker et al., 2019; Detomasi, 2007; Grabs, 2018; Ruggie, 
2004; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer et al., 2009; van Oosterhout, 2010). Following this line 
of thought, companies can fulfill a novel political role when they participate in the finding and 
implementation of governance approaches through collective and/or individual self-regulation 
(Beckmann et al., 2014; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Néron & Norman, 2008; Rasche, 2012; van 
Oosterhout, 2010).  
Yet, as new political actors and governance makers, companies could potentially contribute to 
a fragmentation of governance as they provide additional individual and collective governance 
mechanisms. To complicate matters further, companies are still governance takers that strive 
for value creation within the given ‘rules of the game’. Thus, the third paper works with the 
important distinction of companies as governance takers and makers (see e.g. Jinnah, 2017; 
Scherer et al., 2014; Schultze, 2003; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). In more detail, the paper 
elaborates on the question how companies as governance takers and makers affect and are 
affected by different manifestations of fragmented sustainability governance. In order to do so, 
Paper III also uses the empirical case of the global gold sector. The third paper shifts our focus 
towards the actual role(s) of companies in environments of fragmented governance. This 
provides new insights and food for thought for business managers that are, as governance takers 
and/or makers, intertwined with fragmented governance in their respective industrial sector. 
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Paper III: Research question 
This paper addresses the following overarching research question: 
RQ(III): How do companies affect and are affected by different manifestations of fragmented 
sustainability governance in the case of governance for gold? 
 
Paper III: Unit of analysis 
As the third paper puts the business firm in the spotlight of its research, the respective unit of 
analysis of Paper III refers to companies in their role as governance makers and takers and their 
interlinkages with governance fragmentation. 
 
Paper III: Contribution 
As its main contribution, Paper III provides a more fine-grained analysis of the interplay of 
companies (in their role(s) as governance makers and takers) and fragmented sustainability 
governance (in terms of different manifestations of fragmentation). To achieve this, the three-
tiered ordonomic framework by Pies and colleagues (Pies et al., 2010, 2014) is used as a 
searchlight to analyze and interpret the empirical findings. In particular, the manuscript delivers 
a fine-grained understanding of companies in terms of affecting and being affected by the 
fragmentation of governance at different stages of the three-tiered framework (rule-finding, 
rule-setting and rule-following). When doing so, the paper also provides a distinction of 
different manifestations of fragmentation – depending on the analytical location of 
fragmentation in the three-tiered framework. The third paper contributes to the wider scholarly 
debate on the political role of the business firm, particularly in a business ethics context. 
Furthermore, it argues for an ambivalent treatment of fragmentation. Corporate practitioners 
receive some stimulus to reflect their own position and actions in light of different 
manifestations of fragmentation and are encouraged to rethink the prevailing negative 
connotation of governance fragmentation.  
 
Paper III: Research design and methodology 
Paper III entails a comprehensive literature review and particularly draws on research from 
political science and business ethics to lay the foundation of the manuscript. Similar to Paper 
II, the third paper uses empirical insights from the global gold sector. Paper III incorporates 26 
semi-structured expert interviews with different actors from the gold sector, including company 
representatives and other parties like NGOs and researchers. While the interviews and 
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interviewees are identical with those used in Paper II, the individual papers focus on different 
questions and parts of the respective interviews. Therefore, each paper uses a different data set 
– despite working with identical interviews. Expert interviews were chosen because they help 
to explore the perspectives of companies as both governance makers and takers in an 
environment of fragmented sustainability governance. Similar to Paper II, the relevant 
interview data were manually coded and experienced a qualitative content analysis.  
 
3.1.4 Paper IV: Hidden allies for value chain responsibility? A system theory 
perspective on aligning sustainable supply chain management and trade 
compliance 
 
Paper IV: Motivation and research gap 
The fourth paper of this dissertation focuses on the interlinkages of the business firm with its 
changing, complex and demanding environment and respective internal corporate functions to 
take value chain responsibility in such an environment. Paper IV starts with the observation 
that companies are more and more supposed to take responsibility for negative sustainability 
effects affiliated with their upstream and downstream business operations (Busse et al., 2017; 
Kovács, 2008; Letizia & Hendrikse, 2016; Schrempf-Stirling & Palazzo, 2016). In more detail, 
these manifold requests to take responsibility are intertwined with increasingly complex and 
diverse stakeholder expectations in the firm’s environment (Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010; 
Harms et al., 2013). Most prominently, according to scholarly knowledge and business practice, 
the corporate function of sustainable supply chain management is in charge of taking care of 
the firm’s value chain responsibility. Yet, Paper IV argues that the additional and often-
overlooked corporate function of trade compliance is also delivering important VCR 
contributions. Surprisingly, so far, little is known about the interlinkages and potential synergies 
of SSCM and TC as two corporate functions to take VCR. Against this background, Paper IV 
elaborates on the potential functional alignment of SSCM and TC in a VCR context. 
 
Paper IV: Research question 
The fourth paper addresses the following overarching research question: 
RQ(IV): How can evolutionary system theory explain not only the co-evolution of two distinct 
VCR functions (SSCM and TC) but also the potential and challenges for their future alignment? 
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Paper IV: Units of analysis 
As its units of analysis, Paper IV focuses both on the interactions of the business firm with its 
environment (characterized by varying and changing stakeholder expectations) as well as the 
interlinkages between two internal corporate functions (SSCM and TC). 
 
Paper IV: Contribution 
This paper delivers at least four contributions. First, it contributes to the wider scholarly 
discussion of using evolutionary systems theory in a business management and organizational 
studies context (Cooren & Seidl, 2019; Luhmann, 2018). In particular, it applies this realm of 
theory to the universe of VCR and its interlinkages to SSCM and TC. Second, it puts the often-
overlooked function of trade compliance in the spotlight of our attention and into the scholarly 
debate on VCR and SSCM. This is particularly important and valuable, as so far, sustainable 
supply chain management represents the ‘default’ function for VCR and thus receives the lion’s 
share of scholarly attention. Third, the paper carves out potential synergies and challenges of a 
functional alignment of SSCM and TC to jointly take value chain responsibility. Last but not 
least, Paper IV provides stimulus for further research and food for thought for business 
managers by mapping a research agenda. In more detail, the paper introduces nine testable 
propositions to expand our understanding of a potential alignment of SSCM and TC.  
 
Paper IV: Research design and methodology 
In contrast to the first three papers of this dissertation, Paper IV uses an entirely conceptual 
reasoning approach to answer its research question and build its arguments. More precisely, 
this paper draws on theoretical foundations of evolutionary systems theory, particularly using 
the seminal contributions by the German sociologist and philosopher Niklas Luhmann 
(Luhmann, 2006; A. Schneider et al., 2017; Seidl & Becker, 2006; Thompson & Valentinov, 
2017). Evolutionary systems theory is used to understand both VCR related interactions 
between the firm and its environment as well as the co-existence of SSCM and TC to take VCR. 
Furthermore, insights from organizational path dependency are used to shed light on potential 
barriers of aligning SSCM and TC (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Wagner, Morton, 
Dainty, & Burns, 2011).  
 
 25 
3.2 Key findings of the four research papers 
I use this subsection to present selected key findings of the four individual papers of this 
dissertation. The subsequent section then elaborates on the integration of these findings based 
on the perspective of business management as well as on implications for business practitioners. 
 
3.2.1 Mapping the research, configurations of fragmented sustainability governance 
and management approaches 
The key findings of Paper I are structured according to its focus on the interdisciplinarity of the 
research on fragmented sustainability governance, the diversity of the phenomenon of 
fragmented sustainability governance and the toolbox of management approaches to cope with 
fragmented sustainability governance. The findings of Paper I stem from a descriptive and 
qualitative content analysis of 134 peer-reviewed scientific papers (hereafter called data set). 
First, considering the composition of the research on fragmented sustainability governance, 
Paper I reveals that the academic literature grows since 2013, takes place in various scientific 
journals and entails contributions from different scientific disciplines. Furthermore, the 
literature still mainly consists of qualitative studies as well as theoretical and conceptual studies, 
whereas quantitative studies and literature reviews are scarce. Considering the occurrence of 
scientific journals, Paper I found that the data set of 134 publications stems from 81 journals 
with a wide range of scientific backgrounds. More precisely, the two most prominent journals 
contribute eight publications each and 55 out of 81 journals provide only one publication 
respectively. An encompassing citation network analysis shows that the ten most commonly 
cited publications within the data set account for 45% of all citations in the citation network. In 
contrast, 25 out of 134 journal articles in the sample do not show any citation interlinkages.  
Considering the contributions of different scientific disciplines to the scholarly body of 
literature on fragmented sustainability governance, Paper I found that various scholarly 
disciplines are involved, yet the identified literature is clearly dominated by political science 
contributions. In more detail, 15 out of the 20 most often cited publications in the data set can 
be assigned to the realm of political science, while two belong to business and economics 
research and environmental studies respectively and one publication to law and legal studies. 
Although political science publications deliver valuable contributions to understand the 
multifaceted phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance, they provide only limited 
support to understand the interlinkages between the business firm and fragmented sustainability 
governance. This can partly be explained by the fact that studies in political science address a 
different and often more abstract level of analysis and predominantly do not consider the 
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(internal) perspective of the business firm in environments of fragmented sustainability 
governance. Furthermore, independent of the respective scientific discipline, 54 out of 134 
publications address the interlinkages between fragmented sustainability governance and the 
business firm. Thereof, the majority (31 out of 54) focuses on companies as governance makers 
whereas the minority (15) looks at companies as governance takers. Surprisingly, the dual role 
of companies as governance makers and takers is only addressed by five papers.  
Second, regarding the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance, Paper I carves out 
different dimensions of fragmented sustainability governance in order provide a more nuanced 
assessment. More precisely, the paper introduces the dimensions of ends, means, context, 
outcomes and actors which can all show variations of fragmentation. These variations of 
sustainability governance fragmentation are captured in a framework and discussed in more 
detail in Paper I. By doing so, the framework emphasizes that the actual dimensions of 
governance fragmentation are multifaceted and thus supports the initial assumption of this 
paper that the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance comes in many forms. In 
more concrete terms, sustainability governance can be fragmented regarding its ends (what is 
actually governed?), e.g. considering multiple or selected sustainability topics and dimensions, 
the means (how is governance provided?), e.g. referring to multiple governance instruments in 
light of soft, hard and hybrid governance approaches, as well as the context (where is 
sustainability governance provided?), e.g. considering geographic and sectoral differences of 
governance. Eventually, the outcome of sustainability governance (with what effect?) can be 
fragmented, e.g. considering differences in governance quality, effectiveness, maturity and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, Paper I emphasizes the fragmentation of different governance actors 
(governments, NGOs, companies, etc.) that contribute to the formation and fragmentation of 
sustainability governance.  
Third, Paper I derives an overview of different management approaches to deal with fragmented 
sustainability governance from the qualitative content analysis. Given the aforementioned 
multifaceted nature of fragmented sustainability governance, there is naturally no ‘silver bullet’ 
to manage it. Instead, Paper I derives three overarching categories of how governance makers 
can manage governance fragmentation: coordination, convergence & integration as well as 
meta governance. The management category of coordination leaves the ‘fragments’ of 
governance untouched and instead focuses on improving the interplay between them. In more 
detail, this entails instruments such as governance orchestration, agenda setting and 
complementary governance approaches. The findings reveal that orchestration (the indirect 
influence on the coordination of governance fragments via intermediaries) is most prominently 
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covered in the literature and mainly executed by governments and intergovernmental 
organizations. In contrast, the management category convergence & integration aims to change 
the existing governance fragments. This entails the altering, alignment or even merging of the 
content of governance, e.g. referring to sustainability schemes, standards, policies or laws. Last 
but not least, meta governance is identified as a field of management that provides the 
‘governance of governance’. In more concrete terms, meta governance provides guidance and 
rules for shaping sustainability governance, e.g. by providing standardized processes and 
quality criteria for setting sustainability standards (Bernstein & van der Ven, 2017).  
 
3.2.2 Exploring general and sector-specific factors that explain the fragmentation of 
sustainability governance in the global gold sector 
The key findings of Paper II cover the variety of explanatory factors that help us understand 
the emergence (and potential continuation) of fragmented sustainability governance in a single 
commodity sector. The findings of Paper II are based on a comprehensive literature review and 
a case study in the global gold sector.  
In a first step, Paper II derives general explanatory factors of sustainability governance 
fragmentation from the scholarly literature and conceptually assigns them to four overarching 
categories: contextual, intra-organizational, inter-organizational factors and the scope of 
sustainability governance. Here, contextual factors refer to the specific industry characteristics 
and existing regulations that might impact the prevailing (or absent) fragmentation of 
sustainability governance in a commodity sector. Intra-organizational factors for governance 
fragmentation refer to the internal interaction mechanisms within governance actors (most 
prominently multi-stakeholder initiatives) that shape the governance landscape in a commodity 
sector. This can inter alia refer to the member composition of a governance initiative as well as 
the given mission and the understanding of sustainability. In contrast, inter-organizational 
factors describe interaction mechanisms between independent governance actors, e.g. between 
different multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that are engaged in setting governance in a single 
sector. So far, the scholarly literature focuses on competition as an inter-organizational factor 
to explain the fragmentation of sustainability governance (Gulbrandsen, 2005; Meidinger, 
2011; Prado, 2013; Smith & Fischlein, 2010). In addition, the scope of governance refers inter 
alia to the addressed target group(s) and sustainability issue(s) of the respective governance 
approach.  
In a second step, Paper II then explores how these four general categories of factors are 
applicable in the empirical case of governance for gold and derives additional, sector-specific 
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factors that explain the fragmentation of sustainability governance in the gold sector. In more 
detail, Paper II reveals that, first, the unique characteristics of the gold sector manifest in 
specific governance needs which are addressed by multiple governance approaches in the form 
of sustainability schemes and standards (contextual factors). In particular, the value chain 
architecture of gold (e.g. regarding different buyer markets) and the inherent differentiation 
between large-scale mining (LSM) and artisanal mining (ASM) and their particularities (e.g. 
manifesting in different sustainability challenges) explain the multiplicity of different 
governance approaches. Paper II thus emphasizes the effects of the value chain architecture and 
its different stakeholder groups on governance fragmentation which has so far received little 
scholarly attention (see Manning, Boons, von Hagen, & Reinecke, 2012). In addition, the 
existence of key regulatory references for the sustainability schemes in the gold sector still 
allow a multiplicity and variation of the content of the schemes. Paper II argues that this could 
be explained by the vagueness and missing components of precisely these references. 
Second, the paper reveals that intra-organizational factors play an important role in explaining 
the fragmentation of governance for gold. In particular, the initiators and members of the 
governance setter, the differing organizational logics and ‘business models’, the understanding 
and conceptualization of sustainability (or responsibility) as well as the actual governance 
instruments impact the fragmentation of governance. These findings support previous studies 
on governance fragmentation in different commodity sectors (Bartley, 2007; Dingwerth & 
Pattberg, 2009; Manning & Reinecke, 2016) and simultaneously draw our attention to the rather 
novel aspect of different ‘business models’ of sustainability schemes in the gold sector. 
Furthermore, the paper suggests that intra-organizational factors might resemble distinct 
hurdles to align or streamline different governance approaches.  
Third, somewhat surprisingly, inter-organizational factors only provide limited power to 
explain the fragmentation of governance in the gold sector. The empirical findings suggest that 
competition over market shares between governance makers for gold only plays a neglectable 
role. Instead, governance makers in the gold sector are rather engaged in shaping a mutual 
vocabulary and previously operated in their individual niches. 
Fourth, considering the scope of governance, Paper II reveals that, similar to other sectors, the 
scope of governance is closely linked to a fragmentation of sustainability governance. In the 
case of gold, the wide range of content of different governance approaches can inter alia be 
explained by the great variety of sustainability challenges. The scope of governance varies e.g. 
regarding the separation between single and multi-commodity sustainability schemes as well 
as the different value chain coverage of sustainability schemes.  
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To illustrate and integrate these findings, Paper II introduces a conceptual framework which 
encapsulates both general and gold-specific factors for the fragmentation of sustainability 
governance in the gold sector.  
 
3.2.3 Introducing a more nuanced understanding of the interplay of fragmented 
sustainability governance and companies as governance makers and takers 
The key findings of Paper III cover different interlinkages between the business firm (as a 
potential governance maker and taker) and fragmented sustainability governance in the 
empirical case of the global gold sector. As a key finding, Paper III identifies three novel 
conceptualizations of governance fragmentation depending on the level of analysis: 
fragmentation as multiplicity of discourses and worldviews in the rule-finding stage, 
fragmentation as specialization of the content of governance in the rule-setting stage and 
fragmentation as dissipation of governance and resulting challenges in the rule-following stage. 
In more detail, the findings of Paper III reveal how companies in the global gold sector affect 
and are affected by different conceptualizations of fragmentation in the rule-finding, rule-
setting and rule-following stage.  
First, the findings of Paper III suggest that the role of companies as potential governance makers 
is important in the rule-finding discourse (meta-meta game). According to the empirical 
findings, multiple rule discourses exist that shape the rule-finding processes. This includes a 
wider societal/political discourse as well as a community discourse. The first discourse is 
composed of a variety of actors such as governmental bodies, civil society organizations, the 
media and further stakeholders, whereas the community discourse is embedded in and restricted 
to the mining and gold industry. Paper III suggests that companies are only to some extent 
contributing to the wider societal/political discourse and are rather dragged or pushed by 
external stakeholders to engage in this particular discourse. This can partially be explained by 
the ‘tradition’ of the gold and mining sector of being a ‘black box’ with few ties to a wider 
societal discourse. Regarding the community discourse, the findings suggest that (some) 
companies are indeed proactively engaged in a community discourse with the intention to shape 
the rule-finding discourse. Here, companies and business associations actively initiate 
roundtables, MSIs and other platforms to jointly discuss governance needs and wants for the 
gold sector.  
Second, the findings illustrate the engagement of companies in the rule-setting stage (meta 
game). Paper III thus reveals how companies in the gold sector are involved in collective and 
individual rule-setting approaches and shape the actual content of resulting governance 
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instruments (schemes, standards, principles, etc.). Considering collective rule-setting 
approaches, the findings show that companies are inter alia engaged in MSIs and consultation 
processes to develop the content of governance approaches. Furthermore, regarding individual 
rule-setting approaches, companies are actively providing firm-specific codes of conduct and 
closed supply chains which can particularly be seen at jewelry companies. These collective and 
individual rule-setting approaches then shape the actual content of the resulting governance 
instruments. Considering the scope, rigor and applicability, Paper III identifies a wide range of 
the content of governance approaches in the gold sector. In more detail, preliminary findings in 
the gold sector suggest a spectrum ranging from ‘best practices’ to ‘entry standards’ with 
minimum criteria.  
Third, in the rule-following stage (basic game), companies, in their role as governance takers, 
struggle with the availability of multiple sustainability governance approaches to regulate the 
extraction, processing and trading of gold. In more detail, the findings show that companies are 
experiencing a lack of orientation considering the landscape of sustainability governance 
instruments in the gold sector. Hence, the fragmentation of sustainability schemes makes it 
harder for the business firm to identify and choose the ‘right’ governance tool for its specific 
governance needs. Furthermore, the findings suggest that multi-commodity companies are 
particularly experiencing negative effects of fragmented governance in the basic game. This 
refers particularly to multi-commodity mining and manufacturing companies. In addition, the 
findings show that, once a company has found its sustainability scheme(s), the handling of the 
scheme(s) becomes a resource-intensive and challenging endeavor and can e.g. result in a so-
called ‘audit fatigue’. 
Building on these empirical findings, Paper III expands the three-tiered framework by Pies and 
colleagues (2010, 2014) and provides a more fine-grained analysis of the interplay of 
companies with fragmented sustainability governance. The findings and conceptual reasoning 
in Paper III emphasize that, in the meta-meta game, companies need to cope with two separate 
discourse arenas (societal/political and community discourse) and their respective ‘languages’, 
expectations and stakeholders. In the meta game, companies create specific governance 
approaches for their specific governance needs via collective and/or individual governance 
instruments and, as a consequence, create numerous sustainability schemes. Last but not least, 
in the basic game, companies are confronted with business management challenges caused by 
the prevailing fragmentation of sustainability governance. Against this background, Paper III 
provides some initial thoughts on harmonization, interoperability and commodity unspecific 
governance approaches to decrease potential negative effects of governance fragmentation in 
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the basic game. Yet, these promising solutions need to be implemented in the meta and meta-
meta game in order to resolve negative effects of governance fragmentation in the basic game. 
The paper carves out the importance of feedback mechanisms between the different stages of 
rule-finding, rule-setting and rule-following in order to prevent or minimize negative effects 
for involved companies.  
 
3.2.4 Environmental complexity, corporate functions to take VCR, synergies of 
functional alignment and organizational barriers 
The key findings of Paper IV address the complexity of stakeholder expectations in the firm’s 
environment, the separation of corporate structures in the context of value chain responsibility 
and the specialization of corporate functions to take VCR. As Paper IV resembles a conceptual 
paper, its findings are based on the application of theoretical perspectives and conceptual 
reasoning. Furthermore, Paper IV uses illustrative examples from business practice to support 
its argumentation. 
In a first step, Paper IV applies a Luhmannian systems theory perspective (Cooren & Seidl, 
2019; Luhmann, 2018) in order to elaborate on the relationship between the business firm (as a 
system) and its environment. Regarding the latter, Paper IV emphasizes the rising complexity 
of the firm’s external environment, particularly considering the manifold stakeholder 
expectations a firm has to cope with. Furthermore, in line with systems theory, Paper IV argues 
that the firm (as a closed and simultaneously open system) has to translate external complexity 
into internal complexity (A. Schneider et al., 2017). In more concrete terms, the paper 
elaborates on how two distinct corporate functions with their respective structural entities 
(departments, teams, etc.) emerged to address specific expectations of the complex environment 
of the firm and mirror external complexity with internal complexity: The function of sustainable 
supply chain management emerged to address specific stakeholder expectations, e.g. regarding 
aspects like working conditions in the extended value chain or issues of environmental 
pollution. In more detail, the function of SSCM responds to stakeholder concerns to take care 
of sustainability challenges associated with the firm’s value chain (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 
2009; Gold et al., 2010; Harms et al., 2013). Likewise, the function of trade compliance (TC) 
emerged to address selected stakeholder expectations, e.g. regarding the trade of dual-use items, 
compliance with international trade obligations and supply chain security. 
As a key finding, Paper IV compares the corporate functions SSCM and TC and carves out 
their differences. The paper identifies key differences of both functions regarding the historical 
origin of the function, critical incidents for its development, the specific contribution of the 
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function to support the VCR capability of the firm, important stakeholders of the function, the 
type of applied governance (soft law vs. hard law) as well as exemplary structures that host the 
function. As an example, SSCM was initially triggered by civil society actors and consumers 
and rather followed a soft law governance logic, whereas TC was requested by governments, 
customs and regulatory bodies and thus rather followed a hard law logic. Against this 
background, Paper IV reveals that SSCM and TC, as separate functions, focus on distinct VCR 
aspects and can therefore be framed as ‘hidden allies for value chain responsibility’.  
In a second step, the paper argues that, considering the evolutionary aspect of systems theory, 
SSCM and TC are more and more dealing with overlapping or ‘hard to pin down’ sustainability 
or VCR challenges. In more detail, Paper IV argues that current changes in the business firm’s 
environment suggest to rethink the separation of SSCM and TC. It is reasoned that it becomes 
difficult to clearly assign certain sustainability challenges to a single corporate function. This 
challenge of functional assignment can e.g. occur with regard to human rights violations or 
conflict minerals. Furthermore, the paper suggests that the clear separation into soft law and 
hard law governance approaches does also not hold true anymore: While SSCM aspects 
experience a ‘hardening of soft law’, TC aspects, on the contrary, now also experience soft law 
governance. Following this line of thought, the paper encourages to think about potential 
avenues for a functional alignment of SSCM and TC.  
In a nutshell, the paper argues that the rising complexity in the firm’s environment (challenges 
of functional assignment, blurry boundaries between governance logics, interdependencies 
between sustainability dimensions, etc.) requires to rethink and change the internal complexity 
within the firm. Although systems theory suggests that changes in external complexity would 
sooner or later result in internal changes in the system, real-life observations show that the 
business firm cannot restructure its organizational structures ‘from scratch’. Instead, Paper IV 
argues that the capability of the firm to change (e.g. fostering a functional alignment of SSCM 
and TC) depends on corporate decisions in the past: history matters.  
In a third step, the paper therefore works with the concept of organizational path dependencies 
(Sydow et al., 2009) to carve out distinct hurdles that might impede an alignment of SSCM and 
TC. In more detail, three system structures are identified which represent barriers for the 
internal alignment of SSCM and TC to jointly take value chain responsibility. Institutional 
structures with their respective routines or rules might complicate the synergistic cooperation 
or even integration of separate functions. Normative and professional barriers might also 
represent hurdles for an alignment, because different professional backgrounds in the SSCM 
 33 
and TC function prevail. Closely related, differences in organizational culture could resemble 
barriers for an alignment.  
Fourth, Paper IV develops a research agenda with testable propositions to assess the 
relationship of the firm with its environment as well as options and barriers for an internal 
functional alignment of SSCM and TC.  
 
3.3 Integration of findings and managerial implications 
This section serves to integrate the aforementioned key findings of the four papers of this 
dissertation and thus expands our understanding of how companies can take value chain 
responsibility in a complex, fragmented and changing business environment. In order to do so, 
this section integrates the findings from a business management perspective and introduces a 
tentative framework (Figure 3) to capture and display the interlinkages between the findings of 
the four papers. Furthermore, this section discusses selected implications for business 
practitioners. In more detail, the integrative framework distinguishes between an outside-in and 
an inside-out perspective and draws our attention to the importance of partnerships. As a key 
element, this section emphasizes how changes in the firm’s environment, resulting from 
fragmented sustainability governance and stakeholder expectations, might impact internal 
management practices. 
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Figure 3 Integration of selected key findings and respective managerial implications. The conceptual depiction 
shows some selected tentative relations between the revealed findings and derived managerial implications, but 
does not claim any outright causal effects between the illustrated elements  
 
3.3.1 Outside-in perspective 
 
A) Given its multifaceted nature and contextual dependency, sustainability governance 
fragmentation can be considered as an ambivalent phenomenon 
Paper I, II and III in this dissertation emphasize that the fragmentation of sustainability 
governance is not a “monolithic phenomenon but instead comes in many forms” 
(Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019, para. 9). As a key finding and contribution, Paper I 
therefore provides an initial conceptual framework of different configurations of fragmented 
sustainability governance, whereas Paper II carves out different drivers to explain the 
emergence of the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance in a single commodity 
sector. Furthermore, both papers argue that the fragmentation of sustainability governance can 
be an inherent feature of governance and might to some extent prevail (Heidingsfelder, 2019; 
Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019; Kalfagianni, 2014; van Asselt & Zelli, 2014). Against this 
background, this dissertation provides a more nuanced understanding of fragmented 
sustainability governance and aims to overcome the widespread negative perception of 
fragmented sustainability governance (Fransen, 2011; Isailovic et al., 2013; Kotze, 2014; 
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Reinecke et al., 2012; Thauer, 2015; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013). In more detail, the findings of 
this dissertation emphasize that potential negative and/or positive effects of governance 
fragmentation strongly depend on the level of analysis and the contextual factors (Paper II & 
III). But what does this mean for business management?  
A key implication is that companies are advised to pay close attention to the phenomenon of 
fragmented sustainability governance. This dissertation thus provides valuable guidance for 
business managers to approach the multifaceted phenomenon of fragmented sustainability 
governance. As Paper III shows, there can be considerable challenges for the firm if it has to 
run its value creation and VCR activities in an environment characterized by fragmented 
sustainability governance, such as regulatory confusion or an overburden of handling multiple 
sustainability schemes and audits. However, seen from another perspective, governance 
fragmentation can lead to positive effects, e.g. when companies can create specific governance 
approaches for their specific needs or choose from a variety of standards to achieve the ‘best 
fit’. Furthermore, a fragmentation of governance does not necessarily lead to overall lower or 
less ambitious governance approaches – on the contrary, governance fragmentation could e.g. 
lead to ‘baseline standards’ for companies that just enter pathways of more sustainable or 
responsible business conduct as well as quite ambitious ‘front runner’ standards for companies 
that already have ambitious sustainability practices in place (Paper III). Fragmentation could 
even lead to governance innovations and the avoidance of monopolistic governance structures 
(Keohane & Victor, 2011; Widerberg & Pattberg, 2015). In a nutshell, building awareness 
amongst business practitioners for the multifaceted nature of fragmented sustainability 
governance is a key prerequisite to find adequate management answers to it.  
Coming back to the conceptual background on fragmented sustainability governance (Section 
2), this dissertation emphasizes that companies (willingly or not) are increasingly becoming 
governance makers who set the ‘rules of the game’ for their business operations, often in 
cooperation with civil society and/or governmental bodies. Yet, given the oftentimes negative 
connotation of governance fragmentation, companies might be reluctant to engage in 
governance processes. Therefore, as a food for thought, I encourage business practitioners to 
rather work with notions like governance co-creation/co-production (see Arnold, 2017; see 
Lund, 2018; see Miller & Wyborn, 2018), participatory governance or collaborative governance 
(Florini & Pauli, 2018; Lee, Mellahi, Mol, & Pereira, 2019; Moratis, 2016) for addressing 
sustainability challenges affiliated with value creation activities. By doing so, companies might 
be more motivated and willing to proactively engage in shaping governance.  
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B) Receiving guidance from the interdisciplinary scholarly literature should go hand in hand 
with establishing and cultivating knowledge management systems to develop management 
approaches for dealing with fragmented sustainability governance 
Paper I reveals that the academic literature on fragmented sustainability governance is 
multidisciplinary and takes place in various scientific disciplines – but with a clear dominance 
of political science contributions (Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019). Contributions from 
business and economics research are rather scarce. Furthermore, the multifaceted interlinkages 
of companies with fragmented sustainability governance still need further elaboration and 
explanation. Paper II and III therefore provide distinct contributions to deepen our 
understanding of how fragmented sustainability governance is shaped and how companies 
affect and are affected by fragmented governance.  
Coming back to the interdisciplinary character of the literature and the spreading across 
different disciplines and academic journals (Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019), it remains a 
key challenge for corporate practitioners to navigate the complex and multifaceted body of 
scholarly literature on fragmented sustainability governance and to find the respective piece of 
information. With its mapping of the scholarly literature, Paper I provides an initial ‘map’ for 
corporate practitioners to navigate the scholarly knowledge on the phenomenon of fragmented 
sustainability governance. Nevertheless, it remains a challenging task for business practitioners 
to translate and adapt the scholarly knowledge to their specific business operations and 
management tasks.  
Moreover, corporate practitioners naturally depend on various additional sources of 
information to guide their management practices. Companies that are experiencing (negative) 
effects of fragmented sustainability governance at their value chain operations will presumably 
not consult the oftentimes inaccessible scholarly literature and instead refer to existing 
knowledge and action patterns, industry guidelines or the practices of their value chain partners 
or competitors. Having said that, providing a roadmap of the scholarly knowledge is certainly 
a valuable contribution for business managers. Yet, it does not diminish the necessity and 
importance of a well-functioning knowledge and information system within the business firm 
(Abubakar, Elrehail, Alatailat, & Elci, 2019; Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Iskandar, Jambak, Kosala, 
& Prabowo, 2017; Wang & Wang, 2016). Therefore, I encourage business practitioners who 
are coping with the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance in their business 
context to a) dare to dive into the scholarly literature and b) likewise install or expand and 
cultivate a firm-specific or value chain specific knowledge management system to guide 
business decisions in regard of fragmented sustainability governance. In more concrete terms, 
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this could e.g. entail process descriptions for choosing and/or handling multiple sustainability 
schemes as well as internal policies on how to engage in rule-finding discourses and actual 
standard-setting processes (e.g. via MSIs). This might particularly pay off for multi-commodity 
companies that are engaged in numerous governance activities.  
In a nutshell, companies are advised to refer both to the scholarly literature and their respective 
knowledge management system(s) to allow informed operational and strategic decisions in 
business environments characterized by fragmented sustainability governance.  
 
C) In order to find responses to changes in the firm’s external environment, companies are 
advised to pay increased attention to (novel) stakeholders and their expectations  
All four papers of this dissertation highlight how changes in the firm’s environment affect the 
business firm, its value creation activities and its capability to take VCR. In more detail, Paper 
I, II and III emphasize how the fragmentation of sustainability governance is increasingly 
becoming a key feature of the firm’s regulatory environment. Furthermore, Paper IV highlights 
how a wide range of stakeholder expectations on VCR increases the complexity of the firm’s 
environment. In particular, Paper IV shows how these VCR expectations overlap and are 
difficult to assign to a distinct internal corporate function (e.g. sustainable supply chain 
management or trade compliance). In all four papers, the rising complexity of the firm’s 
environment is linked to the expectations and actions of different stakeholder groups that impact 
the firm’s scope of action. For instance, additional sustainability schemes created by civil 
society groups and competitors might require a response by the firm (e.g. joining the 
governance approach, starting an individual one or coping with the consequences of neglecting 
it). Furthermore, stakeholders at the outer edges of the value chain (e.g. consumers and raw 
material suppliers) might bring new topics and respective expectations ‘on the table’ which so 
far were not on the radar of the firm, e.g. considering aspects of conflict minerals or working 
conditions far down the value chain (see Paper IV). Eventually, these changes in complexity 
and stakeholder expectations require internal changes within the business firm (A. Schneider et 
al., 2017; Thompson & Valentinov, 2017), e.g. regarding internal organizational structures, 
functions, routines and the allocation of corporate resources, mandates and authority.  
In a nutshell, this dissertation draws our attention to the interlinkages between rising external 
complexity of the firm (particularly considering its regulatory environment) and the firm’s 
stakeholders. Thus, a key managerial implication is that the importance of external stakeholders 
for the firm’s internal capability to run its value creation activities and take VCR in changing 
environments cannot be overemphasized. Referring to existing studies and conceptualizations 
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of stakeholder theory (Ackermann & Eden, 2011; Bryson, 2004; Stieb, 2009), this dissertation 
encourages business practitioners to take respective stakeholders into account when finding 
internal responses to external increases in complexity.  
 
D) Changes in the external environment (governance fragmentation & stakeholder 
expectations) call for internal changes and change management 
As illustrated in the preceding aspect C, a key managerial implication of this thesis is that 
companies need to find adequate internal solutions to changes in the external environment of 
the firm (particularly considering the fragmentation of sustainability governance and the 
changes in stakeholders’ VCR expectations). In more detail, Paper IV argues that a functional 
alignment of two, oftentimes structurally separated, corporate functions (SSCM and TC) could 
help the business firm to take value chain responsibility more effectively and efficiently. In 
addition, Paper I emphasizes the importance of management approaches a firm can internally 
use to cope with fragmented sustainability governance. Closely related, Paper III reveals how 
companies as governance takers might struggle with fragmented governance and hence need to 
employ operational practices. Building on these observations, this dissertation calls for internal 
management responses to challenges in the firm’s environment. Or, put differently, there is a 
need for internal change in light of fragmented sustainability governance and increasing VCR 
expectations. Thus, the notion of internal change management (Rosenbaum, More, & Steane, 
2018; see Todnem By, 2005; see Vora, 2013) offers a worthwhile field of action for the firm.  
In particular, one key change management aspect could be to rethink the current internal 
structural organization of the firm to respond to VCR expectations. This is discussed in more 
detail in Paper IV. In addition, companies are well advised to understand the effects of the novel 
role of the firm as a potential governance maker for their business conduct (Paper III). Starting 
from these observations, multiple questions emerge: How should the firm organize its internal 
responses to VCR expectations? Is there a need to reorganize internal structures of the firm and 
if so, in which direction and form? How should authorities, mandates and decision processes 
be changed in light of changing VCR expectations and fragmented sustainability governance 
in the firm’s regulatory environment? Who should be responsible for fulfilling a potential 
political role in the firm and represent the firm as a governance maker? Which professional 
backgrounds and competences are needed to successfully cope with the outlined changes in the 
firm’s environment? Given these questions, companies will presumably need to conduct 
internal changes with the help of change management tools. Furthermore, companies will likely 
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face internal hurdles when striving for change which can e.g. be explained by path dependencies 
in the firm (Sydow et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2011) as illustrated in Paper IV. 
 
3.3.2 Inside-out perspective 
 
E) A management toolbox for coping with fragmented sustainability governance is derived but 
needs further refining and adaptation to corporate needs and capabilities 
Paper I provides an overview and categorization of management approaches (coordination, 
convergence & integration and meta governance) which can be used by governance makers to 
proactively deal with unwanted and negative effects of fragmented sustainability governance 
(Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019). In more detail, the management toolbox provides 
instruments to all types of governance makers such as governments, civil society organizations 
and also companies. Hence, the management toolbox offers initial guidance for companies on 
how to proactively cope with negative effects of fragmented governance in their role as 
governance makers. However, the majority of the identified management tools are so far 
primarily tailored for and used by governmental bodies, NGOs and international organizations 
(Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019). Although companies are now equipped with an initial 
guidance to address fragmented sustainability governance, they still need to translate and 
potentially adapt those instruments to their specific corporate needs and capabilities. 
Furthermore, the toolbox focuses on governance makers. Therefore, companies which are still 
greatly functioning as governance takers need to find additional management instruments to 
cope with downsides of governance fragmentation in their role as governance takers, e.g. 
considering the handling of multiple sustainability schemes or an overwhelming burden of 
audits (Heidingsfelder, 2019). To complicate matters further, successful management 
instruments need to be adjusted to the configuration of fragmented sustainability governance 
(Paper I) in the respective context of the business firm.  
Against this background, companies are encouraged to refer to existing management 
instruments and routines in other business contexts (e.g. considering supply chain management 
practices) to further develop and ‘customize’ their very own set of management instruments to 
deal with fragmented sustainability governance. Put differently, firms can foster the intra-firm 
transfer of knowledge and best practices to cope with the rather novel phenomenon of 
fragmented sustainability governance (see Spraggon & Bodolica, 2012; see van Wijk, Jansen, 
& Lyles, 2008). Again, the ability to manage knowledge within the firm is of great importance 
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and an adequate knowledge management system can help to store and provide guidance for 
management approaches to deal with governance fragmentation.  
 
F) Linking the dual role of companies as governance makers and takers with aspects of 
strategic and operational management 
Paper I, II and III employ the distinction of companies as potential governance makers and 
takers (Beckmann et al., 2014; Eberlein et al., 2014; Scherer et al., 2014) and their possible 
interlinkages with fragmented sustainability governance. Yet, the challenging question remains 
how to connect these two roles to aspects of operational and strategic business management. 
This section therefore elaborates on selected linkages between the role of governance taker and 
operational management and between governance maker and strategic management, 
respectively.  
Starting with the perspective of governance making, Paper III argues that companies, in their 
role as governance makers, can be engaged in multiple discourses to influence rule-finding 
processes (which issues and topics require regulation?) for their respective value creation 
activities and sustainability challenges. On the one hand, this might resemble a charming 
possibility for business firms because the engagement in rule-finding processes offers 
considerable leverage on the resulting (or missing) rule-setting processes. In other words, 
companies could proactively use the possibility to engage in rule-finding discourses to put their 
topics and issues on the agenda. Hence, the engagement of the firm in rule-finding discourses 
can be linked to the strategic management of the business firm, as companies can use this 
engagement to impact governance in the long run and thus shape the ‘rules of the game’ 
according to the firm’s interests. On the other hand, it remains questionable if a) the majority 
of companies is willing to actually engage in rule-finding processes – as this might inter alia 
imply a need for more transparency and opening up to external stakeholders and potentially 
even competitors – and if b) companies are capable to simultaneously engage in different rule-
finding discourses, as this might include varying languages, cultural perspectives, values and 
assumptions in the respective discourse arenas (Heidingsfelder, 2019).  
Moreover, considering the actual development and implementation of sustainability 
governance approaches, Paper III emphasizes that companies can contribute to rule-setting 
processes, e.g. by engaging in individual and/or collective governance approaches. By doing 
so, companies can (at least to a certain degree) shape the resulting sustainability schemes and 
standards and match them with their respective governance needs or wants. Again, the 
engagement of companies in individual and/or collective rule-setting activities can be 
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considered as an important field of strategic management. Here, companies have to some degree 
the possibility to create or choose specific governance approaches for their respective 
governance needs which might considerably impact the firm’s ability to take value chain 
responsibility and successfully run its value creation activities (see Moratis, 2016). Companies 
are therefore encouraged to integrate both aspects of rule-finding and rule-setting engagements 
into their strategic agenda and thus allocate more importance and resources to these rather novel 
forms of engagement. Eventually, governance making could even resemble an element of 
gaining a competitive advantage which again emphasizes the relevance of governance making 
for strategical considerations in the firm.  
In addition, the potential integration of rule-finding and rule-setting engagements into strategic 
considerations of the business firm relates to the wider debate on a potential political role of the 
business firm (as outlined in Paper III). Given the engagement of companies in various forms 
of rule-finding and rule-setting activities, a key managerial implication of this dissertation is to 
rethink the actual role of the business firm. In more detail, this dissertation encourages business 
practitioners to add aspects of a political role of the firm (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Pies et al., 
2014; Rasche, 2012; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; Scherer et al., 2009; van Oosterhout, 2010; 
Whelan, 2012) into the organizational thinking and understanding of the firm. By doing so, 
practitioners might find more adequate ways to succeed and take VCR in light of (fragmented) 
sustainability governance.  
Regarding the firm’s role as a governance taker, Paper III shows how companies can face 
detrimental effects of fragmented sustainability governance for their conventional value 
creation activities as well as their capability to take value chain responsibility. In order to deal 
with negative effects of fragmented sustainability governance, companies need to understand 
the drivers behind governance fragmentation (which is covered for one commodity sector in 
Paper II). Moreover, they need to find and adapt instruments to cope with governance 
fragmentation, e.g. referring to structuring decision processes for choosing sustainability 
schemes or streamlining internal processes between different departments that are affected by 
sustainability governance requirements (e.g. the purchasing department and quality 
department). Hence, governance fragmentation can be considered a worthwhile field for 
operational management. However, although companies might be able to optimize and refine 
their operational management responses to fragmented sustainability governance in a rule-
following context, Paper III argues that long-term and fundamental improvements need to be 
found in the rule-finding and rule-setting processes. Therefore, companies are once again 
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encouraged to participate in precisely these processes and treat them as an issue of strategic 
management.  
 
3.3.3 Importance of partnerships 
 
G) Partnerships are essential to successfully take value chain responsibility in a complex and 
demanding environment 
So far, this dissertation primarily speaks of ‘the business firm’ and how it aims to take VCR in 
an environment characterized by manifold stakeholder expectations and fragmented 
sustainability governance. However, taking VCR does not take place in isolation – on the 
contrary: Firms are required to find adequate partners to jointly take value chain responsibility 
along their value chain operations. Metaphorically speaking, the capability of a single firm to 
take VCR is oftentimes impacted by the ‘weakest link’ in the chain, e.g. represented by a 
supplier far down the chain. Furthermore, as Paper I, II and III show, sustainability governance 
is shaped by a multitude of governance actors. If a company aims to shape governance 
according to the firm’s specific governance needs, it will oftentimes need to find supporters and 
partners to jointly achieve this in the rule-finding and rule-setting processes (Paper III). 
Likewise, the management of fragmented sustainability governance presumably requires the 
joint efforts of different actors, e.g. regarding the cooperation of companies with governmental 
bodies and civil society and/or even competitors. As Paper I highlights, the management 
category of orchestration requires precisely such a cooperation of different actor types.  
A key implication of this dissertation is that companies, on their journey to take VCR, are well 
advised to proactively use partnerships and cooperation practices with different actor groups 
(governments, civil society, value chain partners and maybe even competitors). By doing so, 
the business firm might be able to get access to additional resources, capabilities and skills and 
also receive or increase its legitimacy. Considering the shaping of sustainability governance in 
the rule-finding and rule-setting processes, companies might refer e.g. to the approach of 
strategic alliances (see Canzaniello, Hartmann, & Fifka, 2017; Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007; 
Lin, 2012) in order to coordinate their governance needs and preferences with peer companies 
and then jointly advocate for joint governance approaches. This could also imply to cooperate 
with competitors in the rule-finding and rule-setting processes in order to reach common rule 
interests and governance approaches for VCR aspects which relates to aspects of business 
coopetition (see Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; see Padula & Dagnino, 2007).  
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Furthermore, within the firm, partnerships and cooperation between different corporate 
functions and their respective structural units (teams, departments, etc.) are also important to 
successfully take VCR, as highlighted by Paper IV. It remains a key management challenge to 
foster internal partnerships and cooperation between the firm’s internal structural units to fulfill 
VCR expectations. A promising approach to improve this form of cooperation is the concept of 
communities of practice (CoP) (Corso, Giacobbe, & Martini, 2009; Forsten-Astikainen, 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, Lämsä, Heilmann, & Hyrkäs, 2017; Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 
2002). Essentially, the concept of CoP aims to offer platforms for exchange and tools for 
cooperation for business practitioners from various organizational departments or teams who 
share a common concern or goal. In the context of this dissertation, CoP could thus provide 
structured and systematic tools to bring together practitioners who want to cope with VCR 
challenges. Put differently, CoP resemble a promising approach to replace or complement 
incidental cooperation within the firm with intended cooperation.  
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4 Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
This dissertation advances our understanding of how companies can respond to value chain 
responsibility expectations in environments shaped by complexity, fragmented sustainability 
governance and changing stakeholder expectations. With the help of different methodological 
approaches and theory perspectives, the four individual papers of this dissertation provide 
distinct contributions and implications for business practitioners as outlined in the preceding 
sections. 
Furthermore, complementary to the individual contributions, this dissertation expands our 
knowledge on VCR in complex environments in the following ways: First, this dissertation 
emphasizes the need to rethink the role and organization of the business firm in light of 
increasing VCR expectations and changes in environmental complexity. This includes to take 
into consideration a potential political role of the business firm and the resulting tasks and 
responsibilities. To this end, this dissertation tightly links to the overall scholarly debate on the 
political role of the business firm. Simultaneously, this dissertation also contributes to the 
scholarly discussion on refining the role of the firm and its relationship with society (see 
Thompson & Valentinov, 2017). This dissertation also provides some food for thought to 
rethink traditional organizational structures to provide corporate functions to take VCR in an 
ever-changing and complex value chain environment. By doing so, it contributes to the 
emerging scholarly debate on ‘organizing for sustainability’ (Rasche, de Bakker, & Moon, 
2013). Second, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of partnerships and cooperation 
with external and internal stakeholders in order to take value chain responsibility in times of 
fragmented sustainability governance and changing stakeholder expectations. By doing so, it 
provides some stimulus e.g. for the scholarly discourse on stakeholder theory. Third, as 
indicated in the conceptual background, this dissertation is embedded in the greater discourse 
on corporate social responsibility and corporate responsibility. By following the notion of value 
chain responsibility, this dissertation deliberately focuses on the firm’s responsibility 
considering its value creation activities with partners along complex and multi-tier value chains. 
Thus, scholars and practitioners interested in CSR and CR can gain insights from this 
dissertation and its focus on VCR. Moreover, it contributes to the scholarly debate on 
connecting corporate social responsibility to aspects of governance and regulation (Arora, 
Kourula, & Phillips, 2019). Last but not least, this dissertation also emphasizes that terms like 
fragmentation or complexity, despite their oftentimes negative connotation, can also imply 
opportunities and positive effects – depending on the contextual settings. In this regard, this 
dissertation sheds more light on the ambivalence of fragmented sustainability governance.  
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Overall, this dissertation provides several key contributions for both academia and corporate 
practitioners. While these contributions expand our knowledge in the realm of VCR, 
fragmented sustainability governance and changes in stakeholder expectations, they 
simultaneously point out what we do not know. I therefore highlight four promising avenues 
for further research in the following paragraphs.  
 
The advancement of our understanding of value chain responsibility in a complex environment 
This dissertation sheds light on changes in the firm’s environment and their interlinkages to the 
firm’s VCR obligations and capabilities. As a key contribution, this dissertation analyzes 
factors that explain the fragmentation of sustainability governance in the particular case of the 
gold sector (Paper II) and how companies interact with governance fragmentation in their roles 
as governance makers and takers (Paper III). While these contributions offer important insights, 
they are not directly applicable to other industrial sectors beyond the gold sector. Therefore, I 
suggest further research on a) the drivers of governance fragmentation in other commodity 
sectors and b) the analysis of the interlinkages of companies with fragmented sustainability 
governance across different sectors and branches. This could be achieved by conducting further 
empirical and cross-case studies.  
Adding to this, Paper IV draws our attention on changes in the firm’s environment and on how 
different internal corporate functions (SSCM and TC) might be affected by these changes. 
Given its theoretical and conceptual nature, Paper IV does not provide any empirical insights. 
Therefore, I encourage researchers to elaborate on potential synergies of SSCM and TC to 
jointly take value chain responsibility in a real-life context. This could be done by conducting 
expert interviews with SSCM and TC professionals in different companies as well as with the 
help of field research (e.g. using shadowing techniques or observations).  
 
The question of competences 
The four individual contributions explore how changes in the firm’s environment (particularly 
fragmented sustainability governance and changing stakeholder expectations) are intertwined 
with the notion of value chain responsibility. Building on these insights, this dissertation 
suggests that companies and their leaders, managers and employees might require novel 
competences (or bundles of competences) in order to successfully run corporate value creation 
operations and take VCR. This claim becomes most comprehensible when considering the dual 
role of companies as both governance takers and makers in light of (fragmented) sustainability 
governance. As companies are traditionally not perceived as political actors by default, to the 
 46 
best of my knowledge, little is known about the necessary organizational and personal 
competences the firm and its employees need in order to fulfill the novel role as a governance 
maker. Further research is therefore needed to explore the organizational and personal 
competences which are required for this novel role. Likewise, little is known about the needed 
competences to manage or cope with fragmented sustainability governance from the 
perspective of the firm as a governance taker (see Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; see Ewert & 
Maggetti, 2016). In order to do so, I encourage peer researchers to use explorative qualitative 
approaches, e.g. in the form of expert interviews with corporate practitioners at different 
hierarchy levels and across different business sectors. Furthermore, longitudinal studies seem 
promising, as they might help to explore the development (or variation) of organizational and 
personal competences over time, e.g. considering the long-time engagement of a firm in a multi-
stakeholder initiative. Exploring potential competences of the business firm in a VCR and 
governance context can build on existing scholarly contributions on corporate competences 
(e.g. Osagie, Wesselink, Blok, Lans, & Mulder, 2016; Osagie, Wesselink, Blok, & Mulder, 
2019; Osagie, Wesselink, Runhaar, & Mulder, 2018; Pies et al., 2010).  
 
The quest for theoretical advancements 
As a distinct contribution, this dissertation applies insights and concepts from a Luhmannian 
evolutionary systems theory perspective (Cooren & Seidl, 2019; Luhmann, 2018) to the realm 
of value chain responsibility and respective corporate functions and structures to take VCR 
(Paper IV). By doing so, this dissertation aims to further position the seminal contributions on 
systems theory by Niklas Luhmann in the business, economics and organizational studies 
scholarly community. Considering the other three papers (I, II & III), insights from political 
studies, social sciences and business and economics research are employed to understand facets 
of the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance and its interlinkages with the 
business firm. Yet, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no sophisticated and widely accepted 
theory to frame and research fragmented sustainability governance. Against this background, I 
call for research to further develop theoretical insights regarding the phenomenon of 
fragmented sustainability governance and in particular the role of business firms in 
environments of fragmented governance. When doing so, it might resemble a worthwhile 
journey to consider aspects of evolutionary systems theory to better understand this 
phenomenon. Furthermore, the theory branch of complexity theory might also be a valuable 
point of departure (see Anderson, Meyer, Eisenhardt, Carley, & Pettigrew, 1999; Brodbeck, 
2002; M. Schneider & Somers, 2006).  
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In addition, all four papers highlight changes in the firm’s environment and how they eventually 
relate to VCR, business conduct and internal practices within the firm (e.g. considering the 
structural and functional organization to cope with VCR expectations). Thus, I suggest to use 
insights from contingency theory to further research the outlined field of interest of this 
dissertation (Husted, 2000; van De Ven, Ganco, & Hinings, 2013; P. Williams, Ashill, & 
Naumann, 2017). Aspects of contingency theory offer a promising searchlight because they 
draw our attention to environmental conditions and how they might impact the organization 
and scope of action of the business firm.  
 
The engagement of business and economics scholars 
This dissertation builds upon various streams of literature, including, but not limited to, political 
science, business, economics and management studies, social sciences, organizational studies, 
systems thinking as well as business ethics literature. Yet, considering the findings in Paper I, 
this dissertation emphasizes that business and economics scholars have so far shown rather little 
interest for the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance. Instead, political science 
scholars provide the lion’s share of scholarly contributions to understand this phenomenon. 
Although political science scholars provide valuable contributions, they often focus on a rather 
abstract level of analysis and neglect the role of the business firm and its specific (management) 
questions when operating its business and VCR activities in light of fragmented governance 
(Heidingsfelder & Beckmann, 2019). Therefore, I invite scholars from the business and 
economics community to incorporate aspects of fragmented sustainability governance and its 
linkages to the business firm into their research agenda. Doing so might resemble a first step to 
provide guidance for corporate practitioners to successfully cope with fragmented governance.  
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6 Extended Abstract 
Considering severe sustainability challenges resulting from business conduct, companies are 
increasingly expected to take responsibility for the negative social, ecological and economic 
effects related to their value creation activities. In this dissertation, corporate efforts to cope 
with sustainability challenges related to value creation activities are summarized under the 
notion of value chain responsibility (VCR). Yet, value chain responsibility is not taking place 
in a vacuum. Instead, this dissertation emphasizes that aspects of VCR take place in a value 
chain context characterized by complexity and constant change. In particular, two phenomena 
are important in this regard: the fragmentation of sustainability governance and the changing 
VCR expectations of stakeholders. Fragmented sustainability governance describes the complex 
regulatory environment in which business firms operate their value creation activities and VCR 
efforts. Changing stakeholder expectations describe how stakeholders in the firm’s 
environment are increasingly drawing the firm’s attention to (novel) sustainability topics and 
challenges which require adequate responses. Furthermore, these two phenomena have 
considerable interlinkages to the firm’s internal management practices and organization and 
thus represent two worthwhile fields of business management research. Against this 
background, the overarching objective of this paper-based dissertation is to expand our 
understanding how companies can take value chain responsibility in environments shaped by 
complexity, fragmented sustainability governance and changing stakeholder expectations.  
To achieve this, this dissertation builds on the findings and contributions of four individual 
papers: Paper I starts with the premise that, in order to proactively cope with (negative) effects 
of fragmented sustainability governance, companies need guidance. Therefore, Paper I provides 
an initial ‘mapping’ of the scholarly literature on the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability 
governance and its interlinkages with the firm. In order to achieve this, Paper I uses a systematic 
literature review consisting of 134 peer-reviewed journal publications as well as a citation 
network analysis to find out more about the composition of the research. Simultaneously, Paper 
I uses the content of the identified publications to derive a conceptual framework of the 
multifaceted phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance as well as to introduce a 
preliminary overview of management tools to cope with fragmented governance. 
Paper II suggests that, in order to be able to deal with fragmented sustainability governance in 
a particular industrial sector, business practitioners first need to understand the drivers and 
reasons behind the emergence of a fragmented governance landscape. Therefore, Paper II 
derives general explanatory factors from a literature review that help us understand the 
emergence of fragmented sustainability governance. With the help of an encompassing case 
study and 26 in-depth expert interviews, Paper II explores the drivers of governance 
fragmentation in the empirical case of the global gold sector. As a key contribution, Paper II 
introduces a conceptual framework which contextualizes general and gold-specific explanatory 
factors for governance fragmentation.  
Paper III starts with the premise that companies are nowadays also actively shaping the ‘rules 
of the game’ of business conduct and value chain responsibility in their novel role as 
governance makers. Companies could thus presumably not only be affected by fragmented 
sustainability governance but instead also contribute to this fragmentation or multiplicity of 
governance in the first place. In more detail, Paper III explores how companies are affected by 
and affect the fragmentation of sustainability governance in the empirical case of the global 
gold sector. By doing so, the paper employs the conceptual framework by Pies, Beckmann and 
Hielscher (Pies et al., 2010, 2014) that distinguishes between the stages of rule-finding, rule-
setting and rule-following as a searchlight for analysis. 
Paper IV leaves the realm of fragmented sustainability governance. It focuses on changing 
stakeholder expectations in the firm’s external environment and on how these changes might 
require internal changes within the firm. As a conceptual paper, Paper IV uses insights from a 
Luhmannian evolutionary systems theory perspective to understand how VCR changes in the 
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firm’s environment might require internal structural changes. In particular, Paper IV provides 
some arguments for a functional alignment of the corporate functions sustainable supply chain 
management (SSCM) and trade compliance (TC) to jointly take value chain responsibility. 
Simultaneously, Paper IV draws on insights of organizational path dependency to illustrate 
potential barriers of such an alignment.  
Considering the integration of the research findings and managerial implications, this 
dissertation emphasizes that first, business practitioners are required to develop a more 
profound understanding of the ambivalent phenomenon of fragmented sustainability 
governance. Second, although companies are now equipped with an initial ‘map’ for the 
literature on fragmented sustainability governance, they still need to adapt general management 
tools to deal with governance fragmentation to their specific contextual settings and incorporate 
additional sources of knowledge and best practices beyond academia. Here, the dissertation 
emphasizes the importance of intra-firm knowledge exchange and a knowledge management 
system. Third, all four papers of this dissertation highlight the importance of external 
stakeholders for the firm’s ability to take VCR along its value chain. Hence, this dissertation 
once again emphasizes the importance of taking stakeholders’ expectations into account. 
Fourth, in light of considerable changes in the firm’s environment, the firm will need to respond 
internally with changes in its functional and structural organization. Fifth, this dissertation 
provides some stimulus on linking the novel role of governance making to strategical 
considerations of the business firm, e.g. considering the strategic engagement in rule-finding 
discourses and rule-setting activities (e.g. via multi-stakeholder initiatives). Sixth, 
understanding value chain responsibility as a joint effort of value chain actors, this dissertation 
emphasizes the importance of partnerships between the business firm and its value chain 
partners and third parties to successfully take VCR. This could even entail the cooperation with 
competitors. Likewise, the importance of internal partnerships and cooperation of different 
corporate functions such as SSCM and TC is highlighted as a prerequisite to take VCR.  
Overall, this dissertation provides distinct contributions to the scholarly community. This 
includes, but is not limited to, the wider scholarly discussion on the political role of the firm, 
business ethics studies, management studies, political science as well as systems theory, 
organizational studies, sustainable supply chain management scholarship and the literature on 
trade compliance. Naturally, given its focus on value chain responsibility, this dissertation also 
provides some assets to the greater academic field of corporate social responsibility, corporate 
responsibility and corporate sustainability. Having said that, this dissertation also provides four 
promising avenues for further research: First, considering our understanding of value chain 
responsibility in a complex environment, I suggest additional research on a) the drivers of 
sustainability governance fragmentation in other commodity sectors beyond the researched 
gold sector and b) the analysis of the interlinkages of companies with fragmented sustainability 
governance across different sectors and branches. Second, regarding the role of organizational 
and personal competences to thrive in an environment of fragmented governance and complex 
stakeholder expectations, I call for further research to explore the organizational and personal 
competences which are needed to fulfill the novel role of the firm as a governance maker. 
Likewise, more research is required to understand the needed competences to manage or cope 
with fragmented sustainability governance from the perspective of the firm as a governance 
taker. Third, regarding the availability of theoretical foundations, I encourage researchers to 
develop further theoretical insights regarding the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability 
governance and in particular the role of business firms in environments of fragmented 
governance. Fourth, considering the role of business management research, I invite scholars 
from the business and economics community to incorporate aspects of fragmented 
sustainability governance and its linkages to the business firm into their research agenda. Doing 
so might resemble a first step to provide guidance for corporate practitioners to successfully 
cope with fragmented governance. 
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Abstract
To address global sustainability challenges, adequate governance solutions are needed.
Yet, sustainability governance is typically fragmented. This fragmentation poses a key
challenge for practitioners and researchers and receives growing scholarly attention
in different academic disciplines. So far, however, these research streams are missing
a comprehensive mapping of the scholarly work on fragmented sustainability gover-
nance. While this lack of knowledge consolidation inhibits further academic learning,
it also fails to provide corporate actors with practical guidance about the interplay
between firms and fragmented sustainability governance. To address these gaps, we
apply a mixed-method approach consisting of a systematic literature review and a
citation network analysis to derive the following contributions. First, we elaborate on
the composition and development of the research field on fragmented sustainability
governance, including a citation network analysis. Second, we introduce a conceptual
framework of overarching types of fragmentation regarding the ends, means, context,
and outcomes of sustainability governance. Third, we introduce three types of manag-
ing fragmentation: coordination, convergence and integration, and meta governance.
Fourth, we derive implications for future research regarding the role of business in
fragmented sustainability governance.
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1 Introduction
Today’s global value chains give rise to severe sustainability challenges. In order
to cope with such challenges, adequate governance for sustainability is needed. As
traditional governance setters, governmental actors fall short of providing such gover-
nance, leading to the emergence of governance gaps (Abbott 2012a; Bäckstrand 2008;
Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Smith and Fischlein 2010). As an answer to these gover-
nance gaps, companies and civil society organizations increasingly engage in setting
governance (Fransen and Conzelmann 2015; Holzscheiter et al. 2016). However, the
emergence and multitude of different governance setters have led to a fragmentation
of governance for sustainability challenges.
For businesses, the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance is of
potential significance in two complementary ways. On the one hand, companies are
traditionally above all governance takers. As economic actors, they optimize their
value creation activities within the given governance rules of the game (Pies et al.
2014; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004). In light of global value chains, however, these
corporate activities no longer fall into one, say national, governance domain but span
different fragmented governance domains. In fact, companies and their operations
face fragmented sustainability governance characterized not only by diverse national
and supra-national regulation but also by international norms and increasingly over-
whelming numbers of private sustainability standards, which can result in conflictive
governance guidance or missing resources and capabilities to deal with fragmented
sustainability governance. On the other hand, companies increasingly operate as gov-
ernance makers. As political actors, companies contribute to setting and enforcing
the governance rules of the game (Eberlein et al. 2014; Pies et al. 2014; Scherer and
Palazzo 2011; Scherer et al. 2014), e.g. by introducing private standards or by leading
multi-stakeholder-initiatives (MSIs) as a form of collective private governance setting.
In doing so, companies can contribute to a further fragmentation of sustainability gov-
ernance in the sense of a growing number of governance actors that deal with different
aspects of sustainability challenges. In short, business has an important dual role in
the fragmentation of sustainability governance, as companies are both affected by and
do affect fragmentation (Zeyen et al. 2016).
Given this dual role, companies face various questions, e.g. regarding their authority
and capacity to fulfill this new role, considering how to choose from a variety of gover-
nance approaches or regarding the multifaceted expectations of stakeholders. In order
to answer such questions, corporate actors benefit from a solid scientific knowledge
base. However, in the case of fragmented sustainability governance, research provides
so far limited guidance for corporate actors. In order to overcome this shortcoming,
our study addresses the following three objectives.
1.1 Mapping the literature on fragmented sustainability governance
Our point of departure is that we know little about the composition of the scholarly
literature on fragmented sustainability governance. Despite some important previous
contributions (Isailovic et al. 2013; Pattberg et al. 2014) we still lack an overview
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of the available academic knowledge on the fragmentation of sustainability gover-
nance, particularly regarding the role of companies in environments of fragmented
sustainability governance. This raises questions regarding the development and char-
acteristics of the interdisciplinary research on fragmented sustainability governance.
To facilitate mutual learning between the existing knowledge bases, we need a thor-
ough mapping of the research. We therefore propose two research questions regarding
the composition of academic research on fragmented sustainability governance:
RQ1 What is the state of interdisciplinary research on fragmented sustainability gov-
ernance, including its development over time, applied methodologies and occurring
journals?
RQ2 What are the most influential publications on fragmented sustainability gover-
nance and to which research disciplines can they be assigned?
1.2 Providing amore nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of fragmented
sustainability governance
Second, the fragmentation of sustainability governance is not a monolithic phe-
nomenon but instead comes in many forms. In fact, fragmentation as such is not a
clearly defined concept and can entail various manifestations, e.g. regarding a geo-
graphical fragmentation of sustainability governance practices, different means and
ends of governance or different roles of involved actors. Our second objective is there-
fore to provide a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of fragmented
sustainability governance considering its multifaceted nature. Given the complexity
of sustainability governance approaches, decision makers in companies benefit from
such a solid understanding of the different types of fragmentation that they might face
in the real world. So far, however, the multifaceted nature of fragmented sustainability
governance has only received little attention by scholars (Biermann et al. 2009). Yet,
a conceptual clarification of the multi-dimensional nature of fragmentation can serve
both practitioners and future research. We thus introduce our third research question:
RQ3 What types of fragmented sustainability governance can be derived from the
scientific literature?
1.3 Identification of management approaches for fragmented sustainability
governance
Third, there are diverse and competing ways to address and manage the fragmentation
of sustainability governance. In line with other authors, we argue that the fragmen-
tation of sustainability governance has to some degree always existed, is inevitable
and will most likely prevail (Acharya 2016; Kalfagianni 2014; van Asselt and Zelli
2014). Against this background, companies as both governance takers and makers
must deal with a prevailing landscape of fragmented sustainability governance. Yet,
as fragmented sustainability governance comes in many forms, there is no silver bullet
to manage it. In order to proactively cope with this continuing fragmentation, gover-
nance actors and particularly companies thus benefit from a conceptual understanding
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of alternative approaches to manage fragmentation. Aspects of managing fragmenta-
tion have so far, however, received little scholarly attention (Gupta et al. 2016). To fill
this gap, we introduce our fourth research question:
RQ4 What are approaches to manage the fragmentation of sustainability governance
and how can these approaches be categorized?
To answer the introduced research questions, we use a mixed-method approach,
entailing a systematic literature review (SLR) and a citation network analysis (CNA).
In a first step, we use the SLR and the complementing CNA to thoroughly map the
scientific research on fragmented sustainability governance in a systematic and repro-
ducible manner, resulting in a descriptive analysis. By doing so, we amalgamate the
existing knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance, show blind spots, point
out avenues for mutual learning and further research, shed light on the citation inter-
linkages between publications on fragmented sustainability governance, and identify
the most influential publications with their respective disciplinary background. This
allows us to answer RQ1 and RQ2.
Simultaneously, the SLR provides us with a rich data set consisting of journal arti-
cles on fragmented sustainability governance. In a second step, we use this generated
data set for an encompassing qualitative content analysis. Findings from this quali-
tative data analysis allow us to answer RQ3 and RQ4. In particular, the qualitative
data analysis helps us to identify different management types to deal with fragmenta-
tion and to derive a conceptual framework of dimensions of sustainability governance
fragmentation.
Our paper proceeds in six steps. We start by introducing the concept of fragmented
sustainability governance. Then, we introduce the methodology of our SLR and CNA.
In a third step, we map the literature in terms of development over time, occurring
journals, methodologies, composition of the citation network as well as influential
publications and their affiliation with research disciplines. Fourth, we employ a qual-
itative content analysis of the identified publications in order to develop a conceptual
framework of the different dimensions of fragmentation that allows mapping frag-
mentation in terms of governance ends, means, context, and outcomes. Fifth, we use
the qualitative data analysis to introduce three categories of managing fragmentation:
coordination, convergence and integration, and meta governance. We close our study
with some concluding remarks, limitations of our research and implications for future
research regarding the role of business in fragmented sustainability governance.
2 The fragmentation of sustainability governance
Companies are increasingly supposed to take responsibility for negative social, envi-
ronmental, and economic effects that are interlinked with their value creation activities.
In today’s jargon, such negative effects along corporate value chains are framed as
sustainability challenges, referring to environmental, social, and economic issues (Elk-
ington 1998). In order to allow companies to address such sustainability challenges,
an adequate regulatory environment is a key prerequisite, which can be framed as
governance. In line with previous studies (Pies et al. 2014), we refer to a definition
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of governance by Williamson (2010, p. 674, emphasis in original) who describes it as
the “means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual
gain”. Following this definition, sustainability governance can be understood as the
means to provide a regulatory environment (order) that enables actors to mitigate or
minimize sustainability challenges (conflict) and thus allow sustainable development
pathways for all (mutual gain).
Yet, due to the increasing quantity and complexity of governance approaches for
sustainability, the fragmentation of sustainability governance is becoming a key topic
for academia and practitioners (Acharya 2016; Biermann et al. 2009; Held and Young
2013; van Asselt and Zelli 2014; Zelli and van Asselt 2013). Researchers have particu-
larly focused on the causes of fragmentation (Abbott and Snidal 2010; Acharya 2016;
Fransen 2015) and on the possible outcomes of fragmented sustainability governance
(Loconto and Fouilleux 2014; Ponte and Daugbjerg 2015). The literature shows dif-
ferent perceptions of fragmentation, ranging “from a positive, affirmative assessment
of fragmentation to a rather negative one” (Biermann et al. 2009, p. 14). In this review,
we point out that fragmentation is ubiquitous, inevitable and has always been a key
feature of governance (Kalfagianni 2014; van Asselt and Zelli 2014). We refrain from
the negative connotation of fragmentation and aim to treat it as a “descriptive term”
(Pattberg et al. 2014, p. 9f). For the purpose of our study, fragmentation can inter alia
refer to (a) the plurality of governance mechanisms and actors, (b) different addressed
issues and (c) different goals and normative values of governance actors.
As an important note, we want to highlight that the phenomenon of fragmentation is
also discussed in a ‘general’ governance context, e.g. regarding fragmented governance
of laws and regulations for customs, software codes, trade compliance standards and
so forth. In other words, governance fragmentation is a general phenomenon and
potential issue for involved actors, e.g. companies. From a corporate management
perspective, sustainability governance and its potential fragmentation is a specific
challenge, however, for at least three reasons: first, sustainability governance deals
with the simultaneous consideration of multiple sustainability dimensions that are
relevant for the business firm. Second, sustainability governance is characterized by
the involvement of different stakeholder groups such as NGOs that can in turn be(come)
governance makers. Third, corporate actors are increasingly held responsible to take
care of sustainability topics along their corporate value chains, thus requiring adequate
governance. Given these unique features of sustainability governance, we limit our
analysis to the fragmentation of sustainability governance in particular. Nevertheless,
we are open to the idea that our findings and conclusions might also apply in some
regards to fragmented governance in general.
3 Methodology
We combine a systematic literature review with a citation network analysis to map
and analyze the scholarly knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance. In a
first step, we use a SLR to identify relevant publications on fragmented sustainability
governance. The resulting dataset allows us to conduct further bibliometric analyses
in the form of a citation network analysis.
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Table 1 Topic-related and sector-related search terms
Topic-related search terms Sector-related search terms
“sustainab* governance” ; “global governance”;
“environment* governance”; “private
governance”; “governance architect*”; “new
governance”; “old governance”; “transnational
governance”; “labour governance”; “labor
governance”; “social governance”; “governance
for social”; “societal governance”; “governance
for societal”; “human right* governance”;
“governance for human right*”
“single”; “gap”, “void”; “dual”; “heterog*”;
“homog*”; “ambi*”; “align*”; “fragment*”;
“harmoni*”; “de-harmoni*”; “deharmoni*”;
“consolidat*”; “patchwork”; “complex*”;
“unif*”; “central*”; “decentral*”; “multi*”;
“converg*”; “congestion”; “poly*”; “mono*”;
“hegemony”; “innovat*”; “coordinat*”;
“co-ordinat*”; “collaborat*”; “cooperat*”;
“diverg*”; “diversi*”; “rival*”; “compet*”;
“standard*”; “hybrid”; “modular”
3.1 Methodology of the systematic literature review
In line with previous SLRs, we follow a structured multistage process (Denyer and
Tranfield 2009; Shabir and Rosmini 2016) to systematically identify, analyze, and
synthesize the knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance. This multistage
process consists of a planning phase, a scoping study, the selection of search parame-
ters, the selection of publications as well as the data analysis and the synthesis of the
publications (Denyer and Tranfield 2009; Garkisch et al. 2017; Pilbeam et al. 2012,
p. 360; Shabir and Rosmini 2016). Our SLR builds on six scientific databases (Denyer
and Tranfield 2009; Seuring and Müller 2008), ranges from 2002 to 2017 (Hohen-
stein et al. 2014) and includes 134 peer-reviewed journal publications (hereafter
called data sample).1 We included a variety of databases to ensure the represen-
tation of different research streams (Denyer and Tranfield 2009; Hohenstein et al.
2014): ABI/INFORM Collection, EBSCO Host (including Business Source Com-
plete and EconLit), HeinOnline, Science Direct, and Scopus. In addition, we used
Google scholar. We conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the identified
publications.
3.1.1 Keywords and search strings
In line with Maier et al. (2016), we organized our search terms into topic-related
terms and sector-related terms. While the expressions ‘topic’ and ‘sector’ might be
misleading, they practically refer to the context of sustainability governance (topic:
different expressions to specify governance) and to the phenomenon of fragmentation
(sector: different terms to describe the fragmentation of governance). Table 1 shows
the 16 topic-related terms and the 36 sector-related search terms.2
This dichotomy facilitated the structuring of our search terms into 16 search strings.
In order to receive our search strings, we combined each topic-related term with a
sequence of the sector-related terms. Although we chose the keywords with great
1 A list of the 134 analyzed publications in the SLR is available as Electronic supplementary material.
2 Following the valuable suggestion of a reviewer, we included additional keywords in our search process
that particularly cover the social dimension of sustainability.
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Fig. 1 Overview of the data collection process, including numbers of publications per search step
care, there are still abundant more keywords that describe the realm of sustainability
(like climate, biodiversity, fairness, etc.). As it is not feasible to include all possi-
ble keywords in the search process, we decided to search wide and then use strict
inclusion/exclusion criteria in order to judge whether or not a publication relates to
sustainability governance and its fragmentation.
3.1.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
We apply inclusion and exclusion criteria for the systematic selection of publications
(Denyer and Tranfield 2009; Shabir and Rosmini 2016). In the search process, the query
of each search string was applied to the entire text.3 In case this search exceeded 200
results, the search was further refined to the title, abstract, and keywords. If this step
still resulted in over 200 results, the search was limited to “title only” (Candel 2014).
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to the title of the publications, the
keywords, and the abstract. In cases where the application of inclusion and exclusion
criteria was straightforward, the systematic selection of publications was conducted
by the first author. Critical cases during the systematic selection were discussed by
the two authors until agreement was reached. Our final sample of papers all fulfill
our inclusion criteria (Shabir and Rosmini 2016, p. 83). The usage of strict inclusion
and exclusion criteria serves to secure a high quality of our SLR (Shabir and Rosmini
2016). Figure 1 shows the respective number of publications per step. Our final sample
of publications consists of 134 peer-reviewed journal publications.
As the focus of our study lies on the available scientific knowledge, we decided
to narrow down our search using the following criteria (Maier et al. 2016; Seuring
and Müller 2008). We only include peer-reviewed scientific publications in academic
journals in English. Only publications with a clear link to sustainability topics (of
social, ecological and/or economic nature) and the affiliated fragmented governance
were selected. In this selection step, we referred to our previously introduced under-
standing of sustainability governance and fragmentation.
3 All steps and results of the search process were recorded in a data extraction sheet and are available upon
request.
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3.1.3 Descriptive and qualitative data analysis
First, we conducted a descriptive analysis of the identified publications. This descrip-
tive analysis allows us to map the field of research on fragmented sustainability
governance and was conducted with a data extraction sheet4 (Denyer and Tranfield
2009; Shabir and Rosmini 2016). Additionally, we used the 134 identified publications
as a data set for a qualitative content analysis. In more detail, we used the software
MAXQDA as an instrument to structure, code, and analyze the publications (Macpher-
son and Holt 2007; Pittaway and Cope 2007). As guiding questions for the qualitative
inductive coding, we searched for different dimensions of fragmented sustainability
governance and approaches to manage fragmentation. Furthermore, we searched inter
alia for the objects of fragmentation, reasons and drivers of fragmentation, definitions
and understandings of fragmentation as well as research questions and further research
suggestions in the data. To this end, we carefully read in full all identified publications
and applied an open, inductive coding approach. In a second step, we reorganized,
merged, and structured the codes. This resulted in a total of 316 different codes and
over 7.500 coded segments in all 134 publications. Where applicable, we provide the
absolute number of coded segments and respective publications in the following for-
mat: number of coded segments/number of documents. The qualitative data analysis
supported the development of our conceptual contributions. In greater detail, the con-
ceptual framework on overarching types and dimensions of sustainability governance
fragmentation and the overview of management types which we introduce in Sect. 5,
mirror prominent codes and code families.
3.2 Methodology of the citation network analysis
In order to shed light on the composition of the research on fragmented sustainability
governance, we applied further bibliometric analyses in the form of a citation network
analysis, including the identification of influential publications in our data sample. Bib-
liometric analyses and citation networks resemble an excellent supplement to SLRs
as they allow to visualize the interlinkages of scholarly articles (Aliyev et al. 2018;
Colicchia and Strozzi 2012; Fahimnia et al. 2015; Kim et al. 2018; Wetzstein et al.
2018). We assigned a unique ID to each of the 134 publications in our data sample
and constructed a matrix of citation interlinkages between the publications. Using the
software Gephi, we visualized the citation network, consisting of nodes (representing
publications) and edges (representing citations to articles within our data sample).
Building on this, we identified the 20 publications with the highest citation scores
(in terms of number of citations within the sample) and their respective disciplinary
background. Here, the underlying assumption is that research contributions with a
high citation score are considered to be most influential within the network of pub-
lications. In more detail, we identified the 20 most often cited journal articles within
our data sample based on the absolute number of citations (out-degree) and visual-
ized them with a dual circle layout in Gephi (Fig. 4). Furthermore, we categorized
these 20 most influential publications into scientific research disciplines. In order to
4 The data extraction sheet and the list of codes are available to the reader upon request.
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do so in a rigorous manner, the two authors individually allocated the 20 articles to
research disciplines (Table 2)5 and discussed potential discrepancies until agreement
was reached.
4 Descriptive findings
In order to achieve our first objective, we use the descriptive part of the SLR and
the CNA to provide a mapping of the literature. By doing so, we answer our first
two research questions: What is the state of interdisciplinary research on fragmented
sustainability governance, including its development over time, applied methodologies
and occurring journals? What are the most influential publications on fragmented
sustainability governance and to which research disciplines can they be assigned? In
the following, we highlight the development of research over time and the employed
methodologies, the involvement of different journals, the citation network as well as
the most influential publications and their disciplinary affiliation.
4.1 Development of publications and researchmethodologies over time
Our findings indicate that the topic of fragmented sustainability governance receives
a steady increase regarding the absolute number of publications per year (Fig. 2). This
clear trend indicates that academia is increasingly paying attention to this phenomenon.
From 2008 till 2012, we witness an increase in publications and the appearance of a
corner stone paper in 2009 by Biermann and colleagues (Biermann et al. 2009) which
drew attention to the phenomenon of fragmented governance. The last third of the
time period (2013–2017) can be characterized by a strong increase of publications.
We witness a take-off in this phase, with double digit numbers of publications per year
starting in 2013.
In addition, we elaborate on the development of employed research methodologies
in our data sample over time. Therefore, we assigned the identified publications to
five methodological categories: qualitative, quantitative, theoretical and conceptual,
literature review, and mixed methods (Winter and Knemeyer 2013), and analyzed their
utilization over time (see Fig. 2). The majority of publications are of qualitative nature
(66 out of 134). Of these 66 qualitative publications, 31 use a case study approach.
Theoretical and conceptual publications follow with 52 studies. In contrast, literature
reviews (six studies) and quantitative studies (five studies) are rather exceptional.
Overall, the distribution of utilized research methodologies is rather unbalanced.
When looking at the distribution of methodological approaches over time (Fig. 2),
we witness several observations that mirror the general debate on bibliometric research
(Keathley et al. 2013). The beginning of research on fragmented sustainability gov-
ernance is characterized by qualitative and theoretical contributions, whereas other
methods (quantitative, mixed methods and literature reviews) are slowly starting to
5 Thanks to the valuable suggestion of a reviewer, we measured the inter-coder reliability. The individual
allocation of publications to research disciplines lead to an agreement of 90% and a Krippendorff’s Alpha
(nominal) of 0.477 (Krippendorff 2011).
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Table 2 Overview of the 20 most cited publications
References Title Out-degree Journal Discipline
Biermann et al.
(2009)
The Fragmentation
of Global
Governance
Architectures: A
Framework for
Analysis
25 Global
Environmental
Politics
Political science
Andonova et al.
(2009)
Transnational
Climate
Governance
15 Global
Environmental
Politics
Political science
Abbott (2012a, b) The transnational
regime complex
for climate
change
14 Environment and
Planning C:
Government and
Policy
Political science
Abbott and Snidal
(2009)
Strengthening
International
Regulation
Through
Transnational
New Governance:
Overcoming the
Orchestration
Deficit
14 Vanderbilt Journal
of Transnational
Law
Political science
Overdevest and
Zeitlin (2014)
Assembling an
experimentalist
regime:
Transnational
governance
interactions in the
forest sector
12 Regulation and
Governance
Political science
Pattberg (2005) The institutional-
ization of private
governance: How
business and
nonprofit
organizations
agree on
transnational
rules
12 Governance Political science
Hale and Roger
(2014)
Orchestration and
transnational
climate
governance
11 Review of
International
Organizations
Political science
Abbott and Snidal
(2010)
International
regulation
without
international
government:
Improving IO
performance
through
orchestration
11 Review of
International
Organizations
Political science
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Table 2 continued
References Title Out-degree Journal Discipline
Biermann (2007) “Earth system
governance” as a
crosscutting
theme of global
change research
10 Global
Environmental
Change
Environmental
studies
Fransen (2011) Why Do Private
Governance
Organizations
Not Converge? A
Political-
Institutional
Analysis of
Transnational
Labor Standards
Regulation
10 Governance Political science
Pattberg (2006) Private governance
and the South:
Lessons from
global forest
politics
9 Third World
Quarterly
Political science
Zelli and van Asselt
(2013)
The Institutional
Fragmentation of
Global
Environmental
Governance:
Causes,
Consequences,
and Responses
8 Global
Environmental
Politics
Political science
Meidinger (2008) Competitive Supra-
Governmental
Regulation: How
could it be
democratic?
8 Chicago Journal of
International Law
Law
Pattberg and
Stripple (2008)
Beyond the public
and private
divide:
Remapping
transnational
climate
governance in the
21st century
7 International
Environmental
Agreements:
Politics, Law and
Economics
Political science
Biermann and
Pattberg (2008)
Global
Environmental
Governance:
Taking Stock,
Moving Forward
7 Annual Review of
Environment and
Resources
Environmental
studies
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Table 2 continued
References Title Out-degree Journal Discipline
Reinecke et al.
(2012)
The Emergence of
a Standards
Market:
Multiplicity of
Sustainability
Standards in the
Global Coffee
Industry
7 Organization
Studies
Business and
Economics
Gulbrandsen (2014) Dynamic
governance
interactions:
Evolutionary
effects of state
responses to
non-state
certification
programs
7 Regulation and
Governance
Political science
Schouten and
Glasbergen
(2011)
Creating legitimacy
in global private
governance: The
case of the
Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm
Oil
7 Ecological
Economics
Business and
Economics
Schleifer (2013) Orchestrating
sustainability:
The case of
European Union
biofuel
governance
6 Regulation and
Governance
Political science
Auld (2014) Confronting
trade-offs and
interactive effects
in the choice of
policy focus:
Specialized
versus
comprehensive
private
governance
6 Regulation and
Governance
Political science
appear since 2008 and 2009. With an exception in 2009, quantitative studies only
occur in the last 3 years (2015–2017) of the analyzed period. Mixed methods occur
primarily in the last 4 years (2014–2017) and literature reviews primarily since 2013.
The great majority of publications use a qualitative approach with single or multiple
case studies representing the lion’s share. The single case studies focus primarily on
private sustainability governance setters such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
(Pattberg 2005), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), roundtables (Marin-Burgos
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Fig. 2 Distribution of publications per year for the analyzed time period 2002–2017 and distribution of
research methodologies over time
et al. 2015; Schouten and Glasbergen 2011), meta governance setters like ISEAL
(Loconto and Fouilleux 2014) or governance mechanisms like REDD +. Comparative
or multiple case studies highlight e.g. different meta governance setters (Fransen 2015),
the cross-sector analysis of governance actors (Fransen and Conzelmann 2015) or
multiple actors within a single sector such as coffee or fishery (Manning and Reinecke
2016). While qualitative research provides rich insights, it has shortcomings regarding
the generalization of its findings. Therefore, we encourage researchers to provide more
quantitative studies on fragmented sustainability governance, particularly regarding
comparative and cross-sector research.
Most theoretical and conceptual publications introduce some sort of typology,
framework, or conceptual model. This entails inter alia a conceptual framework on the
certification effectiveness of sustainability governance schemes (de Man and German
2017), a governance triangle which classifies governance setters (Abbott and Snidal
2010), or a framework on meta governance (Fransen 2015). A noteworthy publication
in this regard is the study by Biermann et al. (2009) which introduces a typology of
different types of fragmentation of governance architectures.
4.2 Occurrence in journals
The total of 134 identified publications stem from 81 different journals which cover a
wide variety of different scientific fields, including fields such as political science and
governance, different sub-disciplines of law, international relations, social science,
environmental studies, as well as to a lesser degree business and economic journals.
This result shows that the literature on fragmented sustainability governance is multi-
disciplinary and takes place in different fields and journals. Many of the occurring
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Fig. 3 Overview of leading journals. *Other journals with three occurrences each: Business and Politics;
Global Governance; Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions;
Ecological Economics; Forest Policy and Economics; Policy and Society; Global Policy
journals have an inter- or multidisciplinary character. This makes sense as the phe-
nomenon of fragmented sustainability governance is a cross-disciplinary topic that
can and should be addressed from different research viewpoints. At the same time, the
fact that the research is taking place in many journals with different disciplinary back-
grounds makes it difficult to enter the debate and could potentially impede mutual
learning between involved scholars and journal communities, thus making it more
difficult to develop a concise research agenda. Figure 3 displays the most frequent
journals in our data sample.
We could identify three journals with at least six publications (Regulation and Gov-
ernance, Global Environmental Politics, and International Environmental Agreements)
and nine journals with at least three publications. Yet, no journal hosts more than eight
publications (less than 6% of the total 134 publications) which might indicate that the
overall scientific discourse on fragmented sustainability governance might lack a core
journal or just possess a rather weak core journal. Furthermore, we found 55 journals
with only one publication each. This highlights that the fragmentation of sustainability
governance is a (potential) topic in various journal communities.
4.3 Most often cited articles based on citation analysis
Based on our CNA, we found that 25 out of 134 publications have no citation inter-
linkages to other publications in our sample which means that they neither cite nor are
cited by any other article of the sample. After removing these 25 publications from
our citation data, we received a network consisting of 109 nodes (publications) and
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Fig. 4 Citation network of journal articles on fragmented sustainability governance depicted with a dual
circle layout. The 20 most often cited publications within the network (based on out-degree) are plotted in
the inner circle. The remaining 89 articles are located on the outer circle in sequence of their citation score
(clockwise)
297 edges (citation interlinkages). Figure 4 visualizes the citation network in a dual
circle layout with the most cited publications plotted in the inner circle.
The following table shows the top 20 most influential publications in our network,
including their respective number of citations within the network (out-degree), journal
occurrence, and affiliated research discipline.
Interestingly, the ten most influential publications are responsible for 45% of all
citation interlinkages within the network (134 out of 297 citation interlinkages), with
the leading publication by Biermann and colleagues (2009) representing 8% of all
citations (25 out of 297 citation interlinkages). Furthermore, this leading publication
is cited by 25 out of 109 publications in our network, which stresses the importance
of this single paper for the research on fragmented sustainability governance.
4.3.1 Contributions of research disciplines
Considering all 134 publications, we found that a variety of different scientific disci-
plines provide contributions to the scholarly knowledge on fragmented sustainability
governance. This includes, but is not limited to, political science, law, environmental
studies, business and economics, inter- or multidisciplinary studies, sociology and
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social studies, natural science, and geography. In further detail, we allocated the 20
most influential publications to distinct research disciplines. This revealed some inter-
esting findings: although various scientific disciplines are contributing to the scholarly
knowledge on fragmented sustainability governance, we see that the 20 most influen-
tial publications are clearly dominated by political science contributions. Considering
the different disciplinary backgrounds of the 20 most influential publications in the
citation network, we found that at least 15 publications have a strong affiliation with
the realm of political science, two can be assigned to environmental studies, two to
business and economics research and one publication to the discipline law.
4.3.2 Contributions from political science
Publications in the realm of political science can be considered a key driver of the
academic debate on fragmented sustainability governance. One explanation might be
that the term fragmentation originally stems from the realm of political science and
social sciences and was then “exported” to other fields such as legal studies (Blanchard
2017, p. 329). The field of political science can thus be regarded as the cradle of the
academic discourse on fragmented sustainability governance.
In more detail, the identified publications with a political science background have
a distinct level of analysis and perspective in their research approaches. Publications
in this category primarily focus on overarching (and sometimes abstract) constructs of
sustainability governance, such as (hybrid) regimes, governance architectures, transna-
tional sustainability governance arenas, international relations and institutions as core
actors (e.g. Abbott 2012b; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014; Zelli and van Asselt 2013).
With this perspective in mind, contributions that stem from political science focus less
on the concrete practices of individual actors (such as companies) but often contribute
to understanding the complex phenomenon of sustainability governance arrangements
from a more abstract bird’s eye perspective. When doing so, the involved scholars
incorporate concepts of legitimacy, authority, democracy, hierarchy, power, participa-
tion, and agency beyond the state into their research questions and research endeavor
(e.g. Fransen 2011; Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Schleifer 2013).
Considering the topic focus of the publications with a background in political sci-
ence, we found that climate change and global warming (5 out of 15 publications),
forestry (5), fishery (2), and environmental topics in general (2) are addressed. These
topics have in common that they (a) traditionally have strong ties to state responsi-
bility and (b) have a rather transnational perspective. Regarding the fragmentation of
sustainability governance, the identified publications from political science elaborate
on different types and degrees of fragmentation, governmental responses to fragmen-
tation, pros and cons of fragmentation as well as managing fragmentation (primarily
through orchestration by the state or international organizations) (e.g. Abbott and
Snidal 2009; Hale and Roger 2014).
Regarding the role of companies in light of fragmented sustainability governance,
political science publications highlight the emergence of private governance beyond
or complementary to the state and the shifting responsibilities and roles in this process.
In more detail, the publications shed light on the interplay of public and private gover-
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nance makers and necessary instruments to steer this interplay, as well as conflictive
aspects of public and private governance (Auld 2014).
Although the studies with a political science background deliver important contri-
butions to understand abstract aspects of fragmented sustainability governance, they
provide us with limited support regarding the concrete role of companies in environ-
ments of fragmented sustainability governance. Publications from political science
apply a level of analysis (regimes, governance architectures) that insufficiently incor-
porates the perspective of companies when shaping sustainability governance and/or
dealing with fragmentation in their value chains and business operations. Furthermore,
political science contributions often look at companies from the outside, e.g. when
assessing the interplay of companies, states, and NGOs in jointly setting governance,
yet, they are missing an internal perspective of the firm. The addressed topics and sys-
tem boundaries of political science publications (climate change, transnational fishery
regulations) are certainly of importance for corporate actors, yet, they do not incorpo-
rate a value chain perspective at an industry level. One exception for this is the paper
by Fransen (2011) with a focus on labor standards in the textile industry.
Furthermore, approaches to deal with fragmentation are mainly limited to orches-
tration by governmental bodies or international organizations and do not incorporate
companies and their means and capabilities to manage fragmentation. In a nutshell,
contributions from political science help us to understand overarching and abstract
questions of fragmented sustainability governance, yet they are less suitable to answer
more practical questions linked to the business firm in environments of fragmented
sustainability governance.
4.3.3 Contributions from environmental studies
Publications from the realm of environmental studies primarily address the relationship
and interlinkages between earth/nature and humanity/societal systems. This relation-
ship is in constant change and framed as global environmental change or earth system
governance (Biermann 2007). Naturally, publications with this background focus on
topics such as climate change (2 publications), global commons and resources, pol-
lution and environmental challenges in general. We found that contributions with an
environmental studies background show strong interlinkages to political science, as
they e.g. highlight governance architectures, the role of the state in setting environmen-
tal policies, as well as questions of legitimacy, effectiveness and democracy (Biermann
2007; Biermann and Pattberg 2008). We found that environmental aspects of sustain-
ability governance are often addressed by both scholars from environmental studies
and political science alike. More precisely, many political science publications cover
questions of fragmented environmental governance (such as the governance of climate
change). As a consequence, issues arising from fragmented environmental governance
are covered by the literature streams of political science and of environmental stud-
ies alike. As global environmental governance entails the shift from state-centered
authority to new private governance arrangements, it represents an important field of
research for scholars from political science as well as environmental studies scholars.
We found rather weak linkages to the role of companies in publications with an
environmental studies background. In more detail, companies are often just mentioned
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as being/becoming new governance makers that can shape environmental governance.
Furthermore, forms of cooperation between private and non-private governance actors
are discussed to some degree in environmental studies.
4.3.4 Contributions from business and economics research
The fragmentation of sustainability governance plays an important role for firms, as
companies are (a) affected by (fragmented) governance and (b) increasingly involved
in setting private sustainability governance. This is e.g. the case with regard to the
participation of companies in MSIs which set private governance or regarding the
changing role of companies from mere rule takers to rule makers with regard to sus-
tainability challenges along their value chains.
While the fragmentation of sustainability governance plays an important role in
the empirical reality of companies, our findings suggest that the business and eco-
nomics literature only insufficiently covers questions related to this topic. According
to Paavola (2016), aspects of environmental governance have little visibility for schol-
ars from the field of business and economics. Going one step further, we argue that not
only sustainability governance but more importantly also its fragmentation has only
received little attention by business and economics scholars. This is surprising because
companies can experience the fragmentation of sustainability governance as a real-life
challenge when organizing global value chain activities. As fragmented sustainability
governance, however, is affected by and does affect the empirical reality of compa-
nies, industry associations, NGOs, and other actors, future research will benefit from
more dialogue between political science and other disciplines such as management
and economics.
In the 20 most cited publications, we identified two publications with a background
in business and economics, namely the work by Reinecke et al. (2012) and Schouten
and Glasbergen (2011). Both studies emphasize the importance of sustainability stan-
dards as novel governance approaches to address sustainability challenges along
corporate value chains and global commodity chains. Furthermore, both publications
highlight how companies are intertwined with such new forms of multi-stakeholder
governance, e.g. as actively contributing to governance (maker) and/or being affected
by multiple sustainability standards (taker) (Reinecke et al. 2012; Schouten and Glas-
bergen 2011). By doing so, the authors contribute to addressing relevant questions
of companies that deal with fragmented sustainability governance and are likewise
involved in the creation of multiple sustainability governance approaches. We find
particularly interesting that the study by Reinecke et al. (2012) applies a market forma-
tion research perspective to assess the dynamics in a market of sustainability standards
for coffee, thus combining theoretical insights from economic studies and governance
theory.
Moreover, regardless of the respective research discipline, in total, 54 papers
(out of 134) assess the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability gov-
ernance, including 15 papers with a focus on companies as governance takers and 31
on governance makers, respectively. Interestingly, the non-traditional and somewhat
exceptional role of companies as governance makers thus receives much more attention
than the traditional and much more widespread role of companies as governance takers.
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While practically all companies that operate global value chains experience sustain-
ability governance fragmentation as governance takers, only a small (but important)
group of companies engages in active standard setting etc., thus being governance
makers. What is more, however, the dual role of companies as takers and makers
of sustainability governance received only scarce attention in the identified research,
as merely five publications explicitly highlight both roles of companies as gover-
nance makers and takers (Abbott 2012a; Fransen 2015; Kalfagianni 2014; Potoski
and Prakash 2004; Thauer 2015).
4.3.5 Contributions from law and legal studies
Research in the field of law and legal studies traditionally focuses on questions of
hard law and state-centered authority. Law research has long followed the tradition
of a “Westphalian vision of state power through hierarchy” (Holley 2016, p. 25). The
fragmentation of sustainability governance, which is particularly linked to soft law
and private governance beyond the state, has therefore not been in the spotlight of
law research (as it is seemingly opposed to the traditional focus on hard law and state
authority). A shift in the law literature began in the 1980s towards dealing with new
forms of private governance as complementary, conflictive, supplementary, or parallel
approaches to traditional hard law and state centered authority. As a consequence,
the law literature has expanded its research focus to questions regarding the inter-
play between hard law and new private sustainability governance approaches. A main
question for legal scholars is how to combine new soft governance with traditional
hard law (Holley 2016, p. 26). The complementarity of public and private governance
represents a growing body of legal literature in this regard (Bartley 2011, p. 523).
In the 20 most cited publications, we identified one publication with a strong
law focus which addresses the competition of private regulatory programs and its
implications for democratic legitimacy, power and authority as well as accountabil-
ity (Meidinger 2008). Furthermore, the role and response of the state to competing
governance programs is elaborated. Regarding the role of companies, the identified
paper by Meidinger (2008) stresses the incorporation of business actors in regulatory
programs and to some extant includes a supply chain perspective.
5 Qualitative analysis
We now focus on the multifaceted nature of fragmented sustainability governance and
on approaches to manage it. As indicated before, sustainability governance cannot
always be clearly separated from ‘general governance’. Therefore, some of the fol-
lowing findings and thoughts might also apply to fragmented governance in general.
In the following sections, we assess different types of sustainability governance
fragmentation and potential management practices to address them. We build our
argument on the results of our qualitative content analysis, using the data set gener-
ated by our SLR and analyzed with the help of MAXQDA. In a first step, we argue for
a more nuanced understanding of fragmented sustainability governance and introduce
a conceptual framework that distinguishes different dimensions of fragmentation. In
123
J. Heidingsfelder, M. Beckmann
order to achieve this, we particularly focus on dimensions and manifestations of frag-
mentation in our data sample and group the appropriate findings into ends, means,
context, outcomes, and actors. While the precise allocation of individual code seg-
ments to the category of ends and actors dimensions was too ambiguous, as they
were simply too many and often multi-coded segments, we could directly allocate
coded segments of our qualitative data analysis to the dimensions of means, context
and outcomes. Note, again, that these results will be given as total number of coded
segments/number of relevant documents (e.g. 67/24). In a second step, we provide an
overview of three overarching types of managing fragmentation. Here, we focus on
concrete management approaches to deal with fragmented sustainability governance
that occur in our data sample and the respective codes. In both steps, we first present
our findings followed then by a discussion.
5.1 Types of fragmented sustainability governance
A key challenge of fragmented sustainability governance is that it comes in many
forms. Therefore, involved actors, particularly companies, would benefit from a con-
ceptual understanding of different types of fragmentation that they might face. Despite
existing approaches to cluster fragmentation (Biermann et al. 2009; Pattberg et al.
2014), we are still missing a comprehensive synthesis that aggregates the different
types of fragmentation discussed in the literature. Using the content analysis of our
SRL data, we address our third research question (What types of fragmented sus-
tainability governance can be derived from the scientific literature?) to develop a
conceptual framework of the different types and dimensions of fragmentation.
In Fig. 5, we introduce our conceptual framework of four different types of frag-
mentation, each including additional dimensions. Overall, our framework captures
the multifaceted nature of sustainability governance and shows qualitative variations
with regard to the nature of fragmentation. In more detail, our framework is structured
according to the ends (what?), means (how?), context (where?) and potential outcomes
(with what effects?) of sustainability governance. In all these regards, fragmentation
can occur. Moreover, different governance actors (who?) such as companies, civil
society organizations, or governments are involved in all respective components of the
framework. As an important note, we found that the fragmentation of sustainability
governance can take many forms, which does not mean that it always takes all forms.
On the contrary, we suggest that the fragmentation of sustainability governance can
resemble a configuration of different components of our framework. In other words,
we found in the literature how this configuration could look like, but do not claim that
our framework necessarily covers all possible configurations of fragmentation.
In the following, we elaborate in greater detail on the respective dimensions of
fragmentation.
5.1.1 Ends (what is governed?)
Governance serves to solve specific problems and, in our study, to address diverse
sustainability issues. Here, the specific sustainability issues can differ, thus leading to
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Fig. 5 Conceptual framework of overarching types and dimensions of sustainability governance fragmenta-
tion. The asterisk indicates that the dimensions are not derived from the literature but are instead introduced
in our discussion
fragmented contents. With regard to sustainability, the goals can differ according to
environmental, social, and economic dimensions (Elkington 1998). Yet, the notion of
sustainability can be contested amongst governance setters and lead to diverse and even
competing objectives of governance (Humrich 2013; Manning and Reinecke 2016).
As a consequence, multiple understandings of sustainability and different priorities
with regard to the three dimensions can lead to conflictive goals and trade-offs. How
governance actors set their objectives for governance is overall closely linked to their
underlying normative attributes (Renard and Loconto 2012).
The often fragmented ends of sustainability governance can be differentiated with
regard to adhering to single or multiple goals and considering generic (social chal-
lenges) versus specific (child labor) issues that are incorporated in the goals (Acharya
2016; Biermann et al. 2009; Roberts 2011).
5.1.2 Means (how is governance provided?)
Sustainability goals can be achieved by a variety of governance means. Here, the frag-
mentation of sustainability governance results not from fragmented issues but from the
fragmented use of different instruments. A primary distinction can be made regarding
soft (72 coded segments/36 documents) or hard law approaches (89/48) to set gov-
ernance. Soft law can also be framed as “private regulation […] or transnational new
governance” (Bartley 2011, p. 518), whereas hard law primarily consists of govern-
mental laws to govern sustainability issues. Closely linked to the distinction between
hard and soft law is the differentiation between private (85/41), public (108/42), and
hybrid (72/24) approaches for governance (Abbott 2012a; Acharya 2016; Ewert and
Maggetti 2016; Gutiérrez and Morgan 2017). Public governance refers to nation states
and governmental bodies as governance setters, while private governance is shaped
e.g. by civil society organizations and corporations. Hybrid governance can entail
various combinations of private and public actors such as public private partnerships
(PPPs). As a key feature, hybrid governance brings together different actor groups
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and different governance modes or logics in order to create more than ‘the sum of its
individual parts’. Through hybrid governance, a plurality of actors can work together
and bring in their respective competencies and resources. By doing so, hybrid gov-
ernance can potentially lead to greater legitimacy and accountability and reduce the
complexity of fragmented governance (Rana and Chhatre 2017).
5.1.3 Context (where is governance provided?)
In addition, fragmentation can also refer to a fragmentation of contexts in which
sustainability governance occurs. Contextual settings are a key factor that shape the
fragmentation and multiplicity of governance for sustainability challenges. Our quali-
tative analysis identified sectoral and geographic aspects that considerably impact the
manifestation of fragmented sustainability governance. In our data set, the sectoral
focus highlights the industrial or commodity sector where governance approaches are
applied. Sectoral fragmentation (421/97) primarily refers to industrial sectors such
as forestry (138/33), fishery (42/15), agriculture (26/11) (coffee, soy, palm oil), or
textiles (11/4). Sectors have specific characteristics that can influence the outcome of
governance actions (Fransen and Conzelmann 2015). Considering the sectors that are
addressed by sustainability governance, we found that forestry and fishery are covered
by most studies with 33 and 15 publications respectively. More than a third of all pub-
lications thus circles around these two sectors. Regarding forestry, research mainly
focuses on FSC as a private governance setter (Bloomfield and Schleifer 2017; Cashore
et al. 2003) and the REDD + mechanism (Gallemore 2017; Gupta et al. 2016; Long
2011). Research on fishery almost exclusively highlights the MSC as a governance
setter (Foley and Havice 2016; Gutiérrez and Morgan 2017).
With regard to geographic aspects (13/7), the fragmentation of sustainability
governance can take place in different country contexts or refer to the difference
between universally applicable governance approaches and national, regional, or local
approaches (Acharya 2016, p. 453). Geographical fragmentation can also refer to the
divergence of governance setters located in Western countries and the actual area of
effect of governance in countries in the Global South (Schouten and Bitzer 2015).
Geographic challenges can arise with regard to including stakeholders from different
areas of the world in joint governance approaches such as MSIs (Kalfagianni and
Pattberg 2013b). It can also entail the emergence of new sustainability governance
approaches for particular characteristics of geographic areas, e.g. regarding “territo-
rial eco-certification initiatives” (Foley and Havice 2016, p. 24). For companies with
complex value chains, both sectoral and geographical fragmentation pose a challenge
as their organization needs to deal with a multiplicity of different governance frag-
ments.
5.1.4 Outcomes (with what effect?)
The sustainability governance landscape can also be fragmented with regard to the
effects and outcomes achieved. More specifically, our qualitative data analysis identi-
fied three ways in which sustainability governance outcomes can be fragmented, i.e.
quality and effectiveness, legitimacy, and maturity. Quality (28/9) and effectiveness
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(52/23) refer to the ambitions and performance of a given governance approach with
regard to accomplishing its sustainability objectives, e.g. regarding the impact of dif-
ferent private governance approaches on sustainable fishery (Kalfagianni and Pattberg
2013a). Moreover, with regard to the outcome ambition, this can refer to different
levels of strictness of sustainability governance approaches, e.g. regarding entry level
sustainability standards versus high standards (Reinecke et al. 2012). With regard
to effectiveness, governance approaches can considerably vary and lead to different
degrees of effectively fulfilling the defined sustainability goals (Gulbrandsen 2005;
Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2013a; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017). While effective-
ness focuses above all on the governance output, legitimacy (126/35) is a criterion that
also depends on governance inputs such as transparency or the wide inclusion of stake-
holders. Legitimacy is a key component of overall governance research with ample
scholarly work from political science that highlights that the governance landscape
can be fragmented with regard to the legitimacy achieved by different approaches
(Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2014; Marin-Burgos et al. 2015). Finally, maturity (8/7)
describes the development status of a (sustainability) governance approach. While
some governance approaches might still be in a phase of emergence, consolidation
and development, others might have experienced several years of (successful) per-
formance (Mayer and Gereffi 2010). Maturity can also refer to the number of newly
emerging governance actors and to the mainstreaming or extension of existing gover-
nance approaches (Smith and Fischlein 2010).
By introducing this conceptual framework, we aim to contribute to the scholarly
debate on different forms and types of fragmented sustainability governance. So far,
extant research has mainly focused on rather abstract and theoretical conceptualization
of fragmentation, e.g. regarding different forms of fragmented governance architec-
tures (Biermann et al. 2009) or institutions (Zelli and van Asselt 2013). We believe
that our framework offers more concrete and comprehensive guidance for governance
actors, particularly companies, that deal with the multifaceted nature of fragmentation.
5.1.5 Brief reflection on the conceptual framework
As a key contribution, our study looks at the fragmentation of sustainability governance
from a corporate perspective. In the context of sustainability governance, corporations
are the ones who need to integrate different sustainability issues/topics across different
contents, contexts and scopes, thus referring to multiple types and dimensions of
fragmentation.
Considering the outcomes of fragmentation, the literature so far focuses more on
questions of legitimacy than on quality and effectiveness. Regarding the contextual
factors, the geographic fragmentation only plays a minor role and aspects of value
chain position and commodity segmentation are not covered. These are relevant blind
spots from a corporate practitioner perspective, as companies might be more interested
in sustainability governance quality and effectiveness than legitimacy aspects. Further-
more, companies operate in value chain logics embedded in spatial environments of
fragmented sustainability governance which is so far not addressed in further detail
by studies in our sample. Adding to this, it is also noteworthy that some dimensions of
the fragmentation of sustainability governance are so far not covered by the literature
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at all. For example, companies operate in different commodity segments (e.g. small
scale vs. large scale mining) and deal with different value chain scopes (e.g. single
supplier vs. full supply chain) when addressing sustainability challenges. This could
imply further dimensions of sustainability governance fragmentation which were so
far not covered in our sample.
5.2 Introducing an initial typology of managing fragmentation
After providing a more nuanced conceptualization of fragmentation, we now focus on
various types to manage fragmented sustainability governance. In line with previous
studies, we argue that the fragmentation of governance has to some degree always
existed (Acharya 2016), is inevitable and will most likely prevail (Acharya 2016;
van Asselt and Zelli 2014). Furthermore, we emphasize that the fragmentation of
sustainability governance is per se neither negative nor positive. Instead, it can have
ambivalent consequences depending on the contextual factors (Termeer et al. 2011).
Yet, in order to proactively cope with fragmentation, it is helpful to be aware of
available approaches to do so.
Against this background, our qualitative analysis of the SLR data set identified an
emerging body of research on different ways to manage fragmentation (Gupta et al.
2016; Hale and Roger 2014; van Asselt and Zelli 2014). Managing fragmentation
in this context does not necessarily mean to overcome fragmentation but to execute
approaches that allow existing with fragmentation in a beneficial way (Isailovic et al.
2013; Scott 2011). Yet, based on its multidimensional nature, there are various possible
ways how to manage fragmentation.
Before introducing an initial management typology, we need to make an important
distinction. Similar to the distinction of governance takers and makers, we need to clar-
ify whether managing fragmentation refers to the governance makers (purposefully
steering the implementation of governance) or the takers (dealing with a multiplicity
of governance approaches). This distinction is crucial, as the management of fragmen-
tation is naturally linked to the respective goals of the involved actors. In the case of
governance makers, this could entail to make governance more effective and legiti-
mate (e.g. to advance sustainability objectives). Governance takers in contrast, such as
companies, might primarily be interested in achieving their organizational goals (e.g.
to minimize costs).
Against this background, we answer our fourth research question: What are
approaches to manage the fragmentation of sustainability governance and how can
these approaches be categorized? To this end, we used the content analysis of our SLR
to identify distinct management approaches. With regard to management approaches
for governance makers, our content analysis identified diverse practices to deal with
fragmentation. Upon closer inspection, these practices can be subsumed under three
overarching categories, including several subordinated approaches to address frag-
mented sustainability governance (Table 3).
In the following, we elaborate in greater detail on the derived management types
and their components.
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Table 3 Management types for fragmentation
Management type Description Components
I. Coordination Coordination aims to
purposefully steer the
interaction of different
governance approaches.
While the fragments of
governance remain,
coordination aims to improve
the interplay between
independent fragments. The
relationships between the
individual fragments are
altered. By providing agency
in the background,
coordination helps to bridge
different governance actors
and their actions
Orchestration
Agenda setting
Bridging
Interplay management
Complementary governance
II. Convergence and integration Convergence and integration
refer to the purposeful
altering (a) of the contents of
governance approaches, (b) of
structures and organizations
and (c) of governance actors.
The development takes place
on the level of the fragments
and actors. In the process, the
single fragments are altered,
merged or integrated
Convergence
Integration
Alignment
III. Meta governance Meta governance provides the
governance for fragmented
governance. As the
“second-order governance”
(Holzscheiter et al. 2016,
p. 9), it aims to provide “some
degree of coordinated
governance” (Meuleman
2008, p. 68) by managing the
plurality of governance
approaches for a given issue
or field. It aims to achieve
“core criteria and overarching
principles” (Reinecke et al.
2012, p. 792) with regard to
the content of governance,
while allowing a diversity of
fragments
Multiple components, e.g.
including the establishment of
best practices
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5.2.1 Coordination
As the term expresses, coordination approaches accept the individual governance frag-
ments as given but aim to improve their interplay. Coordination thus does not alter the
fragments but their relationships. Within the management category of coordination,
our SLR identified the subordinate concepts of orchestration (231 coded segments/47
documents), agenda setting (9/7), bridging (11/1), interplay management (10/1), and
complementary governance (32/20). Of those publications in our data sample that
address the question of managing fragmentation, the majority focuses on coordination
practices, particularly emphasizing the concept of orchestration: “Orchestration can
be defined as when a governance actor (the orchestrator) enlists and supports third-
party actors (the intermediary) to address the target indirectly in pursuit of shared
governance objectives” (Pegram 2015, p. 627). Orchestration is mainly used by Inter-
governmental Organizations (IGOs) and governmental actors and allows these actors
to benefit from the resources and competencies of the involved intermediaries (mainly
NGOs and other private governance actors) (Abbott 2012a, p. 562; Schleifer 2013).
It can serve as a catalyst and leverage the limited resources of the orchestrator by
adding additional resources from the intermediaries. Examples of orchestrators are
e.g. UNEP, other UN agencies, the OECD, or the World Bank (Abbott and Snidal
2009; Biermann 2002; Lister et al. 2015). Note that the idea of orchestration as a
management approach is a prominent topic in the realm of political science. There-
fore, it is no surprise that we could hardly find any research on the role of companies
as potential orchestrators—despite the fact that focal firms in value chain networks
might have the ability and interest to do so. One noteworthy exception in this regard
is the study by Gordon and Johnson (2017) who point out the emerging role of private
transnational corporations as potential governance orchestrators.
Agenda setting can provide guidance for involved intermediaries and help to align
and define common goals. By doing so, it can “steer activities in [a] desired direc-
tion” (Abbott and Bernstein 2015, p. 230). It requires the formation of a ‘coalition
of the willing’ which should include relevant stakeholder groups and interests (Galle-
more 2017). Governments are key players to either lead or support agenda setting via
direct management or “the shadow of the hierarchy” (Gulbrandsen 2014, p. 76). Yet,
agenda setting also takes place within sustainability governance approaches, particu-
larly within MSIs and in the context of meta governance (Gallemore 2017; Renard and
Loconto 2012; Schouten and Bitzer 2015). Companies are suited to provide agenda
setting, particularly in the context of MSIs. Yet, our SLR did not find any substantial
research on companies as agenda setters and which resources and competences they
need to fulfill this task.
In the case of bridging, governance actors can bring together different actors through
governance entities such as networks or partnerships. Bridging can serve as a catalyst
function to leverage the individual governance approaches of previously unconnected
actors. Special bridging organizations can fulfill this function, e.g. the REDD + multi-
stakeholder approach (Gupta et al. 2016). Bridging could potentially be important
in the context of industry associations that might support companies as governance
makers.
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Considering interplay management, we can differentiate two types: “Regulatory
interplay management” uses regulatory power to steer the interplay between sustain-
ability governance actors, while “enabling interplay management” uses soft power,
e.g. in the form of capacity building (Auld 2014; Oberthür 2009, p. 377). Corpo-
rate actors could particularly benefit from enabling interplay management in order to
become effective and legitimate governance makers.
Complementary governance aims to transform a fragmented (in the sense of con-
flictive and duplicative) form of sustainability governance into a complementary state
of beneficially co-existing fragments. In this context, fragments comply with different
expectations and address different issues. Like a puzzle, different fragments purpose-
fully complement each other to form a coherent picture (Kinderman 2016; Widerberg
and Pattberg 2015). Potentially, complementary governance can “produce better gov-
ernance outcomes than single instrument or single-party approaches” (Holley 2016,
p. 45). From the perspective of companies as governance takers, complementary sus-
tainability governance is a key step in order to diminish negative consequences of
fragmented sustainability governance, as it helps to avoid duplicates and reduce con-
flictive governance.
5.2.2 Convergence and integration
While coordination approaches take the different fragments as given and try to struc-
ture the space between them, convergence and integration is more about altering the
fragments themselves in order to allow a more coherent interplay. More specifically,
convergence (65 coded segments/26 documents) describes the purposeful approxima-
tion of the content of sustainability governance approaches, particularly regarding
standards, laws and policies (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Perez 2011; Renard
and Loconto 2012; Wood 2016). It can entail the merging of previously separated
governance mechanisms. In our data set, convergence as a management approach
is particularly important for standards as governance mechanisms. Through policy
adjustments, benchmarking and the “commitment to best practices” (Fransen 2011,
p. 361), sustainability governance standards can potentially develop towards “higher
stringency and strictness” (Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2013b, p. 131; Nadvi 2008). Con-
vergence in this regard can also be termed as “upward harmonization of best practices”
(Pedro et al. 2017, p. 163).
Integrative governance (9/4) can refer to different entities, particularly regarding
organizational and policy integration as well as the integration of governance actors
and their respective interests (Humrich 2013). With regard to governance policies,
integration can refer (a) to cascading international norms and policies into private
governance on the ground and (b) to integrating private governance principles into
“national political systems or international agreements” (Pattberg 2006, p. 589f). Con-
sidering governance actors, integration can refer to the merging of organizations, e.g.
regarding the merging of UTZ and Rainforest Alliance, two major sustainability gov-
ernance setters for agricultural products (UTZ 2018).
Alignment practices (e.g. Lister et al. 2015; Meidinger 2008) (4/4) can refer (a) to
approximating the content of different sustainability governance approaches (particu-
larly standards and laws) which allows e.g. the usage of cross-recognition agreements
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and (b) to combining previously unconnected governance approaches. This second
alignment perspective requires the creation of compatible linkages between different
governance approaches.
5.2.3 Meta governance
Meta governance (134 coded segments/18 documents) provides governance for frag-
mented sustainability governance and receives medium attention in our data sample
(Derkx and Glasbergen 2014; Meuleman and Niestroy 2015; Renard and Loconto
2012; Roberts 2011). While meta governance was traditionally executed by govern-
mental bodies, we witness that private governance actors such as NGOs and companies
increasingly engage as meta governance setters (Derkx and Glasbergen 2014). As a
text book example, the ISEAL Alliance (71/17) provides meta governance for sustain-
ability standards and receives the lion’s share of scholarly attention (Fransen 2015,
p. 297). As a non-profit organization, ISEAL serves as a meta governance setter with a
particular focus on its member organizations. By doing so, ISEAL offers the “standards
for standard setting”. With the words of Bernstein and van der Ven, “ISEAL governs
the governors” (2017, p. 547). Meta governance can entail management approaches
of the other identified management types. Despite the great variety of instruments and
actors to execute meta governance, research has almost exclusively focused on ISEAL.
Only recently, scholars began to focus on other (potential) meta governance setters.
Besides ISEAL, new meta governance setters are emerging which could potentially
lead to “rival meta-governance initiatives” (Fransen 2015, p. 293). Competing meta
governance setters could lead to greater coordination and harmonization issues instead
of resolving them (Fransen 2015, p. 293). Again, the role of companies as potential
meta governance actors has hardly been addressed by academia (as shown by zero
overlaps of the codes meta governance and role of companies. Little is known to what
extend companies have the capabilities, legitimacy, and incentives to serve as meta
governance setters.
In summary, the existing literature has a strong focus on NGOs, IGOs, and gov-
ernmental bodies as governance setters and their respective possibilities to manage
sustainability governance fragmentation. Although companies increasingly operate as
governance makers, there is scarce research on how companies as governance setters
can manage fragmented sustainability governance. In this vein, we also lack research
on which management approaches are best suited for the different actor groups (com-
panies, NGOs, governments, etc.). In addition, we only found two studies that address
the aspect of necessary competences to manage fragmentation (Dorsch and Flachsland
2017; Ewert and Maggetti 2016).
6 Concluding remarks, further research and limitations
We used a systematic literature review and a citation network analysis to shed light on
the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance. In particular, we focused
on the dual role of companies as potential governance makers and takers. Our study
assesses the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance and its particulari-
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ties. Sustainability governance is unique for at least three reasons: it deals with multiple
sustainability dimensions, involves various stakeholder groups as governance makers
and takers, and follows a system, life cycle and/or value chain perspective. Naturally,
fragmented sustainability governance has interlinkages and overlaps to (fragmented)
governance in general. Based on our methodological approach to focus on publica-
tions that cover aspects of fragmented sustainability governance, we are not able to
empirically derive conclusions about the differences and similarities of fragmented
sustainability governance and fragmented governance in general.6 Certainly, doing so
represents a promising avenue for further research.
However, using the particular field of sustainability governance, we were able to illu-
minate specific characteristics of fragmented sustainability governance (e.g. regarding
the overarching types and dimensions of fragmented sustainability governance and
management approaches to address this). This allows us to introduce some tentative
assumptions about the differences and similarities between sustainability governance
and governance in general/in other areas (e.g. taxation, customs and transnational
laws). Regarding our conceptual framework of types and dimensions of fragmented
sustainability governance, we assume that the variety of ends (multiple sustainabil-
ity dimensions), the means (soft law vs./and hard law) as well as the importance of
different stakeholder groups (actors) are quite specific for the field of sustainability
governance. In contrast, the outcome (quality, effectiveness) and context (sectoral
focus, geographic focus) might show similarities to other fields of fragmented gover-
nance such as global tax or security governance.
Furthermore, regarding the identified management types for fragmentation, we pro-
pose that some components of our framework (such as the overarching management
types of coordination, convergence and integration, and meta governance) could also
be applied to fragmentation in a general governance context. However, some features
such as orchestration (e.g. for climate governance) and complementary governance
of public and private actors (e.g. manifesting in MSIs) are rather specific for sustain-
ability governance. Against this background, we invite researchers to further expand,
develop, and criticize our conceptual framework and identified types of managing
fragmentation.
In the descriptive findings section, we provided a mapping of the research on frag-
mented sustainability governance in order to accomplish our first objective. A key
finding is that the literature is gaining momentum since the year 2013, spreads across
different journals, and shows contributions from various scientific disciplines. Yet,
when looking at the most influential (in terms of number of citations) publications in
our data sample, contributions with a background in political science clearly stand out.
Although political science publications provide us with valuable insights regarding the
phenomenon of fragmented sustainability governance, they are so far of limited help
in assessing the multifaceted role of companies as governance makers and takers in
environments of fragmented sustainability governance because they often stay on a
rather abstract level of analysis, focus on transnational environmental topics decoupled
from corporate value chains, and employ an outside view on the business firm. In other
6 We want to thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing out the interesting question which findings and
conclusions are specific about fragmented sustainability governance compared to governance in general.
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words, there seems to be an interesting potential in closing the gap between system-
oriented perspectives such as in political science and the internal actor-perspective of
companies that management studies could help to illuminate.
With regard to the state of literature, there is a dominance of publications with a
political science background. At the same time, our citation network and bibliometric
analyses show that other scientific disciplines deliver valuable contributions and often
refer to political science publications as leading studies on fragmented sustainability
governance.
To further assess the composition of the research, we encourage scholars to conduct
cluster analyses of the research on fragmented sustainability governance in order to
find out communities of research publications. This could e.g. be executed with further
network analyses and modularity calculations (Blondel et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2018;
Lambiotte et al. 2009; Wetzstein 2017). Furthermore, future research could assess the
maturity of this research field by using established indicators for the maturity of a
research field (Edmondson and McManus 2007; Keathley et al. 2013).
Regarding the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability governance, we
found that this field of research is still offering ample room for research, particular in
the business and economics community and considering e.g. the dual role of companies
in environments of fragmented sustainability governance. We therefore encourage (a)
researchers from all disciplines to put a stronger emphasis on the interlinkages between
companies and fragmented sustainability governance and (b) more researchers from
the business and economics realm to join the debate.
We provided a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon of fragmented
sustainability governance. Building upon the literature, we developed a conceptual
framework of different types of fragmentation, structured according to the ends, means,
context, and potential outcomes of sustainability governance. Overall, our conceptual
framework calls for two avenues for further research. First, we suggest to elaborate on
how the fragmentation of sustainability governance might differ in different contexts
and how strong (or weak) the different dimensions of fragmentation might manifest.
Second, further research could assess potential patterns of dimensions of fragmen-
tation, e.g. considering the (potential) relationship of hard law/soft law (means) and
geographic focus (context). Potential patterns of sustainability governance fragmen-
tation could for example be identified with a cluster analysis.
Considering the role of companies in landscapes of fragmented sustainability
governance, we encourage researchers to further elaborate on different types of frag-
mentation regarding the interplay of companies and fragmentation. We therefore call
for further research on the diversity and interplay of sustainability goals and the variety
of contextual factors that shape fragmented sustainability governance. In particular,
research should further assess the sectoral and value chain factors as main aspects that
impact fragmentation.
Considering the distinction of governance makers and takers, we encourage
researchers to further highlight the different roles and contributions of actor groups
in different parts of our conceptual model. By advancing research in this regard, one
could derive a more comprehensive understanding of the potential contributions of
different actor groups, particularly companies, when making or taking governance.
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We derived from the literature three types of managing fragmented sustainability
governance: coordination, convergence and integration, and meta governance. Overall,
the scholarly debate particularly focuses on governance makers (states, NGOs, IGOs)
and their respective means to manage fragmentation. Less attention is drawn on how
governance takers, particularly companies, can handle the multiplicity of sustainability
governance. We therefore encourage further research to generate useful guidance on
how companies as governance takers can manage the multiplicity of sustainability
governance approaches they deal with in daily business.
Considering the role of companies as governance makers, we need to know which
competences are needed to fulfill the task of (a) setting governance and (b) managing
the fragmentation of sustainability governance in a proactive manner. We therefore
encourage researchers to further highlight the needed competences of different actors
with regard to managing fragmentation.
Although we chose the keywords and search strings with great diligence, we might
have missed relevant publications which do not include our keywords in their abstract
or title. Considering the qualitative data analysis of the SLR data set, we cannot say
anything about the representativeness of our findings, e.g. considering the represen-
tation and configuration of different dimensions of fragmentation of sustainability
governance. Naturally, our findings only mirror the published scholarly knowledge.
However, they do not necessarily resemble real-life manifestations of fragmented
sustainability governance. In this vein, we encourage researchers to apply our concep-
tual contributions on types of fragmentation and forms of managing fragmentation to
empirical cases. Nevertheless, we are confident that our SLR provides useful starting
points for mutual learning and exchange between researchers from different disci-
plines.
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A B S T R A C T
Governance is needed to address sustainability challenges along global value chains. Yet, the multiplicity or
fragmentation of public and private sustainability governance resembles a potential hurdle for coping with
sustainability challenges. This fragmentation is also intriguing from a research perspective, as little is known
about the drivers of governance fragmentation in specific commodity sectors. This study assesses the frag-
mentation of sustainability governance in the global gold sector. Four general factors for fragmentation are
derived from the literature: contextual factors, intra- and inter-organizational factors as well as scope of gov-
ernance. A comprehensive case study, including a qualitative analysis of 26 in-depth interviews with experts in
the gold sector, is used to investigate these general factors in the case of gold and to derive gold-specific factors
for fragmentation. The five key findings are that, first, specific industry characteristics of the gold sector create
actor-specific governance needs that lead to a multiplicity of governance schemes. Second, key governance
references exist in the case of gold, but leave room for interpretation, thus encouraging a multiplicity of gov-
ernance. Third, intra-organizational factors considerably impact the fragmentation of governance for gold, re-
garding diﬀerent governance initiators and members, organizational logics, missions and ‘business models’ and
the framing of sustainability. Fourth, the scope of governance strongly explains fragmentation in the gold sector.
Fifth, competition between governance makers for gold provides only weak explanations for the resulting
fragmentation. A conceptual framework is introduced that encapsulates general factors of fragmentation from
the literature and gold-specific factors from the empirical findings. It serves to refine, enrich and display factors
of fragmentation in their interaction in the gold sector. Insights from this study expand the scholarly knowledge
on fragmented sustainability governance and provide a starting point for further cross-case and comparative
studies of fragmented sustainability governance.
1. Introduction
Global sustainability governance increasingly depends on actors
beyond governments (Bernstein, 2011; Bitzer, 2012; Börzel and Risse,
2010) and is characterized by the interplay of diﬀerent actors that
provide governance to tackle sustainability challenges along global
value chains. Regarding the shift from primarily government-based
governance to the provision of rules by a variety of actors, which can be
framed with the notion of private governance, one phenomenon is of
great importance: In the last 30 years, a great diversity of new private
governance approaches emerged to address sustainability challenges in
various commodity sectors (Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Riisgaard, 2011;
Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011). This is framed as a fragmentation of
governance (Fransen and Conzelmann, 2015; Gupta et al., 2016; Held
and Young, 2013; Pattberg et al., 2014). This fragmentation of
sustainability governance occurs in several industrial sectors like coﬀee,
agriculture and textiles (Fransen, 2011; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005;
Schouten and Bitzer, 2015; Turcotte et al., 2014). Increasingly, private
sustainability governance approaches are also introduced to the mi-
nerals and metals industries, resulting in an increasing number and
diversity of governance approaches (Kickler et al., 2018; Marques,
2016; Mori Junior, Sturman and Imbrogiano, 2017; Young et al., 2014).
In the case of the gold sector, various sustainability governance
schemes for gold emerged in the last two decades to tackle sustain-
ability challenges related to the extraction, processing and trading of
gold, thus eventually leading to a landscape of fragmented sustain-
ability governance (see Fig. 1). This fragmentation of (private) sus-
tainability governance can cause challenges for practitioners that need
to cope with a variety of governance approaches when operating in
their commodity sector and addressing sustainability challenges (Bitzer
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et al., 2008; Held and Young, 2013; Hospes, van der Valk and van der
Mheen-Sluijer, 2012; Smith and Fischlein, 2010; Zelli and van Asselt,
2013). Furthermore, the phenomenon of fragmented sustainability
governance is also intriguing from a research perspective. While there is
abundant literature on gold-related sustainability challenges (Andrews,
2016; Childs, 2008; Mudd, 2007), we lack suﬃcient knowledge on the
emergence of (fragmented) governance to address them (Marques,
2016; Mori Junior et al., 2017; Vogel, 2018; Young, 2018; Young et al.,
2014). Against this background, the overall research question (RQ0) of
this paper is: How can we explain the emergence of the fragmented sus-
tainability governance for gold?
In order to answer this question, I use three sub-questions: RQ1:
What is fragmented sustainability governance? RQ2: Which types of general
factors can explain the emergence of fragmented sustainability governance?
In a first step, I review the literature on fragmented sustainability
governance and provide a brief overview of the phenomenon of frag-
mented sustainability governance. When doing so, I include scholarly
knowledge from a variety of research disciplines, primarily referring to
political science, environmental studies, law and legal studies as well as
business and economics research. Building on this, I derive mechanisms
from the literature that explain the fragmentation of sustainability
governance and assign them to four overarching categories.
Using a comprehensive case study, including 26 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with experts in the field, these general factors
from the literature are applied to the case of governance for gold, in
order to answer the third sub-question (RQ3): How do general factors for
fragmentation and gold-specific factors influence the fragmentation of gov-
ernance for gold? This step serves to a) investigate the identified general
factors of governance fragmentation in the case of gold and b) identify
gold-specific factors that explain governance fragmentation in this
sector. By doing so, this study contributes to the scholarly knowledge
on diﬀerent factors that help explain the emergence of fragmented
sustainability governance. Furthermore, I aim to refine the literature on
fragmented sustainability governance and contextualize it in the case of
the gold sector, thus advancing the scholarly knowledge.
As a distinct contribution, this study provides an encompassing
analysis of sustainability schemes for gold. Furthermore, it provides
some thoughts on investigating gold-specific factors for governance
fragmentation in commodity sectors beyond the gold sector. To address
this, a conceptual framework is introduced in the discussion section
that entails both general factors as well as gold-specific factors for
fragmentation. This framework aims to stimulate the academic dis-
cussion on factors that explain the fragmentation of governance, it
serves to identify areas of further research and particularly encourages
researchers to apply the conceptual framework as a conceptual lens to
study further commodity sectors. The study concludes with some final
remarks, limitations and suggestions for further research.
2. General overview of the fragmentation of sustainability
governance
Adequate governance approaches are necessary to cope with global
sustainability challenges (Newig et al., 2007; Voß and Bornemann,
2011). Building on the governance definition by Williamson (2010),
sustainability governance aims to create and implement governance
instruments and a regulatory environment that allows diﬀerent actor
groups to prevent or reduce sustainability challenges. By doing so,
sustainability governance can foster pathways of sustainable develop-
ment (see Meuleman and Niestroy, 2015). Considering the increasing
complexity of global value chain operations and the aﬃliated sustain-
ability challenges, governments as traditional public governance actors
struggle to deliver sustainability governance approaches (Abbott,
Fig. 1. Timeline of the development of sustainability governance for gold (own illustration).
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2012a; Bäckstrand, 2008; Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; Biermann and
Pattberg, 2008; Bush et al., 2015; Chkanikova and Lehner, 2015;
Kalfagianni, 2014; Smith and Fischlein, 2010). Against this back-
ground, private governance actors such as civil society organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and business firms gained im-
portance as new providers of sustainability governance (Abbott and
Snidal, 2009; Foley, 2017; Fransen and Conzelmann, 2015; Grabs,
2018; Holzscheiter et al., 2016; Johnstone, 2019; Kalfagianni, 2014;
Schouten and Bitzer, 2015). Following this line of thought, private
governance refers to non-governmental governance actors (e.g. com-
panies) that create, implement and enforce (voluntary) governance
approaches to provide a regulatory environment (Kalfagianni, 2014;
Perez, 2011; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Given this change in gov-
ernance, sustainability governance is increasingly characterized by co-
existing, complementary or cooperating public and private governance
actors and their respective formal and informal governance instruments
(Bartley, 2007; Boström et al., 2015; de Bakker et al., 2019; Derkx and
Glasbergen, 2014; Eberlein et al., 2014; Grabs, 2018; Johnstone, 2019;
Marx, 2017; Reinecke et al., 2012). Due to the emergence of private
governance actors, a variety of new, predominantly voluntary, gov-
ernance instruments such as sustainability standards and labels, codes
of conduct or sustainability certifications were introduced (Abbott and
Snidal, 2009; Auld, 2014; Derkx and Glasbergen, 2014; Kalfagianni,
2014; Reinecke et al., 2012). In this study, these diverse governance
approaches are summarized with the term sustainability scheme
(Kickler and Franken, 2017; MacGregor et al., 2017; Mori Junior and
Ali, 2017).
Furthermore, I apply the distinction between governance makers
and takers in the context of sustainability governance actors (see
Jinnah, 2017; Schultze, 2003). Governance makers are creating and
implementing sustainability governance through respective instruments
such as sustainability schemes. Considering private sustainability gov-
ernance, new actors such as companies and civil society organizations
can actively fulfill the role of governance makers besides governments
(Pies et al., 2014; Scherer et al., 2014). On the contrary, actors that are
primarily aﬀected by sustainability governance and its regulatory in-
struments, can be considered as governance takers. In the context of
sustainability challenges, companies represent a major group of gov-
ernance takers (Pies et al., 2014; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The
focus of this study lies on governance makers in the gold sector and
their respective sustainability schemes and organizations.
The resulting quantity and variety of new public and private sus-
tainability governance approaches for a single commodity sector results
in a so-called fragmentation of governance (Biermann et al., 2009; Zelli
and van Asselt, 2013). This fragmentation of sustainability governance
has become a prominent topic in various scientific disciplines, in-
cluding, but not limited to, political science (e.g. Abbott, 2012b;
Fransen, 2011; Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014; Schleifer, 2013; Zelli and
van Asselt, 2013), law and legal studies (e.g. Bartley, 2011; Holley,
2016), and business and economics research (e.g. Reinecke et al., 2012;
Schouten and Glasbergen, 2011). Furthermore, the seminal article by
Biermann et al. (2009) can be regarded as a corner stone for the sci-
entific discourse on fragmented sustainability governance.
Lacking a single overarching governance entity or rule setting au-
thority, governance naturally comes with some degree of fragmentation
(Kalfagianni, 2014; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013). While scholars agree on
the relevance of fragmentation, there is a lack of definitional clarity
(Isailovic et al., 2013; Pattberg et al., 2014; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013).
Similar to the debate on framing ‘governance’ (Bush et al., 2015; Welch,
2013), scholars have not agreed on a universal understanding of what
fragmentation means and how governance becomes fragmented. In the
simplest way, fragmentation refers to the simultaneous provision of
sustainability governance by diﬀerent actors and approaches.
Existing research analyzed diﬀerent factors that explain the re-
sulting fragmentation of sustainability governance schemes for diﬀerent
commodity sectors (e.g. Reinecke et al., 2012; Smith and Fischlein,
2010; Turcotte et al., 2014; Von Geibler, 2013). Based on a literature
review, this paper develops four overarching categories that help ex-
plain the fragmentation of sustainability governance: contextual fac-
tors, intra-organizational & inter-organizational factors, as well as the
scope of governance (Table 1).
2.1. Contextual factors
Sustainability challenges in commodity sectors and along global
value chains are not occurring in a vacuum but take place in a specific
context. Therefore, governance approaches to tackle these challenges
are also embedded in contextual circumstances. This context is shaped
by the overarching regulatory environment and the respective industry
characteristics.
According to the literature, a key explanation for the variety of
governance approaches could be the “absence of an overarching au-
thority, such as a state government or industry association, [that] cre-
ates a space that allows private actors to become involved in regula-
tion” (Manning and Reinecke, 2016, p. 631). However, according to
Reinecke et al. (2012), little is known whether the existence (or ab-
sence) of an encompassing overarching authority leads to fragmenta-
tion of governance approaches or not (Reinecke et al., 2012).
While some commodity sectors show a multiplicity and diversity of
governance approaches (e.g. textile and coﬀee), other sectors (e.g.
fishery) only show a limited number of sustainability governance ap-
proaches (Fransen, 2011; Schouten and Bitzer, 2015; Turcotte et al.,
2014). Some researchers suggest that the specific characteristics of a
commodity industry can impact the resulting degree of fragmentation
(Fransen and Conzelmann, 2015). According to Fransen and Con-
zelmann (2015, p. 261f), relevant industry characteristics can e.g. in-
clude the “degree of industrial concentration”, the “reputation sensi-
tivity” of firms in the sector, their “functional similarity” as well as the
“competitive value of the economic activity” in the sector.
2.2. Intra-organizational factors of governance makers
Sustainability governance is shaped by governance makers. Yet,
governance makers are not a homogeneous entity but resemble a great
diversity of actors such as civil society groups, companies and gov-
ernmental bodies (Acharya, 2016; Köhne, 2014; Rasche, 2012; Zeyen
et al., 2016). Put diﬀerently, the organization or group of actors behind
a sustainability scheme typically consists of a variety of actors. I use the
notion of ‘intra-organizational factors’ to assess the internal factors of
such sustainability schemes, e.g. including the composition of internal
actors and the mission and vision. Given their heterogeneous con-
stituency, the literature suggests that governance makers show diﬀerent
understandings and conceptualizations of sustainability, as they have
an individual framing of sustainability or sustainable practices (Bitzer,
2012; de Bakker et al., 2019; Manning and Reinecke, 2016; Smith and
Fischlein, 2010). This framing of sustainability is closely linked to
Table 1
Comparison of overarching categories and factors that explain governance fragmentation (own depiction).
Category I. Contextual II. Intra-organizational III. Inter-organizational IV. Scope of governance
Key features - Regulatory environment
- Industry characteristics
- Composition of governance maker
- Mission, framing and objectives
- Competition vs. cooperation - Content and target audience
- Means and communication
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normative beliefs which can considerably vary amongst governance
makers (Hospes, 2014; Reinecke et al., 2012; Tallontire, 2007).
Therefore, some scholars suggest that this is a key factor that helps us
understand the plurality of governance approaches (Nelson and
Tallontire, 2014).
Closely related, diﬀerent and often heterogeneous governance ma-
kers can have varying viewpoints on the ‘right’ ends of setting gov-
ernance for sustainability, resulting in diﬀerent objectives, definitions
of the problem to be solved and agendas (Fransen, 2011; Manning and
Reinecke, 2016). The internal diversity of governance makers often-
times comes with a plurality of opinions on determining the objectives.
In other words, the objectives of a governance maker can be the result
of a discursive consensus finding within the governance organization
(Bartley, 2007; Manning and Reinecke, 2016).
2.3. Inter-organizational factors: interactions between governance makers
Third, governance for sustainability is not shaped by single gov-
ernance makers in isolation. Instead, governance makers interact and
have relational ties. So far, the literature inter alia focused on compe-
tition between governance makers and its eﬀect on the multiplicity of
governance schemes (Gulbrandsen, 2005; Meidinger, 2011; Prado,
2013; Smith and Fischlein, 2010). Rivalry of private governance makers
occurs e.g. in the coﬀee and forestry sector, such as in the case of the
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)1 and the Programme for the En-
dorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) (Bartley, 2007; Bloomfield,
2012; Lee, 2009; Muradian and Pelupessy, 2005; Raynolds et al., 2007;
Sasser et al., 2006). In the context of fragmentation, competition be-
tween governance makers can come in many forms. Governance makers
can e.g. compete for the “definition of sustainability performance
(Smith and Fischlein, 2010)” (Bitzer et al., 2012, p. 359), the ‘right’
ends and means to tackle selected sustainability challenges, or over
market shares of goods certified with their respective sustainability
labels (Bitzer, 2012; Reinecke et al., 2012). According to some scholars,
competition does not necessarily lead to a smaller number of govern-
ance actors, but can instead lead to an emergence and continuing ex-
istence of multiple sustainability schemes (Turcotte et al., 2014).
2.4. Scope of governance
Sustainability governance can address a great variety of issues and
stakeholders. In this regard, the scope of governance approaches is an
important factor to understand the multiplicity of governance in a
single commodity sector. As a consequence of the internal and external
diﬀerences in framing sustainability and the deduced ends and means,
the focus on sustainability topics may considerably vary across gov-
ernance makers. Diﬀerent governance approaches can range from ad-
dressing very specific subject matters, e.g. handling of chemicals, to
universal sustainability challenges such as dealing with social aspects in
general (Acharya, 2016; Reinecke et al., 2012).
Diﬀerent governance makers can have varying stakeholder groups,
as they e.g. focus on industrialized and large producers rather than
small-scale actors (Auld et al., 2015; Duggan and Kochen, 2016;
Reinecke et al., 2012) or address diﬀerent geographical regions (Foley,
2017; Fransen, 2011; Pattberg, 2006; Pekdemir, 2018). Therefore,
sustainability governance can be fragmented with regard to the specific
target audiences of the respective governance makers. Addressing dif-
ferent audiences naturally includes aspects of communication: While
some governance makers are visible to the end consumer (e.g. via la-
bels), others stay invisible for regular end consumers and rather focus
on business-to-business (B2B) transactions.
In a nutshell, this section introduced the notion of fragmented
sustainability governance and provided four general categories of
factors that can explain the fragmentation of sustainability governance.
These factors resemble important mechanisms that explain governance
fragmentation regardless of the commodity sector – be it cotton, coﬀee
or copper. Yet, they provide only limited guidance with regard to
sector-specific factors that contribute to fragmentation. Furthermore,
we have little knowledge on how these categories interact in a com-
prehensive setting. Therefore, the general categories of factors are in-
vestigated and refined in the particular case of the gold sector, using a
comprehensive case study.
3. Research design
This study uses a qualitative case study approach (Siggelkow, 2007;
Sousa and Voss, 2001; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2009) to apply and refine
the identified general factors of governance fragmentation and to
identify new, case-specific factors. Sustainability governance for gold is
used as the respective case, whereas the unit of analysis is the organi-
zational field of actors, in the form of eleven sustainability schemes for
gold and their respective organizational bodies. This includes the In-
itiative for Responsible Mining (IRMA), the International Council on
Mining & Metals (ICMM), the International Cyanide Management In-
stitute (ICMI), the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the
World Gold Council (WGC), the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI),
the Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC), the Alliance for Responsible
Mining (ARM), Fairtrade International, as well as the Regional Certi-
fication Mechanism (RCM) and the Certified Trading Chains (CTC)
approaches. Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983), this approach
aims to take the “totality of relevant actors” and their respective
composition and relationships into account (1983, p. 148).
3.1. Choosing the case of governance for gold
Governance for gold resembles an excellent case to study the
emergence of fragmented governance, primarily because governance
for gold is dynamic and still in the making. The recent years are
characterized by the simultaneous emergence of a multitude of dif-
ferent sustainability schemes. While other researchers focused on sec-
tors like “agriculture, forestry, and apparel manufacturing” (Wahl and
Bull, 2014, p. 585), there are only few studies that highlight aspects of
sustainability governance in extractive industries and its fragmentation
(Kickler et al., 2018; Marques, 2016; Mori Junior et al., 2017; Vogel,
2018; Young, 2018; Young et al., 2014).
3.2. Data sources and data analysis
The case study draws on multiple sources of data, including expert
interviews and secondary data (Sousa and Voss, 2001; Yin, 2009). It
includes 26 semi-structured interviews with key experts. The questions
in the semi-structured interview guide particularly focused on the
emergence of multiple sustainability schemes in the gold sector, the
reasons and consequences of fragmentation, as well as the inter-
relationships between the diﬀerent governance actors. The experts are
representatives from diﬀerent stakeholder groups and were purpose-
fully selected, with representatives from sustainability schemes being
the primary point of contact. All interviewees were anonymized and
received an identifier (ID) code, indicating their stakeholder group with
C (company), G (governance maker), N (NGO) and R (research) (see
Table A.2 in the Appendix). The interviews were conducted between
November 2017 and April 2018, lasted 65min on average and were
conducted in English, German or Spanish. Where applicable, direct
quotes were translated to English. All interviews were transcribed
verbatim and were manually coded, using the software MAXQDA to
support this process. The structured coding process included three
steps: open line-by-line coding, aggregating the codes with under-
pinnings from the literature, as well as re-coding and revising the code-
set. Additional data sources include freely accessible sources such as the1 A list of abbreviations can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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governance organizations’ websites, the actual standards or principles
of the sustainability schemes, public documents, research publications
and media reports (Zander et al., 2016). The additional data sources
were analyzed with a qualitative data analysis approach, yet without
following the structured coding approach that was used for analyzing
the expert interviews. Findings from this additional data analysis are
used to support the findings from the expert interviews and to provide
further information on the sustainability schemes in the gold sector (see
e.g. Fig. 1 and Table 2).
4. Explaining governance fragmentation in the gold sector
This section provides a description of the case and the empirical
findings and contextualizes the insights from the literature review in
the specific case of fragmented governance in the gold sector.
Furthermore, selected results are discussed within the immediate con-
text of the case study. In more detail, I explore how the identified
general factors for fragmentation manifest in the case of gold and which
specific factors for fragmentation occur in the gold sector. In particular,
eleven sustainability schemes for gold are considered. The findings
suggest that the fragmentation of sustainability schemes for gold is due
to multicausal factors:
“Fragmentation does exist but it is not one-dimensional. There are
diﬀerent reasons for fragmentation related to diﬀerent standards,
diﬀerent organizational modes of operation (e.g. funding), diﬀerent
objectives and incentives (of organizations or their funders).” (R6).
In the words of one interviewee, the fragmentation of governance
for gold is “the reality in which we operate” (C7). And further:
“It seems really nice and simple to say: ‘Let’s just have one standard’.
[But] the reality is always a bit more nuanced than that. You have to
ask yourself: ‘What is the purpose of this standard? Whom is it
working for? What are the stakeholders? What are the expecta-
tions?’” (C7).
Against this background, there has been a strong increase in gov-
ernance approaches in the gold sector. Although some national and
international standards and legislations already existed to regulate the
extracting, processing and trading of gold, a multiplicity of sustain-
ability schemes with respective organizations emerged. As a con-
sequence, one could witness the emergence of an “alphabet soup of […]
acronyms” (Horowitz, 2006, p. 307) of governance schemes and actors
for gold-related sustainability challenges over the last two decades.
Fig. 1 displays the development of key actors and governance ap-
proaches related to gold.
The development of sustainability governance for gold started in the
early 2000s and gained further momentum in 2010 with the in-
troduction of the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains (OECD, 2013) with a variety of diﬀerent governance
approaches following shortly afterwards. In addition, the launch of the
International Cyanide Management Code (2002), the Conflict Free
Smelter Program (2008) the LBMA Responsible Gold Guidance and the
WGC Conflict-Free Gold Standard (both 2012) are milestones for the
large-scale mining sector (LSM). With regard to artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM), the development of a Standard Zero (in 2006) by
the Alliance for Responsible Mining (later on in cooperation with
Fairtrade), as well as the resulting Fairmined and Fairtrade standards
resemble key development steps.
In order to understand the emergence of a fragmented governance
landscape for gold, the following sections highlight contextual factors
of the gold industry, intra-organizational mechanisms within the gov-
ernance makers, inter-organizational interactions between these actors
as well as the scope of governance of sustainability schemes.
4.1. Contextual factors in the case of gold
This section highlights the unique circumstances in which govern-
ance for gold is shaped, including both regulatory aspects (4.1.1) as
well as industry characteristics (4.1.2).
4.1.1. Regulatory environment for gold
The diﬀerent sustainability schemes for gold are embedded in an
overarching regulatory environment that impacts the prevailing gov-
ernance fragmentation in the form of diﬀerent sustainability schemes.
One can diﬀerentiate between sector-specific regulation and unspecific
regulation that was not exclusively designed for gold-related sustain-
ability challenges.
First, there exists a plethora of national and international frame-
works, global standards and regulations that are used by the sustain-
ability schemes for gold as references to shape their content. These
sector-unspecific regulations do not necessarily have a focus on mining
or gold. According to one interviewee:
“Overarching frameworks are numerous. […] It could be up to 80
diﬀerent frameworks, […] not for gold, but for metals, mining and
minerals […]. I mean it’s a very long list, so I would say [the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI), the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) performance standards, the International Labour Organization
(ILO)] conventions, convention of biological diversity, World
Heritage Convention, I mean it’s an enormous list.” (C3).
In addition, the findings suggest that national or regional regula-
tions and laws can impact the number and content of sustainability
schemes for gold and eventually lead to fragmentation. One expert
summarizes this as follows:
“Standards only supplement or work based on regulation.
Regulation will always diﬀer from country to country, mining diﬀers
from country to country […]. This justifies multiple standards.”
(R6).
The findings show that the existing diversity of overarching fra-
meworks and regulations that are relevant for gold-aﬃliated sustain-
ability challenges is mirrored by the diversity of sustainability schemes.
Second, the findings in the gold sector suggest that there are distinct
guidelines and regulations with great importance for gold (specific
regulation). This particularly includes the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010) and the OECD
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Aﬀected and High-Risk Areas (OECD, 2013). A majority of the
sustainability schemes for gold either directly or indirectly refer to the
OECD Guidance and/or selected sections2 of the Dodd-Frank Act.3 Ac-
cording to the interviewees, both the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD
Guidance are considered as “game changers” (N4) for the gold sector
that rapidly altered the overall governance landscape:
“The OECD Due Diligence in the gold supply chain, the guidance
that they put out, that is a transparency initiative that is really
looking at what is required to be able to sell artisanal gold into the
international market essentially.” (N4).
And further:
“The dynamic around the discussion of conflict minerals was mainly
triggered by the legal regulations in the USA, the Dodd-Frank Act.
This initial impulse has strongly leveraged the discussion on
2 In the case of gold and extractive industries, the sections 1502, 1503 and to
some extent 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act are of importance.
3 For an encompassing assessment of the interlinkages and cross-references of
diﬀerent sustainability schemes for gold, I recommend the study by Kickler
et al. (2018).
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sustainability and resource extraction and responsibility in the
supply chain. And since then a lot happened based on this conflict
mineral discussion, like the [European Union (EU)] regulation and
all these diﬀerent initiatives.” (R1).
Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Guidance remain vague in
some aspects and do not cover all relevant gold-related sustainability
issues. Therefore, the findings suggest that they allow the sustainability
schemes a degree of freedom to interpret and operationalize them:
“In principal, the five-step model of the OECD is already the perfect
standard. […] The only question is then, how to interpret the whole
thing.” (C2).
And further:
“There are international treaties and so forth which were well-in-
tentioned, but remain very vague considering the implementation.
This makes it diﬃcult to implement them in detail and to audit
them.” (R7).
Overall, the analyzed data lead to the conclusion that the avail-
ability of two key references (sector-specific) and various additional
governance instruments (sector-unspecific) impacts the multiplicity of
sustainability schemes for gold, due to vagueness of the references,
uncovered aspects and the possibility to choose diﬀerent references.
4.1.2. Industry characteristics
The unique industry characteristics of the gold sector become ob-
vious when assessing the value chain architecture, the involved stake-
holder groups and the sustainability challenges. The value chain ar-
chitecture of gold has specifications in the dimensions of producers and
buyers, focal actors in the chain, as well as geographical aspects.
To begin with the latter, the value chain for gold spans several
stages and is strongly globalized. Considering the upstream part of the
chain, it entails the actual exploration and extraction of gold, trading by
intermediaries, processing and shipping the gold to the smelters
(Kickler and Franken, 2017). Linking the upstream and the downstream
part of the value chain, the refiners or smelters play a crucial role in
processing gold. While the extraction of gold primarily takes place in
China, Australia, Russia, the Americas as well as Africa, the refining of
gold does not necessarily correlate with the countries of origin. In
particular, Swiss smelters are key global players. The downstream value
chain entails the fabrication of intermediary products, the manu-
facturing (e.g. of jewelry) as well as sales and recycling usages (Kickler
and Franken, 2017). According to one interviewee, the various actors in
the gold value chain complicate the design and implementation of
governance approaches:
“The roots of the problem lie in the complexity of the industry itself.
[…] The mining issue - from the outside - at first blush, people say
‘that’s the mining industry’. But it is extraordinary complex! There
are diﬀerent parts of the industry that follow very diﬀerent objec-
tives!” (G6).
Going back to the extraction phase of the value chain, gold is sup-
plied by both LSM and ASM approaches. One expert summarizes this as
follows:
“Within the gold sector, you have to make a clear distinction be-
tween small scale, artisanal, medium and the large, industrial
mining sector which uses very diﬀerent […] techniques […] and has
very diﬀerent economic and social implications. There is no single
gold sector.” (R1).
For the purpose of this study, LSM refers to the “activity of major
companies as well as to mid-tier and junior-level companies or to any
formal company that complies with international performance stan-
dards” (CASM, 2009, p. 7). On the other hand, ASM refers to mining
practices by local communities that are often characterized by “low
investment, labor intensive local production, informality, as well as no
or low levels of mechanization and access to market” (CASM, 2009, p.
9). While the LSM-sector is dominated by a few multinational compa-
nies and an encompassing multiplicity of suppliers, sub-contractors and
service providers, it is estimated that 10–15 million miners work in the
ASM gold sector (Armah et al., 2013; CASM, 2009; Veiga and Bakker,
2004).4
Severe sustainability challenges arise from the mining, processing
and trading of gold (Andrews, 2016; Childs, 2008; Mudd, 2007). Yet,
one has to emphasize that LSM and ASM actors can face rather diﬀerent
challenges. For LSM, aspects of land degradation, indigenous rights and
potential conflicts with local communities might be ‘on top’ of the
sustainability list, while ASM actors are confronted with the usage of
hazardous chemicals, financing of armed conflicts and dangerous
working conditions (see e.g. Andrews, 2016; Childs, 2008; Mudd,
2007).
Considering the other end of the value chain (downstream), the
refined gold supplies three major market segments: industrial applica-
tions, jewelry and financial purposes. The findings reveal that each of
these buyer markets has certain particularities, stakeholders and re-
sulting expectations how sustainability schemes should be designed.
All extracted gold has to go through a smelting and refining process.
In general, “smelters and refineries are metallurgical facilities that
produce crude and refined metal products, respectively. […] For gold,
refining is the critical [step] for producing a salable pure product.”
(Young, 2018, n. 1).5 Given the importance of these process steps, it
seems reasonable to argue that smelters resemble a ‘bottleneck’ in the
value chain. However, the data suggest that the role of smelters as focal
actors in the gold value chain is contested. On the one hand, smelters
can be considered “the key pinch point in the supply chain. And so, they
are the actors that can excerpt influence upstream and downstream”
(G5). In more detail, smelters are an integral part of the supply chain
structure and “play an important role, because they are comparatively
few […] and accordingly have an impact on the upstream and down-
stream supply chain” (R1). One expert supports this by stating:
“Smelting is the key point in the value chain. And I would say that
initiatives that have the traceability and chain of custody or some
method of control in that choke point, they avoid that problem [of
conflict minerals] largely.” (G4).
On the other hand, some experts counter the aforementioned im-
portance and potential leverage point of smelters to implement and
shape sustainability schemes for gold. When asked if smelters had a
distinct importance for sustainability schemes, one interviewee stated:
“No. Maybe insofar as you need a smelter to achieve the purity of
the gold. But they do not have a powerful position as such. Because
there are a lot of smelters and they are geographically dispersed.
[…] E.g. there are a lot of smelters in India – don’t get me wrong
here – so cautiously speaking, they have zero sustainability stan-
dards there.” (C1).
In order to understand the industry characteristics of gold, one has
to consider the overall characteristics of the extractive industries.
Starting in the late 1990s, the extractive industries “increasingly em-
braced […] concepts of ‘environmental management’, ‘sustainable de-
velopment’, and ‘corporate social responsibility’” (Hilson, 2006, p.
225). A change of perception considering more responsible practices
emerged in the extractive industries, particularly regarding gold and
4 Although the diﬀerentiation between LSM and ASM actors is used, one has
to be aware that these categories are not well defined, as additional medium-
size actors might not fit into any of the categories.
5 Despite their diﬀerent purposes and technical processes, smelting and re-
fining are often used as interchangeable terms (Young, 2018). I refer to smelters
as an overall facility to smelt and refine gold.
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the so called 3T conflict minerals (tin, tungsten and tantalum) (Jenkins
and Yakovleva, 2006; Young, 2018).
4.2. Intra-organizational factors in the case of gold
The findings reveal that the eleven governance makers for gold and
their respective sustainability schemes considerably diﬀer regarding
their organizational constituency, their members and the resulting ends
and means of their governance engagement. The following sections
elaborate how the internal perspective of governance actors influences
the overall resulting fragmentation of governance for gold. In more
detail, they highlight the impact of the governance initiator and its
respective members (4.2.1), the organizational logic and mission
(4.2.2), the related internal framing of sustainability (4.2.3), as well as
the used means (4.2.4), on governance fragmentation.
4.2.1. Governance initiator and members
The governance makers behind the sustainability schemes have
varying organizational backgrounds: This includes e.g. multi-stake-
holder initiatives and civil society based actors such as IRMA, ICMI or
Fairmined, as well as governance makers with an explicit background
in mining companies and associations like the WGC and ICMM (Kickler
and Franken, 2017). Furthermore, additional governance makers are
rooted in the jewelry supply chain industry (RJC), or come from a semi-
governmental background like CTC and RCM.
The findings suggest that members of a governance maker play an
important role when analyzing the development of the fragmented
governance landscape for gold. The organizational members are at the
core of each governance maker and have strong interlinkages with the
organizational mission, logic, objectives and understanding of sustain-
ability, which are presented in the subsequent sections. The governance
makers for gold have distinct organizational member structures:
Organizations like ICMM, LBMA and the World Gold Council have a
strong industrial membership, particularly including the large players
in the industry. Yet, one can further diﬀerentiate the membership of
industrial companies: In the case of the RJC, the majority of its mem-
bers are jewelry manufacturers and retailers as well as gold traders and
refiners. In contrast, the actual gold producing or extracting companies
seem to be in the minority in this governance organization. According
to one interviewee:
“RJC, as well as LBMA and RMI are representations of interests with
a respective industry behind them. And they can have considerably
diﬀerent visions on how responsible supply chains should look like.”
(C2).
With regard to ASM, the ARM behind the Fairmined Standard is
organized as an alliance with distinct mining partners on the ground,
while the Fairtrade International foundation serves as an umbrella or-
ganization for a variety of sustainability schemes, including the
Fairtrade Standard for Gold and Precious Metals. For the specific case of
gold, Fairtrade partners with a technical advisory group, several con-
sultants and the Artisanal Gold Council, while keeping the organiza-
tional structure of a foundation (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations
International e.V, 2014b).
While one could assume that sustainability schemes for gold mainly
came from civil society organizations, the findings show that reality
looks diﬀerent, as many governance makers are primarily composed of
industrial actors. One expert summarizes this finding as follows:
“[A] lot of companies initiate governance initiatives and civil so-
ciety organizations are somewhat incorporated, but it remains un-
clear, whether and to what extend they are involved in setting and
monitoring the standard.” (N2).
While companies are not necessarily ‘better or worse’ governance
makers than civil society actors, this finding helps to understand why
certain governance makers focus on very particular sustainability
aspects of gold and respectively address specific target audiences such
as industrial refiners and large-scale mines, whereas small scale and
informal miners often ‘fly below the radar’ of these industry-led gov-
ernance organizations.
4.2.2. Organizational logic and mission
The analyzed data suggest that the organizational logics and mis-
sions of governance organizations considerably vary in the case of gold
and lead to a fragmentation. Considering diﬀerent logics of the involved
governance organizations, one interviewee suggests that some govern-
ance makers might have
“a logic of really implementing a positive change … at Fairtrade
perhaps the logic of scaling high, [is] to reach a lot of actors, a high
coverage and eventually you lose the contact to the ground. This is
similar at the RJC: many members and certified companies, but very
[few] mining actors.” (R7).
Adding to the notion of diﬀerent organizational logics, the findings
show that the motivation of members to join a governance maker (or to
create a new one) considerably diﬀers and therefore fosters a multi-
plicity of sustainability schemes. According to one expert:
“Diﬀerent actors are interested for diﬀerent reasons (drivers). It may
be a financial motivation caused by the organization itself (creating
organizational synergies, competition for funding/clients), it may be
due to downstream client requests (industry and consumers getting
confused with too many labels), it may be due to regulatory re-
quirements imposed by governments.” (R6).
In particular, the interviewees stress the importance of the funding
of a governance maker and its ‘business model’:
“It really depends on who is funding the governance organization,
whether the organization is funded by an international donor like
the [United Nations (UN)] or the World Bank or by the members of a
professional industry standard like RJC.” (R7).
Several experts argue that the diﬀerent ‘business models’, as a key
aspect of the organizational logic, foster the multiplicity and con-
tinuation of sustainability schemes for gold:
“[S]tandards are always a business model. If Fairtrade starts to
market [fair] gold, then [they] invest to define the criteria and to
find the sources [of gold] that comply with my criteria. And my
return [on investment] is […] the license fee provided by those who
use my label. This is a common [business] model of many stan-
dards”. (N1).
The importance of diﬀerent business models of governance makers
particularly occurs regarding Fairmined and Fairtrade which have si-
milar approaches and, according to an interviewee, address “the same
target group”, but Fairtrade’s “specific business model hinders them to
cooperate with others” (R3). Against this background, there seems to be
little incentive to actually abandon one’s business model, while in-
centives remain to adhere to the given business model and organiza-
tional logic.
Next to the organizational logic and structure, the data suggest that
the mission of a governance maker impacts the fragmentation of gov-
ernance for gold. Diﬀerent governance actors seem to:
“encapsulate in their mission statements how they see sustainability
meets with their organization, where their organization is going.
And I think that’s almost like the short hand, the abbreviation of
how they understand sustainability.” (C3).
While organizations like ICMM, WGC and LBMA are interested in
maintaining a good reputation of their industrial members by striving
for more responsible practices, other organizations are e.g. bound to
their mission on bringing positive change to small gold miners in de-
veloping countries. Taking these diﬀerent missions into consideration,
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it is no surprise that we witness a great diversity of governance
schemes. One expert describes this as follows:
“in the case of Fairtrade, they have a variety of goods, they do not
only have gold, they also work with agriculture. So maybe it is
diﬃcult for them to specialize in ASM. In [the case of Fairmined
they] are completely specializing and focusing on that, because it's
[their] mission [and] vision […].” (G3).
In addition, the findings suggest that the organizational mission of
each governance maker is inherently bound to the institutional back-
ground of the respective organization, e.g. considering the diﬀerences
between industrial actors as governance makers, multi-stakeholder in-
itiatives and civil society organizations. For the latter group, one expert
argues:
“Well, those are deeply rooted values in, I would say, environmental
movement or civil society organizations. They want to stick to their
ethics and they will not budge. If Fairtrade only wants to work with
producers in developing countries, that is their mantra. […] That's
just the way they're thinking, that's their leadership, that's their
mission.” (C3).
As an example, the mission of LBMA as a key player for the LSM
sector is to “ensure the highest levels of leadership, integrity and
transparency for the global precious metals industry by setting stan-
dards and developing market services” (LBMA, 2018), whereas Fair-
trade Gold wants to “see transparency, traceability, truth and justice
embedded into the livelihoods of the millions of artisanal and small-
scale miners across the world” (Fairtrade Labelling Organizations
International e.V, 2014a). By doing so, Fairtrade aims to “promote
sustainable development and to reduce poverty through fairer trade”,
which is aligned with the “core Fairtrade values of empowering pro-
ducers and local communities through trade and delivering economic,
social and environmental transformation and restoration” (Fairtrade
Labelling Organizations International e.V, 2013, p. 3).
4.2.3. Internal framing of sustainability
The findings in the gold sector reveal that diﬀerent members of the
governance maker can have diverging viewpoints on the content of its
sustainability scheme. In order to come to an agreement, the govern-
ance maker must provide a framing of sustainability. For the com-
modity of gold, the introduced diﬀerentiation between LSM and ASM is
crucial, as their specific sustainability challenges diﬀer considerably.
Against this background, there is ample room to frame the idea of
sustainability. According to one expert, organizations first have to de-
liver an internal framing of sustainability:
“First, you have to define criteria: ‘What does sustainability mean?’
That is essential when you want to create a standard. First, you have
to go through a discussion with diﬀerent stakeholders and define,
what [you] understand as sustainability” (N1).
Interestingly, in the ASM context, sustainability schemes rather
work with the notion of ‘fair’ considering the Fairmined and Fairtrade
standards or the closed-supply chain approach of Fair Trade in Gems
and Jewelry. This ‘fairness framing’ seems to follow a rather encom-
passing understanding of sustainability that incorporates multiple di-
mensions of sustainability. In the eyes of one interviewee,
“[…] sustainability or sustainable practices are how we create op-
portunities for the ASM […]. The sustainability is not only to reduce
impacts in the environment, it’s also to worry about all issues. In our
case, we believe that it is necessary to worry about diﬀerent sus-
tainable issues, the environment, the labor and social aspect, eco-
nomics, the ethical business.” (G3).
On the other hand, the LSM and medium sized mining sector prefers
the notion of ‘responsible’, as proven by the Responsible Jewellery
Council, the LBMA Responsible Gold Guidance or the forthcoming
standard by the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance. Yet, fol-
lowing this framing of responsible practices mirrors the approach of
some LSM schemes that resulted in a rather narrow focus, e.g. solely
focusing on one-dimensional aspects of sustainability like ‘conflict-free’
(WGC, RMI) or the handling of chemicals (Cyanide Management Code).
When finding such framing, the results suggest that each govern-
ance maker has to find an internal consensus, as diﬀerent members
have to agree on a common understanding of sustainability (framing)
and the respective goals and means to operationalize it. In the case of
gold, the individual internal framing of sustainability can be considered
to impact the ends, means and addressed sustainability topics of each
governance maker and therefore fosters fragmentation.
4.2.4. Means
The analyzed sustainability governance schemes for gold show
substantial diﬀerences when considering their means. This includes
inter alia standards (systems), certifications, frameworks and principles
as well as guidance and tracking systems. While most schemes are vo-
luntary, some have a quasi-mandatory character (e.g. the LBMA gui-
dance for refiners that want to stay on LBMA’s ‘Good Refinery List’).
One expert summarizes this as follows:
“LBMA, RMI or World Gold Council, they don’t really belong to the
category of voluntary standards. They are almost tools to realize
legal obligations like the diﬀerent regional or national im-
plementation of the OCED guidance or the Dodd-Frank Act. So those
standards help to translate the mandatory requirements into a fea-
sible and pragmatic manner in order to facilitate the implementa-
tion for their members.” (C4).
Diﬀerent means allow a variation in depth and stringency of the
governance scheme, as e.g. standards in the gold sector are mostly very
detailed and encompassing documents with more or less clear in-
dicators (Alliance for Responsible Mining and Fairmined, 2014;
Responsible Jewellery Council, 2013). On the other hand, frameworks
and principles are often characterized by brevity and lack of guidance
for operationalization, thus requiring additional references.
Additionally, schemes diﬀer with regard to using labels: Some
schemes have a strong focus on the entire gold supply chain and
therefore provide a product-based label for end consumers of gold, such
as Fairmined and Fairtrade (Kickler and Franken, 2017). In contrast,
other schemes, like LBMA or WGC, focus on certification logos for their
members, but so far do not use product-based labels. As the LBMA has a
specific focus on the supply chain and lacks visibility to end consumers,
it makes sense to work with a B2B certification instead of a product-
based label for end consumers.
4.3. Inter-organizational factors in the case of gold
The findings highlight that governance makers in the gold sector
show various interaction behaviors that are relevant for the resulting
fragmentation: shaping the discourse on sustainability (4.3.1), niche
experiments & pre-competition (4.3.2) and competition (4.3.3).
4.3.1. Shaping the discourse on sustainability in the gold sector
Similar to framing an individual understanding within the govern-
ance organization, governance makers also collectively shape the dis-
course on sustainability in the overall gold sector. Considering the de-
velopment of governance for gold over time, ICMM as an industry
association delivered a contribution to bring the discussion on more
responsible practices on the table amongst leading industrial actors.
From a civil society perspective, public awareness was directed towards
gold and its sustainability challenges, e.g. through the ‘No Dirty Gold
campaign’ by Earthworks in 2004.
Yet, similar to other sectors with fragmented governance, it remains
a key challenge to find and agree on a common vocabulary (Reinecke
et al., 2012). Finding such a consensus is partly driven by the Dodd-
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Frank Act and the OECD Guidance as key references for the involved
sustainability schemes. In addition, similar to studies in other sectors
(Manning and Reinecke, 2016), the triple bottom line of sustainability
became a sort of ‘lowest common denominator’, although the potential
contradiction of sustainability and mining remains a contested field of
discussion. According to one interviewee, consensus is e.g. reached
“as interfaces emerge between the diﬀerent initiatives, e.g. through
mutual recognition between LBMA, RJC and [the Conflict Free
Smelter Program (CFSP)] and between RJC and Fairmined and
Fairtrade. […] So, communalities increasingly emerge, leading to a
common ground.” (C4)
Although certain concepts (like the triple bottom line) and terms
(like sustainable development) seem to form a ‘lowest common de-
nominator’, the case study shows that the resulting sustainability
schemes still considerably diﬀer regarding their actual scope, topics and
target audience.
4.3.2. Niche experiments & pre-competition
Considering the origins of sustainability schemes for gold in the
beginning of the 2000s, the findings reveal that this early development
was primarily driven by niche experiments to establish schemes for
particular issues and target audiences. Due to this niche character, the
diﬀerent schemes had rather few direct contact points with each other
in the early days of implementing more sustainable practices. However,
regarding the introduction and framing of sustainability or responsi-
bility in the overall industry, the diﬀerent actors strongly debated on
the assumptions on sustainability in the mining context. The findings
suggest that, while the schemes were acting in their niches on an op-
erational level, they were in contact on a more normative level to
jointly discuss the overall basic assumptions of framing sustainability.
This early phase of sustainability schemes in the gold sector also
showed several cooperation approaches: In the ASM sector, ARM and
Fairtrade jointly developed the so called Standard Zero for ASM gold in
2009, which served as the foundation for the Fairmined and the
Fairtrade standards for gold. One interviewee frames this early devel-
opment of governance as:
“collaborating and the pre-competitive space, before [the in-
itiatives] get to markets. So, I think that's kind of connected to […]
getting rid of the worst practices, just getting to that level and then
you can start to compete on those individual requirements that your
standard can deliver on that you think that is specific either for your
commodity or for your supply chain.” (C3).
4.3.3. Competition
The case study reveals that, in the case of governance for gold,
competition is primarily framed as competition over market shares for
certified gold. Therefore, other facets of governance competition (e.g.
defining sustainability and sustainability performance) were assigned
to diﬀerent categories in this study (see e.g. the section on shaping the
discourse on sustainability). The existing level of competition is seen as
an ambivalent phenomenon by the interviewed experts:
“Certainly, these labels and standard systems […] are in a kind of
competition with other initiatives and need to generate profits and
then there is a need for self-perpetuating the system and to get a
higher market share of the market of certificates.” (R1).
Besides one exception, there is little evidence for an outstanding
role of governance competition in the case of gold. In particular, no
indications for any “outright competition” (G4) of sustainability
schemes occurred. However, the findings show that competition be-
tween governance makers manifests itself in the relationship between
Fairmined and Fairtrade. The respective organizations ARM and
Fairtrade International originally joint forces to develop a standard.
Yet, this cooperation only lasted three years and resulted in two
separate standards (Kickler and Franken, 2017). Diverging opinions on
this phase out of the joint project exist. For some interviewees, there is
definitely competition between Fairmined and Fairtrade:
“They are two initiatives working in the same sector, in the same
place with the same people. They are not working together any-
more. They were working together in the past, but they split.” (R4).
And further:
“The idea was that Fairmined [ …] takes care of the technical as-
sistance on the ground. And Fairtrade takes care of opening the
market. But there was no market. So eventually Fairmined had en-
ough of this partnership. So, there is definitely some fierce compe-
tition going on. And this competition is ridiculous considering the
handful of certified mines.” (G2).
Yet, this perception of competition is contested. Rather than
speaking of competition, one interviewee states that the temporary
partnership between Fairmined and Fairtrade was eventually not pro-
longed due to diverging organizational characteristics: “Diﬀerent phi-
losophies or histories of both institutions collided which were not fully
compatible. So, they decided […] not to renew their partnership.” (C4).
And further:
“The background is diﬀerent. Fairtrade takes care of all kinds of fair
supply chains since a long time. […] the Alliance for Responsible
Mining […], they are coming from the gold sector, […] from the
ASM sector. They have technical and organizational experience. In
the beginning the cooperation worked well, because [Fairtrade]
knows how to establish ethical supply chains. And [Fairmined]
knows how to organize and support cooperatives on the ground.
However, due to Fairmined’s good reputation, they no longer need
Fairtrade.” (C2).
Regardless of a potential competition between Fairmined and
Fairtrade, the data show that diﬀerent organizational logics and mis-
sions suggest that both organizations remain independent governance
makers with separate schemes, despite their evident overlaps on the
content level, thus maintaining the multiplicity of governance ap-
proaches.
4.4. Scope of governance in the case of gold
The sustainability schemes for gold considerably vary regarding the
content of their schemes (4.4.1), their diﬀerent target audiences (4.4.2)
and their supply chain coverage (4.4.3).
4.4.1. Content
Governance makers for gold focus on diﬀerent sustainability di-
mensions and issues (Elkington, 1998): Out of eleven schemes, six
follow a multidimensional approach, as they include social, environ-
mental and economic aspects, whereas five schemes have a particular
focus on one or two dimensions of sustainability. As an example of
addressing multiple dimensions, the IRMA standard delivers an en-
compassing approach, as it provides indicators for various sub-cate-
gories of social, environmental and economic aspects. In contrast, ap-
proaches like the Cyanide Management Code and RMI focus on rather
selective challenges, like the safe and responsible management of cya-
nide or human rights, transparency and traceability. In light of these
findings, the addressed sustainability aspects and their various sub-ca-
tegories can be considered a key explanatory factor for the fragmen-
tation of governance for gold.
Furthermore, the identified schemes can be classified into single vs.
multi-commodity approaches. Out of eleven schemes, only one (WGC)
has an exclusive focus on gold, while most schemes either focus on gold
and associated precious metals (Cyanide Management Code, Fairtrade
and Fairmined), on the 3 TG conflict minerals (CTC and RCM), or on all
minerals and metals (IRMA, ICMM). Two schemes particularly focus on
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gold, but provide complementary guidance for additional metals like
silver or palladium (LBMA, RMI). According to the interviews, the gold
sector often lacks clear boundaries to other minerals and metals, as
extractive resources often jointly occur at a single mining site. This
could explain the existence and emergence of multi-commodity
schemes. One interviewee describes this as follows:
“The gold mining industry is not just pure gold mining companies.
The largest copper mining company is also one of the biggest gold
miners! Because gold often comes with copper. […] There are very
loose boundaries! And the practices of one part of the industry also
eﬀect the other parts of the industry!” (G6).
Referring back to the diﬀerent organizational characteristics,
members and objectives of each governance maker, it is no surprise that
a diﬀerentiation between commodity specific and un-specific schemes
can be found. As an example, the findings show that RJC as a key actor
along the entire jewelry supply chain, made a strategic decision to not
only cover gold, but all jewelry-related minerals (gold, diamonds and
platinum group metals). In contrast, the World Gold Council focuses on
gold only. Amongst the interviewees, diverging opinions exist on the
advantages and disadvantages of establishing commodity un-specific
schemes in the context of gold:
“In an ideal world, we just want one mining standard that captures
ALL the commodities. But it's that complexity of the diﬀerent
commodities and that some of them are used for so many diﬀerent
purposes, that they say: ‘No, we're special, we need our own. We
have our own concerns, we have our own issues, we have our own
supply chains. That's not going to work for us.’” (C3).
Therefore, some governance organizations expand their scope by
either including additional minerals and metals into their existing
schemes, or by introducing new schemes (e.g. Fairtrade Silver). In
contrast, there is a movement of governance makers that foster en-
compassing, commodity un-specific schemes (most prominently
IRMA).6
4.4.2. Target audiences
Considering the specific industry characteristics of the gold sector,
including its value chain organization and stakeholder groups, the
findings reveal that sustainability schemes for gold are fragmented with
regard to their addressed target audiences. More precisely, the data
suggest that the respective stakeholders in the gold value chain con-
siderably impact the fragmentation of governance approaches for gold.
According to one interviewee:
“You have lots of diﬀerent organizations and initiatives that are
responding to stakeholder needs and therefore […] use approaches
that work for a particular aspect that is considered responsible
practices.” (C7).
Sustainability schemes for gold address these diverse stakeholder
needs by specific governance approaches. In the case of gold, the target
audiences of the governance schemes diﬀer with regard to a) the gold
producing side (upstream), b) the buyer market (downstream) and c)
the geographical location.
Considering the distinction between gold producers, the analyzed
schemes either focus on small-scale or large-scale mining, due to their
specific needs and sustainability challenges. One expert supports this
with the following quote:
“There is a general segmentation between the industrial and arti-
sanal gold sector, considering the producers. And a standard setter
cannot cover both sectors.” (C4).
Given the very specific needs of these diﬀerent producer groups, it is
no surprise that so far, no scheme provides an encompassing approach
for both ASM and LSM. According to Kickler and Franken (2017, p. 25),
the “schemes were especially developed for or by one of the two sub-
sectors so that the requirements are adjusted to the target group in
terms of practicality and feasibility”. Out of eleven schemes, eight
schemes primarily focus on LSM actors, whereas three focus on the ASM
sector.
In addition to addressing diﬀerent producer segments, sustainability
governance for gold is fragmented with regard to diﬀerent buyer
markets: industrial applications, jewelry and financial purposes. In this
vein, the RJC has a clear focus on the jewelry sector. In a similar
manner, Fairmined and Fairtrade address end consumers of gold pro-
ducts, e.g. in the form of jewelry, using labels to articulate their sus-
tainability claims. Schemes like LBMA and WGC are rather tailored to
address the governance needs of industrial and financial purposes.
Furthermore, governance for gold is fragmented regarding diﬀerent
geographical regions, due to the characteristics of the gold value chain.
While the majority of governance schemes is globally applicable, some
address specific regions: Fairmined and Fairtrade focus on South
America and Africa, whereas the RCM and the CTC schemes have a
narrow focus on the region of the great lakes in Africa (Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo).
4.4.3. Supply chain coverage
Given the specific value chain characteristics of the gold sector,
sustainability schemes address diﬀerent parts of the supply chain. A
main distinction can be made between a) entire supply chain schemes
like RJC, b) schemes with a particular focus on the upstream part (e.g.
IRMA, ICMM and the Cyanide Management Code) and c) schemes with
a focus on refining and smelting (most notably: LBMA and RMI)
(Kickler and Franken, 2017). Table 2 provides a comparison of the
supply chain coverage by diﬀerent sustainability schemes for gold.
As a focal player in the supply chain, smelters could potentially
support sustainability schemes, given their importance as the last step
in the supply chain before gold becomes an unspecific commodity.
Given this (perceived) importance, one would assume that any type of
governance should first and foremost start by setting appropriate rules
for the smelters for leveraging the impact of sustainability schemes.
Following this rationale, some schemes focus on smelters when de-
signing and implementing their governance approaches (Kickler and
Franken, 2017; Young, 2018). One expert supports this with the fol-
lowing statement:
“The smelters are certainly the bottleneck, similar to other metals.
As long as this bottleneck is not suﬃciently regulated by the law, the
smelters will do what actors further up in the supply chain demand
from them.” (N1).
In particular, the LBMA has a strong focus on smelters. However,
according to one interviewee, smelters are not part of the fragmented
Table 2
Sustainability schemes’ supply chain coverage (Kickler and Franken, 2017, pp.
19, 23; Rüttinger et al., 2015; Rüttinger and Griestop, 2015, p. 7).
6 For a more detailed discussion on this phenomenon see Kickler and Franken
(2017).
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governance landscape, as most of the smelters are associated with the
LBMA:
“The consistency comes from the fact that 90% of the world’s gold
will go through an LBMA [certified] refiner. So, if you take gold
solely, then the supply chain for that mineral is not fragmented,
because [the LBMA] obviously controls it. But look at […] smaller
refiners, who wouldn’t make the [LBMA] good delivery list re-
quirements, then yes, there is fragmentation!” (G5).
5. Discussion
This section provides a more general discussion of the findings from
the case study and introduces a conceptual framework (Fig. 2) based on
the empirical analysis and the existing literature on fragmented sus-
tainability governance that helps explain the fragmentation of sus-
tainability governance in the gold sector. The framework incorporates
both general factors (independent of the commodity sector) which are
derived from the literature review and gold-specific factors which are
stemming from the empirical findings. In more detail, the conceptual
framework serves to refine, enrich and display these factors in their
interaction in the case of the gold sector. It entails four overarching
categories of factors for fragmentation of (private) sustainability gov-
ernance: contextual factors (I.), intra-organizational (II.) and inter-orga-
nizational (III.) factors as well as the scope of governance (IV.).
Selected components of the framework are discussed in detail in
order to refine and expand the scholarly knowledge on fragmented
sustainability governance in the particular case of the gold sector.
Furthermore, this framework aims to stimulate the academic discussion
on factors that explain the fragmentation of governance and particu-
larly encourages researchers to apply the conceptual framework as a
conceptual lens to study commodity sectors beyond gold. It thus also
serves to identify potential areas of further research.
5.1. Regulatory environment (I.a & I.b)
Existing literature on the multiplicity of governance for a single
commodity suggests that overarching governance approaches (or the
regulatory governance environment) can impact the resulting degree of
fragmentation in the respective sector (Manning and Reinecke, 2016;
Reinecke et al., 2012). In the case of the gold sector, the findings show
that the fragmentation of governance is aﬀected by both sector-un-
specific (I.a) and sector-specific (I.b) regulation. Yet, existing literature
has so far scarcely considered such a diﬀerentiation between sector-
unspecific and specific regulation and its potential interrelationship
with governance fragmentation (see Pekdemir, 2018). Regarding
sector-unspecific regulation (I.a), the findings suggest that the multi-
plicity of overarching governance references allows or enables a frag-
mentation of sustainability schemes in the gold sector. This can be
explained as sustainability schemes for gold can choose from a great
variety of overarching guidelines as potential references when de-
signing their concrete governance tools. Depending on the addressed
sustainability dimensions and issues, governance makers for gold can
choose from a variety of guidelines to inspire their own schemes and
standards.
Considering sector-specific regulation (I.b), the findings revealed
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework of general and gold-specific factors that explain the emergence of multiple sustainability schemes. Explanatory factors that are specific
for gold are depicted in italic and bold.
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that two key guidelines (Dodd-Frank Act and OECD Guidance) are
particularly relevant for sustainability schemes for gold. Researchers
introduced the notion of “obligatory passage points” for such key re-
ferences that governance makers in a certain sector have to comply
with in order to gain legitimacy (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009;
Manning and Reinecke, 2016, p. 625). Interestingly, in the case of gold,
a small number of key references does not correlate with a small
number of actual sustainability schemes. On the contrary, sustainability
governance for gold is provided by a dozen schemes. This might be due
to the remaining vagueness and uncovered aspects of both key refer-
ences, thus allowing sustainability schemes room for interpretation. As
sustainability schemes for gold might not find all needed guidance in
the OECD Guidance and the Dodd-Frank Act for their specific purpose,
they either refer to additional references or create their own guidelines
and indicators. Somewhat counterintuitive, the case of gold shows that
a small number of key governance guidelines can still result in or
support a fragmented governance landscape. Against this background, I
argue that the analyzed sustainability schemes build their own ‘port-
folio’ or configuration of governance by incorporating diﬀerent specific
and un-specific existing governance references into their own scheme.
5.2. Industry characteristics (I.c)
The commodity gold shows distinct value chain attributes that help
explain the prevailing fragmentation of governance. In the particular
case of gold, the value chain architecture entails three important as-
pects: the segmentation of producer and buyer markets, the geo-
graphical allocation of value chain actors, as well as the importance of
smelters as focal actors. So far, these facets are mainly overlooked by
scholars when analyzing the eﬀect of industry characteristics on gov-
ernance fragmentation (see Manning et al., 2012). Considering the
segmentation of producers and buyers in the gold sector, I argue that
the segmentation of these market groups can in turn lead to a frag-
mentation of the aﬃliated governance approaches. This can be ex-
plained by diﬀerent stakeholder groups at both ends of the gold value
chain that have particular governance needs and interests, thus leading
to multiple corresponding governance approaches. In the particular
case of the gold sector, small-scale and large-scale gold producers have
diﬀerent governance needs on the producing side of the value chain.
Similar observations can be found in other commodity sectors (Ponte
and Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; Ruben and Zuniga, 2011),
which support my assumption that a segmentation of commodity pro-
ducer groups can potentially enhance the fragmentation of governance.
Similarly, gold buyers (jewelry sector, industrial applications and
financial actors) diﬀer regarding their governance needs. Take the as-
pect of visibility of the sustainability scheme for the final consumer (see
Atkinson and Rosenthal, 2014; Bratt et al., 2011): From a jewelry
standpoint, it might matter that the final consumer who is buying a
wedding ring virtually sees the label of a sustainability scheme like
Fairtrade or Fairmined. In contrast, actors in the financial market re-
quire diﬀerent information from and design of sustainability schemes,
as they will have no physical contact with the gold. Given these dif-
ferent buyer segments with specific demands, it is no surprise that the
market segmentation of gold has a considerable impact on governance
fragmentation.
5.3. Intra-organizational factors (II.a – II.d)
The findings reveal that the composition of governance makers and
their organizational logics and missions, internal framing of sustain-
ability as well as objectives and used means considerably vary in the
case of gold, thus leading to a fragmentation of sustainability schemes.
These findings are in line with previous studies on the emergence of
fragmented governance (Bartley, 2007; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009;
Manning and Reinecke, 2016). Yet, findings from the case study ad-
ditionally stress the importance of the governance makers’ missions and
‘business models’ (II.b). Depending on the rigor of the organizational
mission, governance actors might be more or less willing to cooperate
with other governance makers in their sector to align or integrate
governance approaches. In other words, the gold case shows that the
diﬀerent missions can resemble key hurdles for the alignment or har-
monization of a fragmented governance landscape. Closely related, the
individual ‘business model’ of a governance maker, e.g. referring to its
particular funding system, can hinder governance makers with similar
goals, target audiences and scopes to foster their collaboration or har-
monization, as no governance actor sees a benefit in abandoning its
business model.
Overall, intra-organizational factors within governance makers re-
semble unique organizational characteristics. Following this rationale,
each governance maker for gold has, from an organizational standpoint,
the inherent interest to exist and survive. In particular, the aforemen-
tioned aspects (mission and business model) support this argument.
Therefore, a fragmentation of governance might emerge and remain in
the gold sector due to individual self-interest of governance makers as
organizations – despite potential overlaps and synergies on a content
level. Adding to this, the intra-organizational factors are rather diﬃcult
to change, as they are ‘deeply rooted in the organization’s DNA’.
Governance makers, particularly in the case of gold, can face path de-
pendencies (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009; Vergne
and Durand, 2011) that might hinder them from a stronger alignment
or harmonization of their sustainability schemes.
5.4. Inter-organizational factors (III.a – III.c)
Previous studies suggest that competition can aﬀect the fragmen-
tation or multiplicity of sustainability schemes (Gulbrandsen, 2005;
Manning and Reinecke, 2016; Meidinger, 2011; Smith and Fischlein,
2010). Despite its various facets (Bitzer et al., 2012; Smith and
Fischlein, 2010), the findings show that governance competition in the
case of gold (III.c) is primarily understood as competition over market
shares of certified gold. However, this type of competition only plays a
minor role when explaining the fragmentation of governance for gold.
This can be explained with an overall small market of certified gold,
when compared to other commodities where sustainability schemes
became an integral part of the mass market (e.g. coﬀee or cocoa)
(Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Glasbergen, 2018; Klooster, 2010; Manning
et al., 2012; Millard, 2017). Given the insignificant market share of
certified gold, it is no surprise that competition over market shares
provides little explanatory power for the fragmentation of governance
schemes for gold. As the market for sustainable gold still leaves ample
room for expansion, there is little reason to compete in such a small
market. Instead, governance makers rather aim to individually expand
their market coverage in the overall gold sector.
However, when framing competition in the sense of competing for
ideas, meaning and content (Bitzer et al., 2012; Manning and Reinecke,
2016; Smith and Fischlein, 2010), governance competition can be
found in the case of gold. Competition thus manifests itself in diverging
framings of sustainability and individual objectives and missions of the
governance makers, thus rather relating to intra-organizational factors
(II.). Additionally, the findings show that governance makers for gold
are engaged in collectively shaping the overall discourse on sustain-
ability in the gold sector (III.a) which represents a potential area for
competition. Similar to other sectors, the “ambiguity of sustainability as
a concept continues to allow competing definitions of sustainability to
co-exist and compete” (Manning and Reinecke, 2016, p. 625; Voß et al.,
2007) within a single sector, thus leading to a variety of schemes.
Similar to other sectors, governance actors in the gold sector still
seem to be in the process of framing a common vocabulary and un-
derstanding of sustainability (Bitzer et al., 2008; Higgins and Richards,
2019; Manning and Reinecke, 2016; Reinecke et al., 2012), leading to
diﬀerent sustainability governance schemes in the meanwhile. The case
study shows that, particularly in the ‘early days’, diﬀerent approaches
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to shape the discourse on sustainability led to fragmentation, but lost
momentum as governance makers started to refer to a common voca-
bulary and common references.
Similar to other sectors, governance makers for gold often started as
niche experiments with little direct contact points in their day-to-day
work (De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel, 2014; Manning and Reinecke,
2016; Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014). While the schemes were acting in
their niches on an operational level, they were in contact on a more
normative level to jointly discuss the overall basic assumptions of
framing sustainability. This phenomenon can also be observed in other
sectors beyond the case of gold: According to Reinecke et al. (2012, p.
807), “actors initially cooperate to establish and stabilize a collective
identity and then, once the market space [for governance approaches]
is established, begin to compete more outwardly (Navis and Glynn,
2010)”. Yet, the findings show that this era is shifting towards a
stronger mutual exchange of involved governance actors, thus allowing
prospective means to harmonize or align the various sustainability
schemes.
5.5. Scope of governance (IV.a – IV.d)
Given the great variety of diﬀerent sustainability issues aﬃliated
with the extraction, processing and trading of gold, it is no surprise that
the content of the identified sustainability schemes considerably diﬀers.
Similar to other commodity sectors (de Man and German, 2017; Higgins
and Richards, 2019) the scope of governance (Acharya, 2016) varies
amongst sustainability schemes in the gold sector: Governance ap-
proaches for gold address diﬀerent dimensions and specific issues of
sustainability, thus leading to fragmentation. What is quite unique for
gold is the diﬀerentiation between a single vs. multi-commodity focus
(IV.b) of the involved governance approaches. While some schemes
focus on gold (single-commodity), others include a variety of diﬀerent
minerals and metals (multi-commodity). Against this background, I
argue that governance makers made a strategic decision to either focus
exclusively on gold, or to widen their scope to include other metals and
minerals. The latter option might be due to the joint occurrence of
diﬀerent resources at a single mining site, thus fostering sustainability
schemes that cover multiple resources. Following this reasoning, one
can argue that commodities (like gold) which occur together with other
commodities, can be addressed by both resource-specific and resource-
unspecific governance approaches.
Furthermore, the case study shows that the variation in supply chain
coverage (IV.d) by diﬀerent sustainability schemes is a key explanatory
factor for the resulting governance fragmentation in the case of gold.
Based on the specific value chain architecture in the gold sector (I.c),
sustainability schemes target diﬀerent discrete steps of the chain, ran-
ging from an entire coverage to a particular upstream or focal-actor-
focus.
6. Concluding remarks, further research and limitations
This study uses a case study approach to explain the emergence of
fragmented sustainability governance in the gold sector, particularly
focusing on private sustainability governance approaches. In order to
do so, the study derived general factors for governance fragmentation
from the literature. In a second step, this paper analyzed and discussed
the impact of both general and gold-specific factors on the prevailing
governance fragmentation for gold. In more detail, I introduced a
conceptual framework of general and specific factors that help explain
the fragmentation of governance, focusing on contextual factors, intra-
and inter-organizational factors as well as the scope of governance.
Going one step further, I used the conceptual framework to structure
the discussion and to identify areas of further research.
The five major findings of this study are as follows: First, specific
industry characteristics of the gold sector (upstream/downstream as
well as producer and buyer markets) create actor-specific governance
needs that lead to a multiplicity of corresponding governance schemes.
Governance for gold is fragmented regarding diﬀerent governance
needs of producers and buyers as well as diﬀerent approaches to cover
discrete steps of the value chain. Second, the regulatory environment is
important: While key governance references exist, they leave room for
interpretation and thus encourage or allow the development of multiple
sustainability schemes. Third, intra-organizational factors considerably
impact the fragmentation of governance for gold, particularly regarding
diﬀerent governance initiators and members, organizational logics,
missions and ‘business models’ as well as the framing of sustainability
and deduced ends and means of diﬀerent governance makers. Fourth,
the scope of governance strongly explains fragmentation in the case of
the gold sector. This entails the diﬀerent contents of the sustainability
schemes for gold and their diverging target audiences and supply chain
coverage. Fifth, inversely, interaction mechanisms between governance
makers for gold only provide weak explanations for the resulting
fragmented governance. Competition in the sense of competition for
market shares plays a negligible role when explaining governance
fragmentation in the gold sector.
This study suggests further research in the six following areas: First,
researchers are encouraged to use the introduced conceptual frame-
work to investigate further commodity sectors beyond the gold sector.
Second, considering the category of industry characteristics, the case
study revealed the importance of the value chain architecture for the
fragmentation of sustainability governance. Further research could
therefore elaborate on the impact of diﬀerent value chain architectures,
particularly regarding the segmentation of buyers and producers, on the
fragmentation of governance in diﬀerent commodity sectors. Third,
regarding inter-organizational factors, I suggest to consider at least two
diﬀerent dimensions of competition with regard to fragmented gov-
ernance: competition over market shares and competition over sus-
tainability performance and framing (Bitzer et al., 2012; Smith and
Fischlein, 2010). Further research could answer whether there are
diﬀerent dynamics for fragmentation, depending on whether govern-
ance makers compete over market shares or over performance and
framing. Fourth, regarding the scope of governance, I draw the con-
clusion from the gold sector that a commodity with blurry system
boundaries (like gold) could presumably be more prone to fragmented
governance. Therefore, future research could elaborate whether the
boundary conditions of a commodity have an impact on the respective
degree of governance fragmentation. Fifth, this study derived ex-
planatory factors for governance fragmentation from the literature and
from the case study findings. However, additional research is needed to
build theories to address the phenomenon of sustainability governance
fragmentation and its causal factors. Sixth, while fragmentation of
governance might impede the actual impact on addressing sustain-
ability issues, it also resembles a key challenge for corporate actors that
are dealing with fragmentation as both governance takers and makers.
Understanding the factors behind fragmentation is a prerequisite for
companies to thrive in environments of fragmented governance. Fur-
ther research is needed to assess how companies can successfully
maneuver in such landscapes.
This study faces several limitations. First, the qualitative data ana-
lysis is not entirely objective. I aimed to overcome this limitation by
using a structured coding and analysis process. Second, the findings
from the case study are not generalizable to other sectors. Nevertheless,
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I am confident that the insights of this study and the introduced con-
ceptual framework refine and expand the scholarly knowledge on
fragmented sustainability governance.
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Appendix
Table A.1
List of abbreviations
Abbreviation Full name
ARM Alliance for Responsible Mining
ASM artisanal and small-scale mining
B2B business-to-business
CFGS Conflict-free Gold Standard
CFSP Conflict-free Smelter Program
CTC Certified Trading Chains
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EU European Union
FSC Forest Stewardship Council
GRI Global Reporting Initiative
ICMI International Cyanide Management Institute
ICMM International Council on Mining & Metals
ID identifier
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILO International Labour Organization
IRMA Initiative for Responsible Mining
LBMA London Bullion Market Association
LSM large-scale mining sector
NGO nongovernmental organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEFC Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification
RCM Regional Certification Mechanism
RJC Responsible Jewellery Council
RMAP Responsible Minerals Assurance Process
RMI Responsible Minerals Initiative
RQ research question
RSG Responsible Silver Guidance
UN United Nations
WGC World Gold Council
3T tin, tungsten and tantalum
Table A.2
Overview of interviewed experts and their aﬃliation: C (company), G (governance maker), N (NGO), R
(research)
ID Description
C1 Sustainability manager (refiner)
C2 Environmental manager (refiner)
C3 Consultant
C4 Consultant in the extractive industries/ASM gold
C5 Two experts in the gold sector (refiner)
C6 Entrepreneur (gems and jewelry trading)
C7 CFO and sustainability expert (sustainability scheme)
C8 Consultant and researcher
G1 Project manager ASM (sustainability scheme)
G2 Project manager for gold (sustainability scheme)
G3 Program manager ASM (sustainability scheme)
G4 Standards expert (meta governance organization)
G5 Expert from standard setting organization
G6 Expert (sustainability scheme)
(continued on next page)
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Table A.2 (continued)
ID Description
G7 Expert for standard setting (sustainability scheme)
N1 Expert in the gold sector & sustainability certification (NGO)
N2 Expert for extractive industries (NGO)
N3 Expert in the extractive industries (NGO)
N4 Expert for ASM (NGO)
R1 Researcher and expert in the gold sector (governmental agency)
R2 Researcher and expert in the gold sector (governmental agency)
R3 Researcher and expert in the gold sector (governmental agency)
R4 Researcher and expert in the gold sector (university)
R5 Researcher in the gold sector/extractive industries (consultancy)
R6 Senior expert and researcher in the extractive industries (governmental agency)
R7 Researcher and expert in the extractive industries (university)
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ABSTRACT: Business firms that aim to take responsibility along their value chain are often 
confronted with a fragmentation of sustainability governance. Additionally, companies, in their 
role as political actors, are increasingly involved in the finding and implementing of 
sustainability governance approaches. This article addresses the question how companies affect 
and are affected by different manifestations of fragmented sustainability governance in the 
empirical case of the global gold sector. Building on 26 comprehensive expert interviews and 
conceptual reasoning, a more nuanced assessment of the interplay of companies and fragmented 
governance at the stages of rule-finding, rule-setting, and rule-following, is provided.  
A conceptual framework is introduced that distinguishes three manifestations of governance 
fragmentation and their interactions with companies: multiplicity, specialization, and 
dissipation. This study contributes to the discussion on the political role of the business firm 
and likewise provides stimulus for business management scholars and practitioners dealing 
with the phenomenon of governance fragmentation.  
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In times of shifting societal expectations about the corporate license to operate and its 
legitimacy to do business, the business firm is increasingly pressured by its stakeholders to 
proactively cope with sustainability challenges (den Hond and de Bakker 2007; Scherer and 
Palazzo 2011, 2007; Doh and Guay 2006) and take value chain responsibility (VCR). In order 
to do so, an adequate regulatory environment is needed (Newig, Voß, and Monstadt 2007; Voß 
and Bornemann 2011; Mena and Palazzo 2012). While different research streams exist to frame 
such regulatory environment, I refer to the notion of governance in this article. For the 
remainder of this study, I follow the understanding of governance as “the means by which to 
infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” introduced by Williamson 
(2010, 674 emphasis in original).  
Nation states are historically considered the primary actor to provide governance to set 
the ‘rules of the game’ for companies to do business and eventually cope with sustainability 
challenges (Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Matten and Crane 2005; de Bakker, Rasche, 
and Ponte 2019). In reality, a lack of governance or insufficient governance arrangements, often 
referred to as governance gaps or voids, exist (Rasche 2012; Roberts 2013; Scherer, Palazzo, 
and Matten 2014; Whelan 2012; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Santoro 2010). This development is 
often linked to the globalization and complexity of corporate business activities which are only 
insufficiently regulated by regionally constrained and increasingly weak nation states (Whelan 
2012; Scherer and Palazzo 2008; van Oosterhout 2010; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Scherer and 
Palazzo 2007; Santoro 2010).  
As a consequence, the role of the state as the only governance provider is increasingly 
challenged by new governance actors that see a need (or an opportunity) to serve as governance 
makers (Scherer and Palazzo 2011; Ruggie 2004; Fransen and Conzelmann 2015; Grabs 2018; 
Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Detomasi 2007; van Oosterhout 2010; de Bakker, Rasche, 
and Ponte 2019). Therefore, a great variety of new governance actors emerged in the last 
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decades (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006; Abbott and Snidal 2010; Kalfagianni and 
Pattberg 2013). This includes above all civil society and corporate actors. These new 
governance actors now “increasingly participate in the formulation and implementation of rules 
in policy areas that were once the sole responsibility of the state or international governmental 
organizations” (Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann 2006, 506).  
As governance to address sustainability challenges in a corporate value chain context is 
increasingly provided by a rising quantity and variety of governance approaches, scholars 
employ the notion of ‘governance fragmentation’ (Pattberg and Widerberg 2015; Pattberg et al. 
2014; Acharya 2016; Biermann et al. 2009; Heidingsfelder and Beckmann 2019). Essentially, 
fragmentation of governance can refer to the variety (and multiplicity) of governance actors, 
the different applied means of implementing and enforcing rules, the thematic focus and scope 
as well as the location of applicability (Heidingsfelder 2019). Given this wide understanding of 
governance fragmentation, fragmentation is not a monolithic concept, but rather shows 
different manifestations (Heidingsfelder and Beckmann 2019).  
Following this line of thought, companies are evidentially affected by fragmented 
governance: Corporate actors oftentimes act in landscapes of fragmented sustainability 
governance when doing business and creating value (Heidingsfelder and Beckmann 2019; 
Zeyen, Beckmann, and Wolters 2016). In the words of Scherer et al. (2009, 327), companies 
increasingly “operate in a complex and uncertain [regulatory] environment with gaps in 
regulation and ill-defined rules of appropriate business conduct (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2008[…])”. This fragmentation of sustainability governance raises manifold questions for the 
involved and/or affected companies: Which governance instruments and rules are applicable 
for the respective company? How can companies navigate in a complex realm of fragmented 
sustainability governance? How can they minimize their efforts, e.g. in the form of search costs, 
to deal with fragmented governance? In real-life, the phenomenon of sustainability governance 
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fragmentation inter alia occurs in the textile and agriculture industries (Fransen 2011; Schouten 
and Bitzer 2015) and is currently a prominent topic in the global gold sector (Heidingsfelder 
2019). 
Against this background, I introduce my overarching research question: How do 
companies affect and are affected by different manifestations of fragmented sustainability 
governance in the case of governance for gold? In order to answer this research question, I 
proceed in five steps: First, I elaborate on the dual-role of companies as governance makers and 
takers (Schultze 2003; Jinnah 2017; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2014; Sundaram and Inkpen 
2004) in environments of fragmented sustainability governance. As a searchlight to guide my 
analysis of the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability governance, I use the 
three-tiered ordonomic framework by Pies and colleagues (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 
2014, 2010). Second, I briefly introduce my methodology, consisting of expert interviews in 
the gold sector and a secondary data analysis. Furthermore, I provide a short description of the 
current state of fragmented sustainability governance for gold. In a third step, I then use the 
theoretical insights and the three-tiered framework to analyze the empirical findings. Building 
on this, I discuss the interplay of companies with different manifestations of governance 
fragmentation and derive implications for business management. I support the discussion by 
introducing a conceptual framework of different manifestations of sustainability governance 
fragmentation. The article closes with some concluding remarks and suggestions for further 
research.   
 
COMPANIES AS GOVERNANCE TAKERS AND MAKERS 
In order to understand the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability governance, I 
make a fundamental distinction between companies as governance takers and makers (Eberlein 
et al. 2014; Beckmann, Hielscher, and Pies 2014). First, companies are traditionally governance 
 
5 
takers as they operate their business within the given rules and regulatory environment(s) 
provided by nation states, governmental agencies, and institutions (Scherer, Palazzo, and 
Matten 2014; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Kobrin 2009). Second, companies are increasingly 
engaged as novel governance makers, as they participate in finding and implementing the rules 
to steer their business operations (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2014; Scherer, Palazzo, and 
Matten 2014, 2009; Detomasi 2007; van Oosterhout 2010; Mena and Palazzo 2012).  
As governance takers, companies are considered as being “apolitical and primarily 
concerned with regulatory compliance” (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013, 87; Fuchs and 
Lederer 2007). In this role, companies need to follow the ‘rules of the game’ provided by nation 
states and other governmental bodies when conducting their business operations (Beckmann, 
Hielscher, and Pies 2014).  
From the perspective of companies as governance takers, the fragmentation of 
(sustainability) governance implies considerable challenges for companies. Overall, 
fragmentation often comes with a rather negative connotation in the scholarly literature, given 
its apparent pitfalls such as increasing complexity, competition over legitimacy and authority, 
increased transaction costs, uncertainty, confusion for involved actors, and regulatory overlaps 
(Held and Young 2013; Zelli and Asselt 2013; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013; Hospes, 
van der Valk, and van der Mheen-Sluijer 2012; Bitzer, Francken, and Glasbergen 2008; Smith 
and Fischlein 2010). From a corporate perspective, companies can face negative consequences 
of fragmented sustainability governance: Regarding the real-life effects of fragmented 
governance, it can cause confusion for companies and their customers, increase the complexity 
of handling transactions along the value chain, and require the engagement and resources of 
involved companies, eventually leading to higher costs and coordination efforts (Turcotte, 
Reinecke, and Hond 2014; Fransen 2011). Furthermore, companies might face orientation 
issues in business environments characterized by fragmented governance. Rather than dealing 
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with concise and stringent rules, companies are confronted by an overwhelming (and potentially 
contradicting) offer of hard and soft law approaches (Mena and Palazzo 2012; Rasche 2012; 
Heidingsfelder and Beckmann 2019). Companies in their role as governance takers must 
therefore find answers to deal with negative effects of fragmented sustainability governance 
when taking value chain responsibility.  
More recently, the notion of companies as (potential) governance makers gained 
increasing attention, particularly in the wider scholarly discussion on the political role of the 
business firm (Whelan 2012; Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Rasche 2012; van Oosterhout 
2010; Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2014; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Kobrin 2009; Scherer and 
Palazzo 2007). In this regard, such a political role encompasses inter alia the provision of public 
goods (e.g. health care, education, public infrastructure) by companies (Whelan 2012; Kobrin 
2009; Matten and Crane 2005), collective and individual self-regulation (Néron and Norman 
2008; Rasche 2012; van Oosterhout 2010; Mena and Palazzo 2012; Beckmann, Hielscher, and 
Pies 2014) as well as political lobbying for or against governmental regulations (Scherer, 
Palazzo, and Matten 2009; Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013).  
In this article, I primarily refer to corporations as political actors when being proactively 
involved in collectively and/or individually shaping, implementing, and potentially enforcing 
regulation, thus functioning as governance makers. Referring back to the introduced 
understanding of governance, companies, as (new) political actors, are thus proactively engaged 
in finding, implementing, and enforcing adequate instruments to “infuse order” in order to 
“mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains” (Williamson 2010, 674). Or, following Pies et al. 
(2014, 252), companies “take a political role as soon as they […] participate […] in rule-setting 
processes and rule-finding discourses”. Following this rationale, companies are not exclusively 
governance takers, but, often simultaneously, also proactive governance makers. In more 
concrete terms, companies can use various approaches to engage in the political arena as 
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governance makers and political actors. This includes, but is not limited to, the participation in 
multi-stakeholder-initiatives (MSIs) (Zeyen, Beckmann, and Wolters 2016; de Bakker, Rasche, 
and Ponte 2019; Rasche 2012) and the establishment of codes of conduct to provide guidance 
along the firm’s value chain (Mena and Palazzo 2012; van Tulder and Kolk 2001; Waddock 
2017).  
Taking the perspective of companies as political actors and, more precisely, governance 
makers, I suggest that the interplay of companies and fragmented governance needs a more 
nuanced assessment. Taking for granted that companies are governance makers, they might 
influence the resulting fragmentation of governance that characterizes their regulatory 
environment (Heidingsfelder and Beckmann 2019). Following this rationale, new questions 
emerge regarding the relationship of companies and fragmented governance: On the one hand, 
companies can proactively shape the resulting governance landscape they are operating in when 
doing business and taking VCR. Although few in numbers, some studies highlight potential 
benefits of fragmented governance such as innovation through governance experiments, 
flexibility, and adaptability, competition over best practices as well as avoiding monopolistic 
structures of governance makers (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015; Keohane and Victor 2011). On 
the other hand, one can argue that the existing and prevailing fragmentation of governance 
might partly be triggered by companies functioning as governance makers. As companies 
increasingly act as governance makers, the number and diversity of governance approaches 
might rise (see Waddock 2017; de Bakker, Rasche, and Ponte 2019).  
In a nutshell, I argue that prevailing fragmented governance landscapes resemble an 
important field of business and management research in light of the greater debate on the 
political role and responsibility of companies along globalized value chains. Furthermore, 
companies that are confronted with (as governance takers) and potentially shaping (as 
governance makers) fragmented governance when aiming to take value chain responsibility, 
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need practical guidance. However, the many shades of interplay of companies and fragmented 
sustainability governance are only starting to gain scholarly attention (Heidingsfelder and 
Beckmann 2019). Therefore, I further assess the interplay of companies and fragmented 
sustainability governance in the following sections. In order to do so, I focus on companies in 
an environment of fragmented sustainability governance in the empirical case of the global gold 
sector. To structure the data analysis and conceptual reasoning, I refer to the three-tiered 
conceptual framework by Pies, Hielscher, and Beckmann (2009; 2010, 2014). 
 
THE THREE-TIERED ORDONOMIC FRAMEWORK  
In order to analyze the interplay of companies with fragmented governance in a more nuanced 
manner, I use the three-tiered ordonomic framework introduced by Pies, Beckmann and 
Hielscher (2009; 2010, 2014)1. It suggests that companies are “not only […] economic actors, 
but also […] political and civil society actors” (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2010, 275). 
Starting from this perspective, Pies and colleagues further differentiate the role of companies 
when aiming to take responsibility for their business activities. They argue that companies can 
be engaged in three ways: the “basic game of business conduct”, the meta game of rule-setting, 
and the meta-meta game of “rule-finding discourse” (Pies, Hielscher, and Beckmann 2009, 
385). Figure 1 illustrates these three stages. 
                                                             
1 For a detailed introduction to the ordonomic approach and its link to governance and the political role of the 
business firm see Pies et al. (2009). 
 
9 
 
Figure 1: Three-tiered Conceptual Framework in the Context of Sustainability Governance. Own Depiction 
Based on Pies et al. (2014, 231, 2010, 274)  
 
Basic Game 
First and foremost, companies are taking care of their business activities in the “basic game of 
business conduct” (Pies, Hielscher, and Beckmann 2009, 385). Here, companies aim to 
optimize and increase their value creation capabilities in given regulatory circumstances. 
Regarding sustainability challenges and value chain responsibility, it is the basic game where 
companies directly affect or are affected by sustainability challenges. Through their value 
creation activities in the basic game, companies might simultaneously create undesirable 
negative environmental, social, and economic effects along their value chains (Busse et al. 
2017; Kovács 2008; Letizia and Hendrikse 2016; Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo 2016). 
However, it is also the basic game where companies can operationalize and implement 
corporate practices to prevent, minimize, or eliminate sustainability challenges, thus allowing 
the firm to take value chain responsibility. The extent to which companies can thrive in the 
basic game (successfully create value and take value chain responsibility) fundamentally 
depends on the given regulatory environment (governance).  
 
 
 
10 
Meta Game 
In the meta game, the respective rules to steer interaction and cooperation in the basic game are 
set (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2014, 232). It thus serves as an arena to shape the regulatory 
environment for business to do business and address sustainability challenges. According to 
Pies et al. (2009, 386), the meta game is necessary to establish “internal rule-setting, e.g., 
corporate codes of conduct, as well as external rule-setting, e.g., social or environmental 
standards”. Coming back to sustainability and corporate value chain responsibility, the meta 
game is crucial to form adequate governance instruments that enable (or force) the business 
firm to take responsibility in the basic game.  
 
Meta-Meta Game 
The meta-meta game refers to “rule-finding”, where involved actors engage in a discourse on 
what should be governed (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2014, 246) and serves to “identify 
common rule-interests” (Pies, Hielscher, and Beckmann 2009, 394). Through discussion, 
different actor groups collectively decide on issues that require governance, thus triggering rule 
setting in the meta game and impacting the way companies interact in the basic game. 
According to Pies et al. (2009, 386f), the discourse in the meta-meta game is steered by internal 
and external discussions, e.g. referring to corporate culture (internal), and “multi-stakeholder 
dialogue[s] or […] business roundtable[s]” (external).  
In a nutshell, the three-tiered framework points out that companies, in their role as 
political actors, are (potentially) engaged in the finding (meta-meta game) and setting (meta 
game) of governance rules, thus creating the regulatory environment for doing business and 
addressing sustainability challenges (basic game). While the framework by Pies and colleagues 
offers a valuable starting point to assess the interplay of companies and governance, so far it 
does not incorporate the aspect of governance fragmentation. Therefore, I expand the 
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framework in the following analysis by a) emphasizing the nuanced role of companies as both 
governance takers and makers and b) incorporating the aspect of different manifestations of 
fragmented governance. In order to do so, I refer to the empirical case of fragmented 
sustainability governance in the gold sector.  
 
METHODOLOGY: EXPERT INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA 
As its main data source, this article draws on 26 semi-structured expert interviews with different 
actors from the gold sector, including company representatives and other parties (NGOs, 
researchers, governance initiative representatives, etc.). A unique ID was assigned to each 
interviewee (see Table 1 in the Appendix). The semi-structured interviews took place between 
November 2017 and April 2018. On overage, they lasted 65 minutes. The interviews allow me 
to focus on the actor perspective of companies in a landscape of fragmented sustainability 
governance in the empirical case of the global gold sector. Using the software MAXQDA, the 
transcribed interviews were manually coded in an inductive and three-step procedure. 
Additional secondary data (e.g. corporate websites and freely accessible documents of 
sustainability schemes2) were incorporated and analyzed.  
 
THE INTERPLAY OF COMPANIES AND FRAGMENTED SUSTAINABILITY 
GOVERNANCE IN THE GOLD SECTOR 
In this section, I provide a nuanced assessment of the interplay of companies in a landscape of 
fragmented sustainability governance in the case of the global gold sector. I start my analysis 
with a brief overview of sustainability governance in the gold sector. Then, I use the three-
                                                             
2 I apply the notion of sustainability schemes to summarize different governance instruments (standards, principles, 
etc.).  
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tiered framework to further analyze and contextualize the role of companies as governance 
makers and takers in the context of fragmented sustainability governance for gold.   
In the last two decades, a multiplicity of sustainability schemes emerged for metals and 
minerals, and in particular for gold (Kickler et al. 2018; Young, Zhe, and Dias 2014; Mori 
Junior, Sturman, and Imbrogiano 2017; Heidingsfelder 2019). These sustainability schemes 
aim to tackle sustainability challenges associated with the mining, refining, and trading of gold. 
Taking a closer look at the gold case, eleven sustainability schemes3 are particularly important 
(Heidingsfelder 2019). Furthermore, numerous private and governmental governance setters 
exist in the gold sector with the aim to introduce sustainability governance mechanisms.  
As the focus of this article is on the interactions between fragmented sustainability 
governance and corporate actors, I do not dive deeper into the particularities of the gold sector, 
e.g. regarding its specific sustainability challenges (Mudd 2007; Andrews 2016; Young 2018) 
and its sectoral arrangement of artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) and (large scale) 
industrial mining actors (Childs 2014; Armah, Luginaah, and Odoi 2013). However, I want to 
emphasize that the boundaries between gold and other metals and minerals are not always clear-
cut. Although the focus of this article is on gold, I will inevitably refer to the extractive 
industries in general at some points.  
In the following sections, I use the introduced three-tiered framework to analyze the 
interplay of companies with fragmented sustainability governance in the empirical case of the 
gold sector. In more detail, the interplay of companies as both governance takers and makers 
with regard to fragmented governance is assessed at each of the three stages of the framework. 
                                                             
3 Important sustainability schemes and actors for gold are inter alia the “Initiative for Responsible Mining (IRMA), 
the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), the International Cyanide Management Institute (ICMI), 
the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the World Gold Council (WGC), the Responsible Minerals 
Initiative (RMI), the Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC), the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM), Fairtrade 
International, as well as the Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM), and the Certified Trading Chains (CTC)” 
(Heidingsfelder 2019, 4) 
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Figure 2 shows the condensed findings. In the following sections, I further elaborate on each 
aspect in greater detail, starting with the meta-meta game.  
 
Figure 2: Categorization of Corporate Activities in Their Roles as Governance Makers and Takers at 
Different Stages of the Three-tiered Conceptual Framework in the Empirical Case of the Global Gold 
Sector. Own Depiction Based on Pies et al. (2014, 231, 2010, 274) 
Companies and Fragmented Governance in the Meta-Meta Game 
The three-tiered framework suggests that companies as political actors can be engaged in the 
societal/political discourse (meta-meta game). Yet, the empirical findings provide a more 
nuanced picture of the engagement of companies as governance makers in the meta-meta game. 
As an important differentiation, I distinguish between two discourse arenas in the meta-meta 
game of rule-finding based on the empirical data in the gold sector: the wider societal/political 
discourse and the community discourse. While the wider societal/political discourse refers to a 
great variety of actors primarily beyond the actual gold and extractive industries, the 
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community discourse refers to actors that are strongly involved in and/or affected by the gold 
value chain, e.g. including mining companies, ASM miners, traders, downstream 
manufacturers, supply and service companies, downstream buyers, etc. Although there are 
certainly overlaps and interlinkages between these discourse arenas, this differentiation helps 
to guide the analysis.  
Given these two arenas, I find that companies in the case of gold play a different role in 
each discourse. While I find evidence that companies in the gold sector are actively engaged in 
the community discourse, they are (willingly or not) becoming a part of the wider 
societal/political discourse. I substantiate this claim in the following sections. 
The findings suggest that companies engage in the meta-meta game in different ways. 
First, regarding a larger societal or political debate on sustainability in the gold and extractive 
industries, I found that companies are only to some extent engaged here. When looking at the 
greater societal and political debate, the data suggest that companies are rather pressured by 
third parties (NGOs, media, consumers) to act and put sustainability topics on their corporate 
agenda than proactively picking up sustainability topics. Second, rather than being involved in 
the wider societal and political debate, companies are very well engaged in the meta-meta game, 
but more so with regard to shaping the ‘community debate’ of relevant actors in the gold and 
extractive industries.  
 
Ia. Companies are Becoming a Part of the Wider Societal/Political Discourse 
The findings suggest that in the case of governance for gold, corporate actors are passively 
becoming part of the societal/political discourse. Instead of proactively shaping the discourse 
with external stakeholder groups, companies are rather facing pressure by third parties to 
include sustainable practices in their business operations and to engage in the debate. This 
pressure to a) take value chain responsibility and b) engage in a wider societal/political debate, 
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is primarily coming from external stakeholders such as civil society, the media, governments, 
and investors.  
In more detail, the findings show an increasing pressure by external stakeholders to take 
value chain responsibility and to open up to the societal/political discourse. Willingly or not, 
companies are becoming part of the wider societal/political discourse (meta-meta game). The 
findings suggest that companies are becoming the object of the societal/political discourse, 
rather than being a strong contributing factor. I found indications that companies feel an 
increasing external pressure to implement more sustainable practices along their business 
operations. Furthermore, I found that companies are increasingly pilloried by external 
stakeholder groups:  
“[Companies] have [a] reputational risk … globally Canadian mining companies are 
being tagged more and more by civil society with this accountability, because so many 
mining companies are based on the Canadian stock exchange.” S7 
Overall, I witness a trend of the gold and extractive industries to open up to stakeholders 
and to engage in political/societal discussions. This trend of opening up and taking 
responsibility for the conditions in the gold and extractive industries can be explained by 
external pressure from civil society, the media and governmental bodies (Horowitz 2006, 307; 
Hodge 1987; Jenkins and Yakovleva 2006). Sustainability challenges associated with gold in 
particular (and extractive resources in general) were picked up by civil society organizations 
and the media alike, resulting in e.g. the ‘No Dirty Gold’ campaign in 2004 (Earthworks 2004). 
This development in the gold sector is in line with indications that the overall extractive 
industries are transforming from being a ‘black box’ several decades ago towards more 
transparent industries (David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Haufler 2010; Öge 2016; Corrigan 
2014). The findings suggest that the pressure from stakeholders (primarily considering the 
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downstream part of the value chain) steadily increased in the last years to engage in governance 
and change practices towards more sustainable pathways: 
“If you go back two years, then the pull from the downstream user was a lot less than it 
is now. […]  There is increasingly a voice to make sure for the downstream users 
whether as an individual or as an organization that says: ‘We want to source everything 
responsibly’.” S5 
Based on the empirical findings, the main impetus to bring about change and engage in 
the rule-finding discourse is coming from external stakeholders. Companies in the gold sector 
are pressured to open up to the societal/political discourse, as companies and their practices are 
becoming the object of the societal/political discourse. According to the interview partners, the 
pressure to a) implement more sustainable practices and b) open up to the wider societal 
discourse is particularly coming from the following parties: investors, final buyers of gold 
(containing) products, media, civil society, and governments. In the words of one interviewee:  
“Responsible practices are important to cover the entire supply chain. I think there is an 
expectation from investors and increasingly consumers around responsible business 
behaviors.” B7 
Regarding investors:  
“Another really important aspect of bringing change [to the gold industry] is the pressure 
from the investment sector! They are more and more pressuring companies to function 
in a responsible way. When the investors take this role, [the] mining companies have no 
choice but to listen! That’s really important to bring change to the industry.” S6 
Due to this increasing external pressure, the previously opaque activities of (mining) 
companies in the gold sector gained visibility as stakeholders call for transparency. In 
particular, mining operations are becoming visible to the purchasers and final consumers. This 
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new (forced) transparency puts the involved companies of the gold value chain in the spotlight 
of a wider societal/political discourse:  
“[M]ining has operated far less visibly than the other […] industries. […] The supply 
chain has been so complex and the mines have been able to be relatively invisible, that's 
less true now. And so now [the mining companies] say: ‘Okay, we are more visible. 
And our purchasers are saying: We are going to make you more visible […]’.” S7 
And further: 
“I think we are seeing a huge change simply around the issue of transparency. 
Transparency used to be scary and frightening alone, and we wanted to avoid it […]. 
Some actors were really wanting to avoid it […]. And instead, this idea [emerged] that 
transparency for many of these [mining] sites can be their friend, rather than being afraid 
to have the dialogue.” S7 
Nevertheless, the findings also show that some companies remain reluctant to engage 
in the wider societal/political discourse. Despite the outlined stakeholder pressure to become a 
part of the wider societal/political discourse, the findings suggest that some companies are still 
reluctant to engage in a rule-finding discourse. Following the insights from the interviews, this 
can partly be explained by the ‘tradition’ of the mining sector (thus including the gold sector) 
as being a ‘black box’ and being nontransparent. Although the societal/political discourse 
gained momentum in the last decades, some companies refused (and still refuse) to engage in 
this discourse and refrain from more transparent business operations. Engaging here would 
mean that companies are aware of their responsibility and are willing to step into the 
societal/political arena. One expert summarizes this as follows: 
“The mining industry got caught up in […] criticism. The environmental rules were 
changing. Within about a decade, new legislation on air quality, all sorts of things related 
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to the environment [came up]. Because people were woken up to the fact that we need 
to protect the environment. The mining industry was caught and fought! They said: 
‘This is wrong! Why don’t you just let us do what we are good at?’ And they came 
across as dinosaurs. And some still do … but like always, there are leaders and 
laggards.” S6 
And in the words of one sustainability scheme representative: 
“[…] there will be some [companies] who continue to resist, who say: ‘We already do 
enough. We are already over-audited. […] Why do [we] need to do this? Do you know 
how much [we] do already? We are trying so hard’. And then I say to them: ‘Okay. And 
if I say to a room full of all of you, those of you who are running the irresponsible mines, 
will you please raise your hand?’. And no one is going to raise their hand, right? ‘And 
yet each of you know that some of your colleagues are not running the same 
[responsible] operations that you yourself would do’.” S7 
 
Ib. Companies Actively Shape the ‘Community Discourse’  
In contrast to the societal/political discourse, many companies in the gold sector are now 
strongly engaged as proactive governance makers in the community discourse, where they aim 
to create sustainability governance mechanisms together with their peers. 
The findings highlight the importance of initiating dialogue and establishing common 
perceptions within the community discourse. Companies are increasingly engaged in the 
community discourse as a part of the meta-meta game as governance makers and impact the 
discourse for governance in order to address sustainability challenges related to gold. 
Oftentimes, companies use intermediaries like industry associations to indirectly engage as 
governance makers. In particular, the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) plays 
an important role here. In the community discourse, companies, together with other community 
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members, initiate dialogue in order to establish common perceptions of the matter at hand 
regarding sustainability in the case of gold and the extractive industries. This is particularly 
achieved via industry meetings, roundtables, and increasingly conferences on the topic of VCR, 
governance, and gold. Industry associations such as the ICMM play an important role as a sort 
of intermediary or catalyst to intensify dialogue within the community on sustainability and 
responsibility in the industry. According to one interviewee: 
“ICMM plays an incredibly important role in the world at defining leadership amongst 
the globes largest mining companies set up in particular to deal with addressing some 
of these questions [of] responsible practices, but its entire membership, of course, is the 
mining industry […].” S7 
Furthermore, in the case of the gold sector, the creation of and/or participation in MSIs, 
roundtables, and industry associations plays an important role. The findings further show that 
companies as governance makers in the meta-meta game can be involved in two important 
mechanisms: the creation of platforms for mutual exchange within the community and/or the 
active participation in such platforms. 
First, companies can create multi-stakeholder-initiatives, roundtables, and industry 
associations in order to provide platforms for exchange, thus allowing sustainability topics to 
be discussed. As an important note, I need to emphasize that some of these MSIs are rather 
exclusive (or implicitly exclusive) for companies, while others aim for a more diverse 
membership (see Zeyen, Beckmann, and Wolters 2016; see de Bakker, Rasche, and Ponte 
2019). In the case of gold, there are some governance initiatives and platforms that are primarily 
composed of corporate actors. This can particularly be seen in the case of the industry 
association ICMM – although it does not only cover gold – and the World Gold Council 
(WGC). While the ICMM entails mining and metals companies, and further industry 
associations, the WGC consists of major gold mining companies. In a similar fashion, the 
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Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) was established by diamond and jewelry companies. 
Corporate actors use these institutionalized platforms or arenas to further steer the community 
discourse with key actors of the gold and extractive industries. While these platforms offer 
opportunities for a narrow community discourse, they hold the pitfall of being or becoming an 
exclusive club of corporate actors – thus potentially hindering exchange with external 
stakeholder groups and the wider societal discourse. Nevertheless, companies are also engaged 
in or founding platforms and organizations that allow a more diverse composition of actors, 
thus including e.g. NGOs, labor unions, etc. This can e.g. be seen at the multi-stakeholder 
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), where businesses were actively engaged 
in the founding and development stages.  
Second, companies are actively engaged in such multi-stakeholder platforms (with or 
without being the ones who established them). Whether such platforms are ‘closed clubs’ for 
companies only or factual MSIs, companies can be engaged as governance makers in such 
platforms. Against this background, these manifold discourse arenas resemble important 
instruments and locations for the community discourse.  
 
Companies and Fragmented Governance in the Meta Game 
Following the conceptual foundations of this paper, I now highlight the role of companies as 
governance makers in the meta game. More precisely, the findings suggest that companies as 
governance makers are both engaged in collective as well as individual rule-setting. By doing 
so, they can shape the content of sustainability-related governance instruments depending on 
their governance needs and preferences. 
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IIa. Companies are Engaged in Collective Rule-Setting Commitments 
The findings suggest that companies as collective rule-setters are especially involved in two 
activities: the creation of sustainability schemes and/or the engagement in consultation 
processes. 
First, the findings show that companies are involved in the collective creation of 
sustainability schemes. As previously highlighted, companies in the meta-meta game are 
engaged in governance initiatives and platforms such as MSIs as a means and location for the 
community discourse. In the meta game, companies then use these governance initiatives to 
create and implement sustainability schemes. Similar to the differentiation of ‘company 
exclusive’ and multi-stakeholder governance initiatives (see Ib.), sustainability schemes can be 
created in the meta game with or without the involvement of non-corporate actors. Considering 
the first category (involvement of non-corporate actors), the Initiative for Responsible Mining 
with its IRMA standard is a good example, as it was developed with various different actor 
groups through a participatory process. Regarding the latter (no or little involvement of non-
corporate actors), the WGC and its Conflict-Free Gold Standard (CFGS) can be mentioned. 
Here, companies are the main actors to determine the content of the sustainability scheme. 
Second, companies in the gold sector are engaged in consultation processes. As 
governance makers, companies in the gold and extractive industries are actively involved in 
determining the criteria of governance instruments (e.g. standards or guidelines). As companies 
will be the ones who use governance instruments in the basic game, it makes eminent sense for 
them to be engaged in determining the criteria and content of governance in the meta game. By 
doing so, companies bring in their expertise and have the opportunity to shape governance 
instruments according to their governance needs. One company representative describes the 
involvement of his firm in governance consultations as follows:   
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“[…] We have good contacts with the responsible people at the [Responsible Minerals 
Initiative (RMI)]. So, if they aim to create a new standard, they send us a draft upfront 
and then I provide feedback. They are very thankful if someone from corporate practice 
says: ‘Guys, I like the idea, but it is not feasible in [corporate] practice’. We are 
integrated here. This works very well with the RMI. And similarly, with [the London 
Bullion Market Association] LBMA. They have a grievance mechanism in place. So, 
we can either say: ‘This is going too far’, or: ‘This doesn’t go far enough’. And we are 
actively engaged here.” B2 
 
IIb. Companies are Engaged in Individual Rule-Setting Commitments 
In addition to or instead of collective approaches, some companies in the gold and extractives 
sector prefer to apply individual rule-setting commitments in the form of company-specific 
codes of conduct or standards, or by implementing closed supply chains with specific regulatory 
aspects.  
The results highlight that firms create firm-specific codes of conduct in the gold sector. 
In addition to the existing sustainability schemes and initiatives, some companies have their 
own standards and guidelines. For instance, “the Kering jewelry group has its own standard, 
the ‘Kering standard’4 for jewelry and gold. […] Yet, if different jewelry companies have their 
own standards […], then the situation is becoming more and more confusing! […] And 
eventually nobody will be able to judge these standards.” (B1). 
Closely related, companies establish closed supply chains in the realm of the gold sector. 
Some mining and downstream manufacturing companies, particularly jewelry companies, 
establish closed supply chains as an individual governance approach. A few pioneer companies 
(jewelry companies, gold smiths, and jewelry traders) started to use closed supply chains either 
                                                             
4 Full name: Kering standards for raw materials and manufacturing processes (Kering 2017). 
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before a larger discussion on sustainability governance for gold gained momentum, or in the 
wake of this development. One pioneer in this regard is Fair Trade in Gems and Jewelry that 
aims to “establish the fair trade of precious metals and gemstones” (Siepelmeyer 2004, para. 
4). According to one interviewee, Fair Trade in Gems and Jewelry “has its cooperatives in 
Northern Argentina and they produce and deliver a few goldsmiths that manufacture their 
products with this gold […] and thereby have a closed supply chain.” (B4). In order to set the 
regulatory framework for its closed supply chain, Fair Trade in Gems and Jewelry created its 
own criteria for gold mining and trading which regulates e.g. labor conditions and 
environmental aspects (Siepelmeyer, n.d.). Following this pioneer approach, several goldsmiths 
adopted similar closed supply chains, thus setting their own governance regulations for 
implementing more sustainable practices in their supply chains. As an example for larger 
companies that experiment with individual rule-setting approaches, the jewelry brand Tiffany 
& Co. can be mentioned. As a governance maker in the meta-game, Tiffany introduced a 
company-specific code of conduct for its suppliers in order to take value chain responsibility. 
More specifically, Tiffany claims that:   
“We source the majority of our rough diamonds and metals directly from mines we 
know and from recycled sources. We are devoted to better understanding the social, 
economic and environmental impact of the mining and processing of precious materials 
so that we can create positive change along the supply chain, all the way from the mine 
to our customers.” (Tiffany 2019, para. 3) 
Furthermore, Tiffany aims to establish a closed supply chain for receiving its raw gold5:  
                                                             
5 According to its sustainability report, in 2017, Tiffany “purchased the raw gold used in [its] own manufacturing 
facilities from U.S. and Canadian sources: 18% […] of the raw gold came from Utah’s Bingham Canyon Mine, 
while 75% […]  came from recycled sources in the U.S. […]. The remaining 7% of raw gold came from a refiner 
in Canada that sources gold from a mixture of mined and recycled sources.” (Tiffany 2018, 23). 
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“Tiffany some time ago […] decided to eliminate the risk in their supply chain of gold 
by sourcing all of their gold from the Bingham Canyon Mine in the United States. That 
is the best. You get something at the very large luxury goods producer. But they can 
make a decision like that because they are not that huge of a consumer of gold so they 
can get all their gold from one mine. The origin of all their gold in a sense is perfectly 
known. […] In an environmental and in a traceability perspective it is a decision the 
company took.” C4 
 
IIc. Collective and Individual Rule-Setting Influences the Content of the Resulting 
Sustainability Scheme(s) 
In the meta game, one can see that in the case of gold, various collective and individual 
governance instruments are employed. Both approaches have in common that they deal with 
the content of rules. By being involved in collective and individual rule-setting approaches in 
the meta game, companies can considerably impact the resulting content of sustainability 
schemes, e.g. referring to their scope, ‘quality’, and stringency. This is not surprising because 
companies that are engaged in the rule-setting process have an inherent interest to shape the 
rules in a way that matches their governance needs and corporate goals. In the following, I 
briefly touch upon the effect of collective and individual rule-setting on the resulting 
sustainability schemes. By doing so, I particularly focus on potential pitfalls of company-driven 
governance (certifying ‘low hanging fruits’) and advantages (governance specialization). 
First, I shed light on the accusation that collective and individual corporate rule-setting 
could decisively lead to low or minimum quality requirements or, put differently, a ‘race to the 
bottom’ of governance quality (Fransen 2011; Riisgaard 2011). What I find particularly 
interesting is that some companies in collective or individual rule-setting approaches could 
quality-wise foster lower criteria regarding the content of the governance instrument(s). In the 
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empirical data, I found concerned voices who fear that the influence on the content of 
sustainability schemes executed by companies could lead to a lower quality when compared to 
governmental regulations. In other words, some experts fear that companies would only aim 
for the certification of ‘low hanging fruits’:  
“[One] problem is that, from my perspective, the corporate actors that are on board [of 
governance initiatives], are those that are already doing a good job and they aim for a 
comparatively low level of the standard’s criteria […]. So that they can just be certified 
[without further effort]. But this has no additional value for the firm. And also no 
positive effect on sustainability or responsible practices, because the company already 
had responsible practices in place.” C3 
And in a similar manner: 
“The ‘low hanging fruits’ are reached – those that are already complying with good 
[sustainability] practices.” C1 
According to some interviewees, this is e.g. the case with the RJC. The Responsible 
Jewellery Council started with mines in Australia and the USA, where social standards are 
already provided by governmental bodies. According to one interviewee, “[t]his leads to a 
segmentation of the market. Those actors that already comply with the standard will work 
according to a higher standard, and those [companies] that cannot comply with the standard, 
will work according to a lower standard – and will still get rid of their [gold].” (C1). 
As companies set the criteria for their collective and/or individual governance 
approaches themselves, it remains questionable if these approaches provide adequate criteria to 
cope with sustainability challenges. In the case of individual and firm-specific closed supply 
chains, one expert argues that these governance approaches do not necessarily use certification 
or standards as governance instruments, but could de facto be limited to “the principle of fair 
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trade with a respective narrative” (E5). In other words, jewelry companies with closed supply 
chains “have the advantage that they are not certified. They do not need to comply with any 
regulation” (B2). They provided a narrative, “but this is not sustainable at all” (B2). 
Second, seen from a different angle, companies can achieve a specialization of 
governance approaches for their governance needs in the meta game through both collective 
and individual rule-setting. Fragmentation in the meta game can therefore refer to a 
specialization of governance instruments (both collective and individual) that address specific 
governance needs of companies (and third parties). Such specialization of the content of 
governance can potentially lead to positive outcomes:  
“Positive aspects of this variety are of course that different industry branches and issues 
in different regions of the world are addressed and therefore, a variety of different 
stakeholders and target groups is addressed, which could not be covered by a single 
governance setter.” E1 
Furthermore, a specialization of governance instruments allows different qualities of 
sustainability schemes according to different needs of companies. As one approach, existing 
sustainability schemes introduce distinct levels with varying demands. This approach follows 
the rationale that governance makers have a heterogenous target audience with regard to 
existing qualities of practices (Heidingsfelder 2019). In order to cope with this heterogeneity, 
they provide both baseline standards or principles to lift as many actors as possible to a certain 
level of ‘good practices’, as well as advanced standards for the sector’s corporate front runners. 
According to one expert, such distinct levels are preferable because:  
“The leaders can use more comprehensive standards and the laggards can start with 
lower standards. […] Then you have standards tailored to the capacities of each 
company. The requirements should not be too high to discourage [the companies] but 
also not too low to demand too little from them.” E3 
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Companies and Fragmented Governance in the Basic Game 
In the basic game of rule-following, companies can primarily be seen as governance takers. In 
more detail, they need to deal with the fragmented governance landscape in the basic game that 
was caused by actions in the meta-meta and meta game. Here, they are struggling with finding 
management answers to cope with governance instruments created in the meta game and to 
integrate these instruments into their business operations. In more concrete terms, I identified 
two management challenges where companies struggle with fragmented governance in the 
basic game: confusion and uncertainty and handling the existing multiplicity of sustainability 
schemes. 
 
IIIa. Overall Confusion and Lack of Orientation Due to a Fragmented Sustainability 
Governance Landscape 
In the case of the gold sector, companies find themselves in a landscape of fragmented 
sustainability governance in the basic game, where they, as governance takers, have to deal 
with the multiplicity of specialized governance instruments. Metaphorically speaking, they 
need to navigate the sea of fragmented governance when operating their business and aiming 
to take VCR. Particularly for companies that were not (or only marginally) involved in the meta 
and meta-meta game, this fragmentation can lead to confusion and uncertainty. Fragmentation 
in the basic game can complicate decision-making processes as there might be too many options 
on the table. According to one interviewee: 
“I don’t think [the fragmentation is] helping the industry. I mean, the confusion if [the 
fragmentation] were to persist won't help anyone, because it won't be believable, right? 
It would be so confusing to the consumer out there, right? Whether that'd be the 
purchaser or the ultimate user […] it won't be useful.” S7 
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And further: 
“There are too many standards. Why are there so many? This is very confusing for the 
consumer! […] Why can’t [we] just simplify it? This [fragmentation of standards] 
creates more confusion for the consumer than it helps the industry.” B1 
Eventually, this overwhelming availability of governance approaches creates additional costs 
and efforts for involved companies: 
“[Fragmentation] requires additional effort and it can be confusing to let’s say to the 
layperson or it can be confusing to those who are just coming into this sector. It can be 
confusing to miners, it can be confusing to bureaucrats who do not spend very much 
time on this issue. There is obvious desire to have ironically a less diverse set of 
initiatives. You know everyone is looking for the silver bullet: ‘We want the one 
standard’.” C4 
Furthermore, the findings reveal the burden for multi-commodity companies (both 
mining and manufacturing ones) in the case of fragmented governance for gold. According to 
the findings, multi-commodity companies are especially challenged by fragmentation, as they 
do not only deal with one material like gold, but instead simultaneously deal with multiple 
materials. First, multi-commodity mining companies can face the burden of fragmented 
sustainability governance. As several extractive resources can jointly occur at a single mining 
site, many of the (larger) mining companies are not extracting a single commodity like gold, 
but instead source several commodities (e.g. gold and copper) simultaneously. Given that 
multiple sustainability schemes exist for gold and other jointly occurring minerals and metals, 
multi-commodity mining companies are particularly affected by a fragmentation of 
sustainability schemes. Therefore, one could opt for commodity un-specific instead of 
commodity specific governance approaches. Yet, this would require a shift in the meta game 
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and awareness for this issue in the meta-meta game. Some developments in this direction can 
already be witnessed:  
“[If] you are an LBMA gold and silver refiner, you only have to have one audit that 
covers both your gold and silver production. You don’t have to have two audits for that. 
And we are in the process of launching platinum and palladium, so you will have one 
audit that would cover four metals! […] This consolidation and consistency will happen 
here. […] We are looking to make sure that LBMA good delivery refiners that produce 
more than one metal, that they only have one audit for all their metals!” S5 
Second, considering the downstream part of the gold supply chain, multi-commodity 
manufacturing companies can face the burden of fragmentation. Analogous to multi-
commodity mining companies, manufacturers which use multiple commodities for their 
products (e.g. cars or smartphones) are considerably affected by governance fragmentation 
according to the interviewees: 
“There are a lot of purchasers, who do not buy only one material, right? Whether you 
are in the auto sector or the jewelry sector, or the electronic sector […]. For example, 
there's one electronic company who stood up in a meeting and said: ‘We buy 41 different 
mined materials. We are not going to use 41 different standards, folks!’.” S7 
Another interviewee supports this thought:  
“Take the example of a company that uses different metals and therefore has to have 38 
different reporting or due diligence systems to comply with the different standards … 
this is inefficient and way too cost-intensive. Therefore, this is one of the arguments for 
a harmonization or stronger cooperation of standards, for cross-recognition, etc.” B8 
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Having multiple governance approaches for different commodities is a key challenge for the 
manufacturing companies, particularly regarding the automotive and electronics industry as 
lead purchasers of gold and other mined resources: 
“The automotive companies are in the spotlight of media and held responsible for more 
sustainable practices in the production. And from their point of view, they are not 
pleased with having one standard for each commodity: one for copper, one for gold, one 
for aluminum. This is an important issue. How to make things easier for the industry 
players who buy commodities. […] But the thing is, you are not going to solve that 
problem by simply having a single standard. That might be true from their point of view. 
The reality is that they have to learn that those commodities are different!” S6 
In addition, the findings stress the issue for companies to choose adequate sustainability 
schemes. It is the basic game where companies are facing a multiplicity of governance 
instruments that were created in the meta game. Therefore, choosing the ‘right’ governance 
instrument for a company can resemble a challenge: 
“[The companies] are certainly overstrained with this variety. Because they don’t know 
which [governance] initiative is the right one for them, or which one is trustworthy and 
where they should begin. This overstraining is definitely a disadvantage.” E1 
Furthermore, one expert describes the process of choosing an adequate governance instrument 
as follows: 
“The decision to take LBMA was not based on what you would refer to sustainability 
[criteria], but it was a clear requirement from the market. If you want to sell investment 
gold at a large scale and if you also want to trade gold […], then you need to be 
accredited by LBMA. You just need this nowadays. […] But in the beginning, we said 
we don’t take [LBMA]. We want the [standard] that our customers prefer – and that was 
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rather CFSI [Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative]. So, this was a customer-oriented 
decision.” B2 
Another company representative describes similar experiences with choosing governance 
instruments in order to satisfy stakeholder expectations, which lead to the incorporation of 
multiple sustainability schemes at his company: 
“[…] LBMA is the oldest, let’s say baseline certification. And then [we have] RJC 
because we are primarily active in the jewelry sector. This is our main industry. And 
then for the electronics industry and for the smelters, we [also use CFSI], because it is 
important for them. So, due to historical reasons and due to our core business, we [use] 
these three certifications. And we might use additional certifications if needed. For 
example, one of our subsidiaries […] uses the Fairtrade [certification], because the 
customers want it.” B1 
 
IIIb. Handling of Multiple Sustainability Schemes 
An additional management challenge entails the handling of multiple sustainability schemes. 
Here, the findings show that companies as governance takers in the basic game are struggling 
with multiple audits for different sustainability schemes. Once companies managed to choose 
their respective governance instrument(s), they need to go through audits in order to receive 
certification. Yet, audits become a great challenge in light of fragmented sustainability 
governance. Given the multiplicity of different governance instruments, some companies use 
more than one standard in order to take VCR and comply with stakeholder expectations. Yet, 
complying with multiple sustainability schemes represents a great effort for companies. Several 
interviewed experts describe this phenomenon as ‘audit fatigue’. Audit fatigue can be 
considered a direct consequence of the multiplicity of governance instruments available in the 
basic game: 
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“Audit fatigue! Everyone wants to see a certificate for anything! [...] Everything has a 
certificate for the sake of having a certificate. And this requires auditing. And auditing 
costs money and energy, and a lot of time!” B4 
For companies that use several different sustainability schemes, the findings suggest that audit 
fatigue becomes a severe issue. Again, this is particularly the case for multi-commodity 
companies: 
“We are certified by LBMA and by RJC. And the standards have rather similar 
requirements in some areas and it would be great if we could have one audit that is 
mutually recognized by both parties. This was recently the case. But it is not possible 
anymore. […] This is unfortunate and costs us a lot. It means more audits for us! One 
reason is that this whole standards and certification business became an actual industry. 
And therefore, an audit company prefers to conduct two audits instead of one! This leads 
to a ‘certification business’.” B1 
And further:  
“[…] you don’t want to have auditors coming at your business week after week…first 
environmental, then sustainability, then financial, then…you want one audit that will 
comprise the whole piece that you are trying to address. So the danger is that standards 
do not react to increasing downstream scrutiny around the sustainability piece.” S5 
And in a similar manner: 
“Too many audits are a too great effort. Some audits are not one, but three days, e.g. the 
LBMA audit. And this is an enormous effort: personal, bureaucratic, and financial. … 
So you really have to choose wisely whether you implement yet another [sustainability] 
standard.” B1 
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Furthermore, I found that some companies, e.g. gold smelters, comply with multiple 
sustainability schemes and therefore face multiple audits with potential overlaps in content. 
One expert from a sustainability scheme critically reflects this: 
“We know refiners who are in LBMA, in RJC and in Fairmined. So how can we reduce 
the schemes for them that they don't feel tired […] of audits? Okay, today is the audit 
for LBMA, tomorrow is the audit of RJC and tomorrow is the Fairmined audit. […] We 
have tried to sort of collaborate to reduce the burden of audits, because it is also implying 
time, human capital. We are also spending the human capital of this company.” S3 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings in the gold sector help to develop a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
companies as potential governance makers and takers at the different stages of the meta-meta, 
meta, and basic game. Based on the results and conceptual thoughts, I provide a brief discussion 
of the interplay of companies with different manifestations of sustainability governance 
fragmentation. In greater detail, I introduce a conceptual framework with three different 
manifestations of fragmentation at the different stages of the three-tiered governance 
framework. Furthermore, I elaborate how companies both intensify and are affected by 
fragmented governance. Naturally, the introduced framework is strongly linked to the empirical 
findings of this study and does therefore not claim universal applicability.  
Based on the empirical findings and conceptual thoughts, I argue that the interplay of 
governance fragmentation and companies as political actors requires a more nuanced 
understanding. In order to shed light on the complex interplay of companies with different types 
of fragmented sustainability governance, I introduce the following conceptual framework 
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(Figure 3). In the following sub-sections, I explain the components of the framework and 
highlight three different manifestations of sustainability governance fragmentation.  
 
Figure 3: Conceptual Framework of the Interplay of Companies as Governance Makers and Takers and 
Different Manifestations of Governance Fragmentation, Based on the Findings in the Global Gold Sector 
and Conceptual Reasoning. Own Depiction Based on Pies et al. (2014, 231, 2010, 274) 
Governance Multiplicity and the Role of Companies in the Meta-Meta Game 
Companies are rather passively engaged in the wider societal/political discourse as well as 
actively engaged in the community discourse with their peers as governance makers in the 
meta-meta game. I found two distinct discourse arenas that are of relevance in the meta-meta 
game in the case of gold. Against this background, I argue that the fragmentation of 
sustainability governance in the meta-meta game can be framed as multiplicity.  
First, fragmentation refers to a multiplicity of discourse arenas. While companies in the 
gold sector are rather passively engaged in the wider societal/political discourse, they are 
actively engaged as governance makers in the community discourse. Hence, companies need 
to cope with the challenge of simultaneously participating in two discourses or arenas with 
different stakeholders, contextual factors, logics, and values (see Söderbaum 2008; see Roloff 
2008; Airike, Rotter, and Mark-Herbert 2016). Therefore, the multiplicity of discourses could 
be challenging for companies because the discourse arenas potentially have missing 
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interlinkages, contradictions, and trade-offs. Furthermore, given the different stakeholders in 
the discourses, companies that aim for encompassing VCR practices might face different 
expectations (see Jonker and Nijhof 2006) in both arenas: While these companies might 
experience rejection and prejudgment in the societal/political discourse, they could 
simultaneously be regarded as front runners or role models in the community discourse. I argue 
that a key challenge for companies is to find ways to beneficially participate in both discourses 
with their unique characteristics. Hence, the multiplicity of discourses can resemble a 
management challenge, as the company needs to find ways to proactively engage in different 
discourses with varying rules and expectations.  
Against this background, I want to emphasize two important aspects for companies as 
governance makers in the meta-meta game. First, companies need to develop the necessary 
skills and competences to simultaneously thrive in different discourses. One could argue that 
they inter alia need to develop a sense of “reception competence” which enables the business 
firm and its managers to “enter into an exchange of ideas with all the actors relevant to the value 
creation process […] so that the organization is sensitive to different (and sometimes even 
incommensurable) views and concerns” (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2010, 272). On a 
complementary note, Osagie et al. emphasize the importance of “cognition-oriented 
competencies” (2016, 249) which allow the firm to anticipate sustainability topics and to 
understand sustainability interdependencies between the firm and its environment. These 
competences can help the firm to recognize and incorporate external expectations in the wider 
societal/political debate in the meta-meta game. Efforts for more transparency and openness in 
the gold and extractive industries are a first step in this direction. Furthermore, I argue that 
intermediary and bridging actors (see Abbott 2012; Strambach and Surmeier 2018; Pegram 
2015; Berkes 2009) such as industry associations or organizations like ISEAL or the OECD are 
needed to a) steer, moderate, and facilitate the community discourse, and b) to bridge and 
 
36 
interlink the wider societal/political with the community discourse. In more detail, adequate 
instruments, platforms, and formats are needed to enable exchange and mutual learning both 
within the community discourse and beyond.  
Second, fragmentation in the meta-meta game and in both discourses can refer to a 
multiplicity of ideas and worldviews, stemming from the different stakeholders (see Arenas, 
Lozano, and Albareda 2009; see Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust 2012; Jonker and Nijhof 2006). 
For instance, companies with distinct characteristics (e.g. company size, type, value chain 
position, or geographical anchoring) can contribute diverse perspectives to the overarching 
rule-finding discourse in the meta-meta game, thus allowing a fruitful debate that incorporates 
different worldviews and governance needs. Hence, the multiplicity of ideas, actors, and 
worldviews can be a positive thing, as different voices and concerns of various companies and 
third parties can be integrated in the rule-finding process. However, the challenging question 
remains how different stakeholders with varying worldviews can reach a common rule-interest 
in the meta-meta game. This challenging task is further complicated by the existence of multiple 
discourse arenas in the case of gold.  
 
Governance Specialization and the Role of Companies in the Meta Game 
The insights in the gold sector reveal that companies in the meta game are proactively engaged 
as governance makers in collective and/or individual rule-setting, which mirrors existing 
scholarly contributions (Néron and Norman 2008; Rasche 2012; van Oosterhout 2010; Mena 
and Palazzo 2012; Beckmann, Hielscher, and Pies 2014). By doing so, companies considerably 
impact the content of the resulting governance instruments like sustainability schemes or firm-
specific codes of conduct. With regard to fragmentation, it is the meta game where companies 
trigger a variety of different governance instruments that hold the potential to address specific 
governance needs. As a consequence, various different collective and individual governance 
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approaches with different or overlapping contents are created in the meta game. Although this 
fragmentation could lead to a diminishing quality of governance approaches (see Fransen 2011; 
see Riisgaard 2011), it also holds the potential of offering tailor-made governance approaches 
for unique governance needs of involved companies. Therefore, I argue that fragmentation in 
the meta game can be framed as specialization. Specialization thus refers to tailor-made 
governance approaches for the respective governance needs of companies and other parties.  
As an important note, specialization does not necessarily have to be ‘good’ regarding 
the outcome for sustainability and the capability to take value chain responsibility. It basically 
means that specific governance needs are addressed – regardless of the resulting quality, rigor, 
scope, or stringency of the resulting sustainability scheme(s). Eventually, specialization can 
potentially lead to an increase of governance approaches (individual & collective) to address 
specific governance needs of companies.  
Against this background, I argue that fragmentation as specialization in the meta game 
can lead to both positive and negative consequences. Put differently, specialization of 
governance in the meta game is an ambivalent phenomenon. First, specialization can be positive 
for companies and their ability to take VCR along the gold value chain. As tailor-made 
governance approaches address the specific governance needs of companies, companies are 
enabled to take value chain responsibility according to their existing means and capabilities. 
From this perspective, specific governance instruments can turn out to be more valuable and 
effective than ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance solutions that do not differentiate between different 
company characteristics (e.g. company size, type, and impact on sustainability topics).  
Second, however, specialized governance approaches also come with distinct 
shortcomings. Companies (particularly downstream jewelry companies) increasingly choose 
company-specific codes of conduct and closed supply chain governance approaches in order to 
take VCR. However, company-specific codes of conduct and closed supply chains offer one 
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shortcoming: They considerably increase the overall number of governance approaches. By 
doing so, companies contribute to a greater number of available governance instruments to take 
VCR, thus leading to fragmentation. Companies as governance makers in the meta game thus 
steer the multiplicity of governance approaches. They do so either by creating governance 
approaches and order mechanisms, or by creating firm-specific codes of conduct and closed 
supply chains. While this might be beneficial and rational for the individual company, other 
companies and third parties (e.g. consumers, governments, and civil society) might be 
overwhelmed by this multiplicity, thus causing challenges in the basic game.  
 
Governance Dissipation and the Role of Companies in the Basic Game 
In their role as governance takers in the basic game, companies are confronted with a 
fragmented sustainability landscape that was created in the meta-meta and meta game. 
Therefore, I term fragmentation as dissipation in the basic game. In the basic game, companies 
struggle with dissipated governance, as it affects their business operations, thus leading e.g. to 
difficulties when choosing standards and complying with multiple sustainability schemes. The 
empirical findings reveal two distinct management challenges when facing a dissipation of 
sustainability governance in the basic game: confusion and uncertainty as well as handling the 
existing fragmentation. It is the basic game where companies face the greatest challenges of 
fragmented sustainability governance. Dissipation is a major hurdle for companies when a) 
operating their business and b) aiming to take value chain responsibility. Hence, the findings 
of corporate challenges due to governance dissipation in the basic game are in line with previous 
studies that emphasize the negative aspects of governance fragmentation (Held and Young 
2013; Zelli and Asselt 2013; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013; Hospes, van der Valk, 
and van der Mheen-Sluijer 2012; Bitzer, Francken, and Glasbergen 2008; Smith and Fischlein 
2010). 
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Against this background, companies need to find management solutions to proactively 
deal with a dissipation of governance in the basic game. Companies can aim to optimize and 
improve their activities when acting in a landscape of dissipated governance. This can e.g. refer 
to establishing better processes when choosing sustainability schemes or to internal trainings to 
cope with requirements of different sustainability schemes.  
However, coming back to the three-tiered governance framework, I argue that solutions 
for challenges of fragmented governance can not only be found in the basic game itself, but 
require the engagement of companies in the meta and meta-meta game. I therefore make a claim 
for at least three activities in the meta and meta-meta game that could help to tackle issues of 
governance dissipation in the basic game.  
First, I suggest that companies and other third parties can aim for a harmonization and 
interoperability regarding the content of sustainability schemes in the meta game (aspect A in 
Figure 3) (Pekdemir 2018; Mori Junior, Sturman, and Imbrogiano 2017). In this regard, the 
aspect of interoperability receives growing attention by scholars (Mori Junior, Sturman, and 
Imbrogiano 2017; Kickler et al. 2018; Mori Junior, Franks, and Ali 2016). Changing the content 
of sustainability schemes towards a better alignment could help to reduce overlaps and 
duplications and thus reduce the negative consequences of governance dissipation. 
Furthermore, approaches of harmonization and interoperability in the meta game could help to 
decrease the number and complexity of audits, as e.g. parts of one audit can be cross-recognized 
by another audit. While this does not necessarily mean that the absolute number and diversity 
of sustainability schemes would decrease, it could streamline the different governance 
approaches and allow a better alignment and practical handling for corporate practitioners in 
the basic game. In addition, specialized actors such as the ISEAL alliance could play an 
important role as meta governance actors to facilitate harmonization and interoperability in the 
meta game (Turcotte, Reinecke, and Hond 2014; Fransen 2015). 
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Second, considering multi-commodity companies (both mining and manufacturing 
ones), the introduction of, or fusion of commodity specific sustainability schemes into, 
commodity un-specific or modular sustainability schemes in the meta game could resemble one 
way to decrease corporate challenges of governance dissipation (aspect B) (Kickler and 
Franken 2017; Manning and Reinecke 2016).  
Third, in order to resolve challenges of dissipated governance, adequate feedback 
mechanisms (aspect C) between all three stages of the three-tiered framework are needed. This 
is important as those companies that are engaged in the wider societal/political discourse and/or 
the community discourse in the meta-meta game are not necessarily the same companies that 
are facing challenges of dissipated governance in the basic game. As an example, powerful 
downstream companies could dominate the community discourse and the creation of 
sustainability schemes in the meta game. Whereas upstream companies might struggle with 
following these rules in the basic game. Put differently, the type of involvement of different 
companies at different and/or multiple stages of the three-tiered framework can cause questions 
of matching, representation, legitimacy, and agency: Do the rules created in the meta game 
match with business operations in the basic game? Are the companies who are engaged as 
governance makers in the meta and/or meta-meta game the same who struggle with governance 
dissipation? In order to establish such feedback mechanisms, instruments such as regularly 
consultations, working fora, mixed boards, and company visits could represent promising 
approaches. Furthermore, again, intermediaries and moderators are needed to facilitate 
exchange and cooperation (see Abbott 2012; Strambach and Surmeier 2018; Pegram 2015).  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Adequate sustainability governance is a key prerequisite to allow companies to take value chain 
responsibility. However, sustainability governance often comes in a fragmented manner. In 
light of developments towards transnational sustainability governance and the evident 
fragmentation of governance, the role of the business firm needs to be rethought. This article 
addresses the interplay of companies with fragmented sustainability governance when taking 
value chain responsibility. In more detail, the article addresses the question how companies 
affect and are affected by different manifestations of fragmented sustainability governance in 
the empirical case of governance for gold. As a searchlight to guide the analysis, I use the three-
tiered ordonomic framework by Pies and colleagues (Pies, Beckmann, and Hielscher 2014, 
2010). In order to elaborate the interplay of companies and fragmented sustainability 
governance, I use the empirical case of fragmented sustainability governance in the gold sector.  
As a key contribution, this article provides a more nuanced understanding of a) the role 
of companies as both affecting and being affected by governance fragmentation and b) different 
manifestations of fragmentation at the stages of the three-tiered framework. Based on the 
empirical findings and conceptual thoughts, I shed light on the role of companies as governance 
makers in the meta-meta game. Here, they are involved in two different discourse arenas (the 
societal/political and the community discourse) where they can potentially impact the rule-
finding process. I argue that fragmentation in the meta-meta game can be framed as multiplicity 
of discourses and worldviews, thus allowing fruitful exchange and mutual learning.  
In the meta game, companies are actively engaged as governance makers and determine 
the content of sustainability schemes. Here, they create collective and individual governance 
instruments for their particular governance needs. Therefore, I frame fragmentation of 
governance in the meta game as specialization, thus allowing to find multiple, tailor-made 
governance solutions for specific governance needs. 
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In the basic game, companies passively act as governance takers. It is the basic game 
where companies struggle with the fragmentation of sustainability schemes and where they 
need to find management approaches to cope with downsides of fragmentation. Therefore, I 
frame fragmentation as dissipation in the basic game, thus emphasizing potential downsides for 
companies when a) operating their business and b) taking value chain responsibility.  
By providing a more nuanced assessment of the interplay of companies as both 
governance takers and makers with different manifestations (multiplicity, specialization, and 
dissipation) of governance fragmentation, I contribute to the wider scholarly literature on the 
political role of the firm and sustainability governance. By emphasizing different company roles 
and manifestations of fragmentation at the stages of rule-finding, rule-setting, and rule-
following, I aim to overcome the prevailing negative connotation of governance fragmentation. 
I argue that fragmentation is per se not ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but ambivalent. Therefore, this article 
provides some stimulus for further research regarding the interplay of fragmentation and the 
business firm. First, I encourage scholars to assess the needed competences of companies when 
taking different roles in varying contexts of governance fragmentation. Regarding the 
multiplicity of discourses in the meta-meta game, companies as governance makers might need 
different competences compared to dealing with governance dissipation in the basic game. 
Second, I suggest to investigate approaches to decrease the downsides of governance 
dissipation in the basic game. Answers to do so are to be found in the meta and meta-meta 
game. More research is needed to shed light on the feedback mechanisms between the meta-
meta, meta, and basic game in order to solve problems in the basic game. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: List of Interviewed Experts and Their Respective Organizational Affiliation: B (Business Firm),  
C (Civil Society), E (Education and Research), and S (Sustainability Scheme) 
 
ID Description  
B1 Sustainability manager (refiner/smelter) 
B2 Environmental manager (refiner/smelter)  
B3 Consultancy representative 
B4 Extractive industries/ASM gold consultant 
B5 Two company representatives (refiner/smelter) 
B6 Company representative and founder (jewelry trading) 
B7 Sustainability expert 
B8 Consultancy representative and researcher 
C1 Expert for sustainability certification and the gold sector 
C2 Extractive industries expert 
C3 Extractive industries expert 
C4 ASM expert 
E1 Researcher in the extractive industries and in the gold sector (governmental body) 
E2 Researcher in the extractive industries and in the gold sector (governmental body) 
E3 Researcher in the extractive industries and in the gold sector (governmental body) 
E4 Researcher in the extractive industries and in the gold sector (university) 
E5 Researcher in the extractive industries and in the gold sector (consultancy) 
E6 Researcher in the extractive industries (governmental body) 
E7 Researcher in the extractive industries (university) 
S1 Sustainability scheme representative and ASM expert 
S2 Sustainability scheme representative 
S3 Sustainability scheme representative and ASM expert 
S4 Expert (meta governance organization) 
S5 Sustainability scheme representative 
S6 Sustainability scheme representative 
S7 Sustainability scheme representative 
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Abstract 
Purpose – The paper investigates how the alignment of two corporate functions, trade 
compliance (TC) and sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) can help companies to 
take corporate value chain responsibility (VCR). In particular, the authors investigate how 
evolutionary system theory can explain the co-evolution of two distinct VCR functions (SSCM 
and TC) and the potential and challenges for their future alignment. 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors introduce evolutionary system theory as a 
powerful explanatory perspective to the field of VCR, SSCM, and TC. By applying 
evolutionary system theory to the VCR debate, the authors analyze the potential for aligning 
both functions. They further analyze the inherent challenges of such an alignment by discussing 
the concept of organizational path dependencies. 
Findings – The paper spells out a research agenda and formulates testable propositions for 
further investigating the interplay of environment and system as well as the structural options 
for a functional alignment of SSCM and TC. 
Originality/value – The corporate function of TC has been widely overlooked by supply chain 
and sustainability scholars. This paper adds the function of TC to the wider discussion on SSCM 
and corporate VCR. Furthermore, the paper develops a research agenda for a pioneer topic and 
trigger discussion in academia and corporate practice. 
Keywords – Sustainable supply chain management, Trade compliance, Value chain 
responsibility, Evolutionary system theory, Organizational path dependency theory 
Paper type – Conceptual paper  
  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Companies are increasingly held responsible for negative effects along their value chain (Busse, 
Schleper, et al., 2017, p. 19). In light of ever more complex value networks, corporate decisions 
within the firm can lead to manifold non-economic consequences outside the firm, both 
upstream and downstream the value chain (Kovács, 2008; Letizia and Hendrikse, 2016; 
Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo, 2016). Diverse stakeholders including NGOs, consumers, 
investors, and more and more also regulators therefore expect companies to actively address 
these social and ecological issues (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Foerstl et al., 2010; 
Gold et al., 2010; Harms et al., 2013). This paper subsumes this responsibility to address a 
corporation’s sustainability impacts both upstream and downstream the value chain as corporate 
value chain responsibility (VCR). 
Within the firm, there are various functions and departments that address VCR. The most 
prominent approach in this regard is without doubt sustainable supply chain management 
(SSCM). SSCM “aims at integrating environmental and social issues in supply chain 
management (Bai and Sarkis, 2010; Gold et al., 2010; Seuring and Müller, 2008; Wittstruck 
and Teuteberg, 2012)” (Harms et al., 2013, p. 207). It has become a dynamic phenomenon in 
corporate practice and has emerged as a widely established field of management research 
(Carbone et al., 2012; Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Harms et al., 2013; Pagell and Shevchenko, 
2014; Quarshie et al., 2016; Rajeev et al., 2017; Roy et al., 2018). SSCM, however, is not the 
only corporate function to address VCR. In fact, this paper sheds light on a second function that 
many companies engage in, yet that is often overlooked in the debate about VCR: the function 
of trade compliance. 
Trade compliance (TC) describes a corporate function in business practice that includes 
two elements: strategic trade control (import and export control) and supply chain security. As 
the term denotes, TC is typically driven by an externally enforced compliance logic to e.g. 
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fight terrorism. While strategic 
trade control focuses on measures to control and manage import and export streams of the 
company, e.g. by controlling dual-use items (European Council, 2009)[1], supply chain security 
implements measures to protect the company’s value chain from unauthorized external 
intrusion (Closs and McGarrell, 2004). 
As both SSCM and TC address non-economic dimensions of the buying and selling 
decisions of a firm, they can both be seen as potential contributions to corporate VCR. Yet, 
little is known not only about TC in general but more importantly about the relationship 
between TC and SSCM. Why do many firms have these two separate functions for VCR? How 
do these functions relate? Is there room for cross-functional integration? And if so, what keeps 
companies from realizing this potential?  
A powerful theoretical perspective to make sense of both the VCR phenomenon as well as 
of the co-existence of the SSCM and TC function lies in evolutionary system theory (Luhmann, 
2006; Schneider et al., 2017; Seidl and Becker, 2006; Thompson and Valentinov, 2017). System 
theory understands the firm as a system that interacts with an external environment. In order to 
prosper, any system needs to adapt to those environmental requirements that are relevant for its 
own functioning (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). To this end, 
systems develop specific functions and structures to build up the necessary internal complexity 
that allows dealing with the immense external complexity of its environment (Müller and 
Powell, 1994; Schneider et al., 2017; Thompson and Valentinov, 2017; Worren, 2016).  
Seen from this system theory perspective, VCR is thus about the interdependent relationship 
between a company (as a system) and its external value chain environment. From an inside-out 
perspective, this relationship includes the sustainability impacts a company causes for its 
outside (systemàenvironment). From an outside-in perspective (environmentàsystem), it 
relates to how the environment, in turn, raises sustainability-related constraints and expectations 
that a company needs to meet in order to sustain important external relationships. 
 3 
 
Evolutionary system theory, however, highlights that system-environment interactions are 
never static but change dynamically (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; Terreberry, 1968). In fact, as 
the environment changes, systems need to adapt. Yet, as the concept of organizational path 
dependencies (Sydow et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2011) highlights, the ability of a system to 
adapt is always constrained by its previous evolution (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Schreyögg and 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Sydow et al., 2009; Wagner et al., 2011). A company cannot re-invent 
itself from scratch but is always influenced by its existing structures and processes.  
This paper builds upon and expands these conceptual considerations to address the 
following research question: How can evolutionary system theory explain not only the co-
evolution of two distinct VCR functions (SSCM and TC) but also the potential and challenges 
for their future alignment?  
To answer this question, the paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 
2 introduces the perspective of evolutionary system theory in more detail. Here, a specific focus 
lies on the importance of functions that allow a system to develop the adequate internal 
complexity necessary for addressing relevant aspects of its environment’s external complexity. 
Building upon this theory, section 3 then discusses SSCM and TC as two functions that each 
address VCR, yet emerged separately as they originally responded to different and separated 
requirements in a firm’s external environment. Section 4 then analyzes why there is an 
increasing potential for aligning the hitherto separate SSCM and TC functions. Here, the key 
idea is that there are dynamic changes in the external environment that blur the boundaries 
between SSCM and TC requirements. As external expectations regarding SSCM and TC 
increasingly overlap, this gradual alignment in the external environment favors adequate forms 
of internal alignment. Section 5 then uses evolutionary system theory to discuss the inherent 
challenges of such an alignment. As the concept of organizational path dependencies highlights, 
companies cannot freely adapt without any constraints but are bound by their previous 
structures and processes. Section 6 uses the evolutionary system theory lens to engage in a 
discussion about the parameters that influence the case for and challenges of functional 
alignment of SSCM and TC. More specifically, the discussion develops three environment-
related, three system-related, and three alignment-related propositions that can be useful in 
guiding future research and spells out a research agenda for further scholarly investigation. 
The paper thus makes the following four contributions. First, it introduces evolutionary 
system theory as a powerful explanatory perspective to the field of VCR, SSCM, and TC. 
Second, it adds the often overlooked, yet empirically relevant function of TC to the scholarly 
discussion on SSCM and VCR. Third, it uses evolutionary system theory to analyze the 
potential and challenges for aligning both functions. Fourth, it spells out a research agenda and 
formulates testable propositions for further investigating the interplay and potential alignment 
of SSCM and TC.  
 
2. Theory Perspective: Evolutionary System Theory 
System theory is an interdisciplinary field of research that studies the emergence, development 
and interrelations of systems and sub-systems with their environments. While there are many 
strands of system theory, this paper employs a pragmatic understanding of key features of the 
Luhmannian perspective (Luhmann, 1995a) that is currently receiving again increasing 
attention in the scholarly discourse (Cooren and Seidl, 2019; Luhmann, 2018). As a key asset, 
Luhmann’s comprehensive work offers “insights on what happens within organizations, but 
also on the interconnection between organization and environment” (Baralou et al., 2012, p. 
296). Following this line of thought, the subsequent sub-sections introduce selected concepts 
of system theory that are useful for analyzing SSCM and TC: distinction, systems, 
environments, openness and closeness, complexity and, importantly, the idea of functions 
(Schneider et al., 2017).  
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According to Luhmann, the aspect of difference or distinction is crucial for any systems 
theory (Luhmann, 2006; Seidl and Becker, 2006). In more detail, “systems theory always begins 
with an assumption of difference” (Müller and Powell, 1994, p. 44). This difference refers to 
the “difference between system and environment” (Luhmann, 2006, p. 38). Through such 
distinctions between the system and its environment, a system can emerge and prevail within 
its system boundaries (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1515). Hence, the system is “the creation 
of form within the medium of environment” and will “always maintain the distinction between 
system and environment” (Brandhoff, 2009, p. 312). In more concrete terms, companies as 
organizations can be regarded as systems with distinct differences that distinguish them from 
their environment. Following previous scholarly work, this paper treats systems and 
organizations as interchangeable terms for the sake of simplicity (Schneider et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the idea of differentiation allows systems to develop internal sub-systems, “for 
which the rest of the system then in turn becomes an internal environment” (Müller and Powell, 
1994, p. 45). In the case of the business firm as an organization (system), this line of thought 
suggests that companies can in turn develop internal sub-systems (e.g. structural 
units/functions) that are different from their respective internal environment (e.g. other 
structural units/functions).  
A second important feature of Luhmann’s work on systems theory refers to the conceptual 
debate in system theory on closed and open systems (von Bertalanffy, 1968; Thompson and 
Valentinov, 2017). On the one hand, Luhmann refers to systems as being operationally closed 
because “they regulate internal and external complexity […] through selectivity or reduction” 
(Baralou et al., 2012, p. 294) within the closed and sharp boundaries of the system. Put 
differently, this operative closure describes a “closure on the level of [the system’s] operations 
in the sense that no operations can enter or leave the system” (Seidl and Becker, 2006, p. 15). 
On the other hand, systems are open and interact with their environment (in turn consisting of 
other systems), e.g. to exchange energy and matter (Baralou et al., 2012; Hernes and Bakken, 
2003; Seidl and Becker, 2006). Bringing in a first element of evolutionary theory, systems 
eventually need to interact with and “adapt to their environments in order to survive (e.g. 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967)” (Child and Rodrigues, 2011, p. 804). Somewhat 
counterintuitively, there is “no contradiction between the openness and closure of boundaries” 
of systems (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1520). Instead, Luhmann argues that “a system must 
be closed in order to be open” (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1520).  
Coming back to the differentiation between system and environment, the notion of 
environmental complexity deserves particular attention. As previously mentioned, systems (e.g. 
business firms) exist through the distinction between ‘what is them’ and everything ‘out there’ 
that matters for their existence. As ‘out there’ comprises not only the structures of the natural, 
economic, legal, and political environment but also psychic systems (i.e. people including 
customers, neighbors, citizens, etc.) and organizational systems (such as companies, 
governments, NGOs etc.) that each spell out expectations regarding the firm, companies always 
face an environment characterized by substantial external complexity (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 
2005). In this context, the degree of complexity can inter alia be framed as the degree of 
interdependencies between the system and its environment. Following the idea of 
environmental complexity, system theory can then be applied to study how systems respond to 
issues of complexity in their environment (Schneider et al., 2017). System theory then points 
out what can be framed as a “complexity differential” (Schneider et al., 2017, p. 183). This 
means that “a system (such as a business firm) is necessarily less complex than its environment 
(Luhmann, 1995a) because, to operate efficiently, a system selects only a limited amount of all 
the information that is available outside its boundaries” (Schneider et al., 2017, p. 183). As a 
consequence, one can argue that a key function of a business firm, as a system embedded in its 
environment (Pache and Santos, 2010), is to handle its external complexity (Valentinov and 
Thompson, 2019, p. 570). 
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To illustrate this abstract thought, take the concrete example of an animal (as a biological 
system) such as a moth (Roeder, 1965). The external environment of this system is incredibly 
complex. Yet, not all aspects of it are equally relevant for the moth’s survival. The moonlight 
might be very relevant to help the moth navigate. To process this aspect of external complexity, 
the moth possesses elaborate structures (eyes) that endow it with the function of sight. This 
increase in its internal complexity allows the moth to handle more external complexity. Note, 
however, there are many more things happening ‘out there’ that the moth does not capture such 
as UV light, magnetism, radiation, and many other aspects. As there is always more going on 
in the external environment, there is always a necessary “complexity differential”. As a result, 
a system’s internal complexity is always selective. It cannot process the environment ‘as it is’ 
but constructs an internal, selective representation of it.  
Similarly, companies need to navigate their environment in a way that addresses the 
relevant aspects of external complexity. To this end, organizational entities can deploy distinct 
strategies to deal with varying degrees of external complexity in their systems’ environments. 
Following a Luhmannian systems perspective, systems need to internalize external 
(environmental) complexity with internal complexity, thus requiring a “modification of their 
structures and processes” (Schneider et al., 2017, p. 203). Put differently, companies as 
organizations need to mirror external complexity with an adequate form or representation of 
internal complexity, e.g. by building new or changing existing functions and structures in order 
to survive as an organization (Schneider et al., 2017). The underlying idea is that systems with 
their given functions and structures can only deal with external complexity until a certain 
threshold. If this threshold of complexity is exceeded, the system has to respond with an internal 
increase in complexity (e.g. resulting in additional functions and structures) (Thompson and 
Valentinov, 2017). 
To illustrate, let us return to the moth example (Roeder, 1965). If bats enter the environment 
that use ultrasonic echolocation, external complexity increases. In fact, hearing what goes on 
‘out there’ may become a matter of life and death for the moth. In this situation, many moth 
species responded to this increase in external complexity by developing additional internal 
complexity: These species have developed the sense of hearing (ultrasonic sound) and then let 
themselves drop to the floor once they hear the approaching bats. Note how changes in the 
external environment favor changes in the internal response of a system and actually lead to 
new structures (ears) and a new function (sense of ultrasonic hearing).  
As the preceding passages already alluded, a key system theory concept lies in the notion 
of functions. From a system theory perspective, the primary purpose or goal of system functions 
is to handle the external complexity of the system’s environment (Müller and Powell, 1994; 
Worren, 2016). In an organizational context, this can be achieved by developing respective 
structures or corporate departments/units (sub-systems of the business firm) to help fulfill the 
function (Thompson and Valentinov, 2017). In the words of Worren (2016, p. 776), a “function 
is fulfilled by a structure, yet function and structure are separate from each other conceptually”. 
As this distinction is of central importance for this article, it is important to elaborate it in the 
following. 
For the remainder of this study, function refers to a specific purpose (e.g. addressing 
complexity, fulfilling distinct stakeholder expectations) that is relevant for a system to survive 
or prosper. Note that with regard to the environment, specific functions then address specific 
parts of external complexity. The moth’s sense of sight, for example, handles visual 
information, yet is blind to sound or temperature. Function then relates, more abstractly, to what 
needs to be achieved for a system. Structure, in contrast, refers to concrete forms of how 
something is achieved. For the moth, the way the eyes are formed, their visual receptors, and 
nervous pathways describe the structure that allows fulfilling the function of seeing. Several 
aspects are worth pointing out here. First, the distinction between structure and function 
highlights that systems can have very different structures, yet the same or very similar functions. 
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Coming back to the moth example, the function of sight can be performed through very different 
eye-structures (insects, vertebrae, and octopus can all see but have completely different eye 
structures). Second, as structures are embedded in how the system operates, they have a stable 
‘structural’ aspect. Third, when structures emerge or change, they do not evolve out of nowhere 
but are embedded in a structural context that influences their further development.  
Applying this distinction to the firm, functions allow companies to handle specific sub-
tasks that are needed to navigate and prosper in a complex environment, whereas structure 
refers to the corresponding format or departmental unit to allow the function to be fulfilled. 
Given distinct functions, it is not surprising that oftentimes the respective structures are clearly 
detached from one another, which can be framed as “structural separation” (Worren, 2016, p. 
779). According to Schneider et al. (2017, p. 183), “internal complexity may be accomplished 
by means of functional speciali[z]ation, structural differentiation, or by enhancing 
organizational processes”. 
To summarize the theory review so far, system theory argues that in order to proactively 
and successfully cope with (rising) external complexity, companies have to adapt their internal 
complexity. Specific functions then allow handling relevant aspects of the external environment 
to ensure the system’s survival. These functions build upon concrete structures within the firm 
such as dedicated positions, the establishment of distinct organizational units or departments. 
Based on this review, the next section discusses not only how the debate about VCR can be 
understood as reflecting an increase in companies’ external complexity. More specifically, it 
also analyzes the two separate functions of SSCM and TC as corporate responses that 
historically emerged separately because they originally addressed separate requirements in the 
external environment.  
 
3. Understanding SSCM and TC as Two Independent System Functions  
Organization theory scholars highlight the general importance of assessing the “relationship 
between firms and the environment” (Chandler, 2014, p. 1722). Elaborating this perspective, 
system theory then invites analyzing how specific functions address selected aspects of the 
system-environment nexus and how changes in environmental complexity correspond with 
changes in a system’s internal complexity, which may include leading to internal functional 
differentiation. 
Applying this perspective to the analysis of VCR first shifts the focus towards 
understanding how modern value chains have changed external complexity, system-
environment relationships, and internal functional differentiation. In this regard, companies 
have developed ever more complex multi-tier value networks in light of off-shoring, out-
sourcing, and an increasingly globalized economy (Gereffi et al., 2005; Kano, 2018). The 
emergence of conventional supply chain management (SCM) as a standard corporate function 
illustrates how firms have established additional internal complexity to handle the additional 
external complexity. SCM manages both the inside-out effects of the firm on its suppliers (e.g. 
supplier development) and the outside-in effects of, for example, changes in price, quality, and 
risk that suppliers create for the firm (Jahns et al., 2006). As system functions necessarily 
process environmental complexity in a selective way, so does conventional SCM. Focusing on 
what is most relevant for the immediate prospering of the firm, it manages the economic 
dimension of the firm’s relationship with its value chain environment.  
Economic value creation, however, is not the only effect that occurs alongside a value chain. In 
fact, individual corporate decision making within one firm in the value chain can translate into 
various (negative) effects for diverse stakeholders both upstream and downstream the value 
chain (Svensson et al., 2018). From a sustainability perspective, these value chain effects can 
materialize in different dimensions. In a well-known, more narrow perspective, sustainability 
is seen as combining the three dimensions of ecological, social, and economic issues as 
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popularized in the Triple Bottom Line (TBL) (Elkington, 1998). With the 2015 declaration of 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), however, the recent sustainability discourse 
embraces a more encompassing perspective of sustainable development that distinguishes five 
dimensions, known as the 5 P’s: planet (ecological dimension), people (social dimension), 
prosperity (economic dimension), peace (security dimension), and partnership (collaboration 
dimension) (United Nations General Assembly, 2015, p. 2). In light of crises such as the Syrian 
civil war or international terrorism, the peace dimension acknowledges the importance of 
providing security as a prerequisite for any society to flourish and take care of people and 
nature. The partnership dimension highlights that none of the SDGs – be it ending poverty or 
protecting the climate – can be achieved by one single actor (Schaltegger et al., 2018).  
Against this background, the 5 P’s provide a useful lens to frame the debate about VCR. 
The SDGs indicate that there are diverse societal expectations regarding sustainable 
development that companies encounter in their value chain environment. Put in the language of 
system theory, as Schneider et al. (2017, pp. 194-195) maintain, aspects of corporate social 
responsibility thus “increase the complexity of a firm’s environment”. If companies want to 
successfully manage this manifestation of external complexity, they need, from a system theory 
perspective, to internalize this external complexity with adequate functions and corresponding 
structures. While there are various corporate functions that can contribute to taking VCR such 
as communications, R&D, production and marketing (see Schaltegger et al., 2014), the 
following sections conceptualize how SSCM and TC have historically evolved as novel forms 
of functional differentiation that each address specific aspects of external complexity by each 
adding specific elements of internal complexity to the firm.  
 
3.1.  Sustainable supply chain management 
If a system wants to manage its system-environment interactions, it needs to bring together the 
inside-out and outside-in effects of this relationship. With regard to sustainability and value 
chain interactions, the inside-out (systemàenvironment) effects relate to how corporate 
decision-making within the firm impacts nature or stakeholders such as workers in the supply 
chain. The decision to source shoes of a specific color, for example, can be linked to the usage 
of chemicals in the dyeing process at a supplier that results in toxic waste water and health 
hazards for local employees. Over the past decades, such potentially harmful effects have 
become more relevant for two related changes in the system-environment interaction. First, due 
to out-sourcing, companies engage in more complex and deeper value chains (Harland et al., 
2003). Second, due to off-shoring, many Western companies source from suppliers that operate 
in countries where environmental and social regulation is weaker than, say, the US or the EU 
(Marucheck et al., 2011, p. 717). As a consequence of these changes in system-environment 
relations, inside-out effects create additional sustainability challenges. 
Note, however, that the mere existence of sustainability-related inside-out value chain 
effects is not automatically sufficient for firms to take responsibility for them. In fact, numerous 
companies do little about their sustainability effects in the value chain, be it companies in less 
developed economies (Kuo et al., 2017) or some Western companies that ‘fly under the radar-
screen’. In this situation, system theory highlights that given the “complexity differential” 
discussed above, companies will always be selective in how they process their environment. 
More specifically, they will focus on those aspects of external complexity that are relevant for 
how the firm can operate and prosper. In other words, the motivation of companies to manage 
their inside-out effects will be influenced by the outside-in effects of how sustainability issues 
in the environment are or are made relevant for the firm. 
Against this background, the evolution of SSCM responds to significant changes in the 
external environment of value chains. In fact, the emergence of SSCM was, among other things, 
triggered by various sustainability scandals in multiple industries, e.g. including scandals in the 
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textile and apparel sector (Khurana and Ricchetti, 2016). Consequently, phenomena like 
consumer boycotts such as in the case of the anti-sweatshop movement created strong outside-
in effects that made the related sustainability issues economically relevant for the prospering of 
the boycotted firms. System theory highlights that critically important elements of a company’s 
environment are other systems such as organizations (e.g. NGOs, media) or psychological 
systems (e.g. critical consumers or citizens). By this logic, it is worth pointing out that it was 
not the sustainability issues themselves that made companies respond to them but changes in 
external expectations voiced by other actors. By now, various stakeholders such as consumers, 
NGOs, governments and shareholders are increasingly expecting the business firm to actively 
resolve sustainability issues along global value chains (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; 
Foerstl et al., 2010; Gold et al., 2010; Harms et al., 2013). Inversely, the non-fulfillment of 
these expectations can result in relevant outside-in effects such as “adverse publicity, 
reputational damage, and costly legal obligations (Carter and Jennings, 2004)” (Foerstl et al., 
2010, p. 118).  
From a system theory point of view, SSCM thus serves as an organizational response that 
increases a firm’s internal complexity in a way that allows handling relevant external 
complexity as a result of environmental change. The function of SSCM emerged in order to 
address “pressures and requirements of different internal and external stakeholders to improve 
the sustainability of products [and value chains]” (Harms et al., 2013, p. 207). Furthermore, the 
function of SSCM is motivated by the “recognition of the strategic importance of purchasing 
and supply activities both in achieving the firm’s long-term performance, and in addressing 
sustainability issues within business capabilities (Burgess et al., 2006; Hall and Matos, 2010)” 
(Touboulic and Walker, 2015, p. 16).  
Apart from some exceptions, the debate on SSCM eventually gained momentum in the 
1990s and 2000s, particularly starting with a strong focus on environmental aspects of 
sustainability in the beginning (Gimenez and Sierra, 2013; Rajeev et al., 2017). Over time, 
companies understood the broader relevance and urgency of SSCM as a function to respond to 
increasing external expectations, which eventually lead to a mainstreaming of the SSCM 
function in business practice (Corbett and Klassen, 2006; Corbett and Kleindorfer, 2003; Pagell 
and Wu, 2009). In corporate practice, SSCM therefore became a common-place extension (or, 
put in system theory language, further functional differentiation) of conventional supply chain 
management (Svensson, 2007). As institutional theory points out, this isomorphic behavior 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in turn strengthens expectation structures of what firms need to 
do in order to be perceived as legitimate.  
Due to its popularity and dissemination in various industries and countries, a plethora of 
definitions emerged to describe the function of SSCM (Touboulic and Walker, 2015). For the 
sake of this study, SSCM can be understood as “the management of material, information and 
capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply chain while taking goals 
from all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e., economic, environmental and social, 
into account, which are derived from customer and stakeholder requirements” (Seuring and 
Müller, 2008, p. 1700). This definition can be nicely related to the system theory employed 
here. First, taking all three dimensions of sustainability into account describes the specific 
function that SSCM contributes to managing the firm-environment relationship in the value 
chain. Second, the customer and stakeholder requirements describe the relevant aspects of the 
environment that define the outside-in effects for the firm. Note that without these 
environmental drivers, SSCM would lose its direction and internal business relevance. Third, 
the management of flows and cooperation along the value chain relates to the inside-out effect 
that the company creates for the environment.  
To fulfill its purpose, SSCM needs to scan what is going on in its value chain environments, 
monitor the firm’s inside-out effects, and manage this interplay. To this end, SSCM entails 
diverse management approaches, starting from purchasing decisions over supply and sourcing 
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to procurement policies, labor practices, codes of conduct and other managerial tools (Vurro, 
Russo, and Perrini, 2009). Furthermore, standards and norms resemble an important field of 
management practices within SSCM to fulfill the function’s tasks, e.g. including social 
conventions and eco-management schemes (Harms et al., 2013) as well as company specific 
codes of conduct (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009).  
The function of SSCM thus serves inter alia to reduce sustainability risks along the value 
chain, assure legitimacy of the company when operating its value creation activities and uphold 
corporate reputation (Harms et al., 2013). Coming back to the important distinction between 
function and structure, the function of SSCM can manifest in corporate practice in different 
forms. Companies can establish particular organizational structures to ‘host’ the function of 
SSCM (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2017) such as separate departments or 
organize the function within related units such as a CSR team (see Harms et al., 2013).  
In a nutshell, SSCM can be regarded as a phenomenon of functional differentiation, which 
adds internal complexity to the firm that allows responding to specific external expectations 
that arose in firms’ environments. The following section discusses that the function of trade 
compliance shows important parallels, yet historically emerged as a response to a different 
subset of environmental requirements.  
 
3.2. Trade compliance 
While SSCM is, indeed, critically important for managing a firm’s VCR, this paper argues that 
there is a second corporate function that scholars interested in VCR have so far largely 
overlooked: the function of trade compliance (TC) (Treier, 2015).  
Although the term TC is not widely used in the literature, it describes a relevant corporate 
function in business practice that includes two elements: strategic trade control (import and 
export control) and supply chain security. Both elements are of particular relevance for VCR. 
Taking the lens of the 5 P’s, the corporate function of TC can fulfill above all specific 
stakeholder expectations in the dimension of peace.  
The first element, strategic trade control, includes import as well as export control activities 
by the firm. Strategic trade control historically developed to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Bauer, 2015, p. 73). While the inside-out effects of such 
corporate behavior could create security issues in the external environment, firms take care of 
them because they would otherwise experience substantial outside-in consequences because of 
regulatory sanctions. In fact, most countries established legal requirements to establish controls 
on sensitive exports due to their obligations under international treaties and agreements (e.g. 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, UN Security Council Resolution 1540). 
While governments regard export controls as an important instrument for promoting peace and 
security, private business interests have often viewed them as hindrance to trade and an example 
of government overregulation (Thorne, 2008). 
Here, companies seek to make sure that their trade flows are in accordance with foreign 
trade and customs law and do not violate legal provisions, e.g. by selling goods without an 
export license (Ewing and Kramer, 2017) or by importing goods that could finance terrorism 
(Alderman, 2018). 
Note the specific source of these outside-in pressures. Export and import restrictions or 
license requirements derive from domestic and foreign trade and customs law, as well as 
international agreements and sanctions. As a result, they reflect the external requirements in the 
legal and political environment, formulated by public actors and regulatory bodies. 
Within the firm, strategic trade control adds internal complexity by being responsible for a 
chain of activities, which includes import, transit, transshipment, brokering, and financial 
transactions (Bauer, 2015). It does not only refer to tangible goods, but also to services and the 
transfer of intangible technologies. In order to manage their inside-out effects, companies have 
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to check the origin, recipient of a good, its final destination and end use (Bauer, 2015). They 
have to be careful that unauthorized actors do not get access to dangerous products (i.e. dual-
use goods, hazardous chemicals, or weapons), which requires for example the screening of 
business partners against international sanctioned party lists. In addition, companies have to 
make sure that they do not finance criminal activities by purchasing goods of unauthorized 
actors (i.e. terrorists or oppressive regimes). 
In academic research, strategic trade control has received little attention so far. At first 
sight, one explanation for this blind spot might be that only few companies are obliged to 
implement strategic trade control. Yet, in 2015, an attempt by the European Commission to 
quantify the size and scope of the EU’s dual-use industry showed that dual-use exports account 
for 3.9% of total EU exports with a value close to €180 billion (SIPRI & Ecorys, 2015, p. 13). 
This is more than twice as much than the €80 billion (Eurostat, 2019), which the EU imported 
that same year in terms of textiles; an SSCM topic, which has received wide scholarly attention 
(Köksal et al., 2017; Oelze, 2017). Among the ten sectors that record the highest value in dual-
use exports (2014) are machinery and mechanical appliances (32%), electrical machinery and 
equipment (18%), and aircraft and spacecraft (12%) (SIPRI & Ecorys, 2015, p. 14).  
The second element of TC is supply chain security. It describes corporate efforts to ensure 
supply chain resilience by protecting “supply chain assets (product, facilities, equipment, 
information, and personnel) from theft, damage, or terrorism, and to prevent the introduction 
of unauthorized contraband, people, or weapons of mass destruction” (Closs and Mcgarrell, 
2004, p. 8). Supply chain security thus combines both an internal and external perspective by 
preventing “intentional, unauthorized act(s) designed to cause harm or damage to, or by, the 
supply chain” (ISO , 2007, p. 2).  
Historically, customs departments focused primarily on issues like tariffs between different 
customs territories, and the prevention of smuggling and theft. With the emergence of 
international terrorism, security played a bigger role on the political and economic agenda. 
Since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001, there is a stronger focus 
on vulnerabilities at different locations of the supply chain (Hintsa, 2010; Williams, Lueg, et 
al., 2009). Several initiatives under the	WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and 
Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework) (WCO, 2018) were launched to efficiently maintain 
supply chain security (Chang and Wu, 2015). The idea behind this voluntary customs-to-
business partnership program is that each company secures its part of the supply chain. If each 
individual link is secured, end-to-end security of supply chains from the manufacturer to the 
final importer can be reached.  
Supply chain security focuses on measures a company can take to protect its value chain 
from external intrusion, whereas strategic trade control concentrates on measures to control and 
manage import and export streams of the company. As there are strong operational overlaps, 
especially in the area of nonproliferation and the fight of terrorism, TC combines both aspects.  
Trade violations and supply chain security breaches can be regarded as a form of supply chain 
risk. Thereby they have the potential to not only damage the company itself but affect society 
at large (Lu et al., 2017). As managing these security issues thus contributes to peace, one 
dimension of sustainable development, it is somewhat surprising that, so far, neither corporate 
practice nor academic scholarship have framed TC explicitly as a sustainability contribution. 
Yet, as fulfilling existing legal requirements is crucial for managing responsible system-
environment relations, TC can be interpreted as an important element of fulfilling the broader 
function of VCR.  
Although TC issues are definitely not new for business, strategic trade control 
predominantly appears in the context of nonproliferation (Hobbs and Young, 2015; Kurzrok 
and Hund, 2013; Weise and Hund, 2016) and has not received much attention by supply chain 
scholars (Salisbury, 2013). In recent years, however, there has been an increasing focus on 
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supply chain security (Autry and Michelle Bobbitt, 2008; Blackhurst et al., 2015; Closs and 
McGarrell, 2004; Williams, Lueg, et al., 2009; Williams, Ponder, et al., 2009).  
 
3.3. Different internal responses to external complexity 
Evolutionary system theory now allows conceptualizing and comparing SSCM and TC. 
Just as SSCM, the emergence of TC can be seen as the functional differentiation of previous 
organizational functions in the light of increasing external complexity. Originally, companies 
that imported and exported goods across borders and customs areas needed to comply above all 
with customs regulation. To manage this relevant aspect of a firm’s legal environment, 
companies already had corresponding internal organzational structures such as customs 
departments. In light of trade liberalization, however, customs regulations have become less 
relevant while the past decades have added new legal and security-related requirements and 
thus additional complexity to the external environment for trade (Williams et al., 2008, p. 255).  
 
Table 1. Differences of sustainable supply chain management and trade compliance 
 
Category SSCM TC 
Evolutionary origin Response to consumer-relevant 
scandals 
Customs regulation and security related to 
political agenda 
Example of critical 
incidents in the 
external environment 
Sustainability scandals in multiple 
industries, e.g. Nike sweatshop scandal 
and resulting social standards 
Threat from international terrorism, e.g. 
09/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center and resulting legislation 
Specific function and 
VCR contribution 
To take into account social and 
ecological issues 
To take into account economic (customs) 
and security (peace) issues  
Key stakeholders that 
create outside-in 
pressures 
Consumers, NGOs, media, civil society Government, public authorities 
Primary subset of 
environmental 
requirements   
Soft law (voluntary standards and 
industry initiatives) 
Hard law (binding customs and trade 
regulation) 
Exemplary system 
structures involved in 
fulfilling the function  
Procurement, marketing, product 
development, CSR-team, quality 
management 
Customs, export control, legal, 
compliance, logistics 
 
From a system theory perspective, TC thus shows many similarities to but also differences 
from SSCM (see Table 1). Just as SSCM, TC serves to manage a specific subset of system-
environment relations. Yet, while SSCM focused originally on social and environmental issues, 
TC emerged with a focus on security-related issues. Both functions thus respond to changes in 
their external environment and to novel external expectations, yet focus on different subsets of 
the external environment. This is reflected by an original importance of the legal environment 
for TC whereas SSCM was driven by voluntary action and non-legal, soft law, standards. 
Closely connected, different stakeholders were originally responsible for creating outside-in 
pressures, with governments and regulatory bodies driving TC and NGOs, consumers, and 
investors calling for SSCM. Mirroring these different subsets of external complexity, the SSCM 
and TC function have established different practices within the firm to increase internal 
complexity. In doing so, both functions differentiated as refinements of existing functions, yet 
typically building upon different structures, with TC being more likely to be linked to the 
customs or legal department and SSCM often connected to SCM, CSR-teams, or similar units. 
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4. The Case for Internal Alignment  
The previous section has argued that SSCM and TC emerged as separate functions within the 
firm because each originally addressed different subsets of external requirements of a firm’s 
environment. SSCM and TC can thus be seen as ‘hidden allies for value chain responsibility’ 
in the sense that both functions focus on separate aspects of VCR, with SSCM focusing on 
social and environmental issues and TC addressing security considerations. 
This section goes one step further and argues that SSCM and TC can increasingly be allies for 
VCR by taking joint responsibility for overlapping sustainability issues. Highlighting the 
dynamic element of evolutionary system theory, the key argument is that there are changes in 
the external environment that result in various trends that increasingly connect the external 
requirements previously addressed separately by SSCM and TC. These areas of overlap or 
alignment in the company’s external environment create the potential for cross-functional 
internal alignment within the company.  
 
4.1. External overlap and interdependencies of sustainability dimensions  
As illustrated by the 5 P’s, sustainability (and therefore VCR) entails a great variety of different 
topics. In this regard, some of these VCR issues can clearly be assigned to one of the two 
specific functions SSCM and TC. While for example issues of emmissions or non-
discrimination in a value chain context can be assigned to the function of SSCM, the screening 
of supply chain actors against international terrorist lists is assigned to TC. However, other 
issues are not easily assignable, because sustainability conversations are increasingly complex. 
To the extent that sustainability issues are increasingly connected in the external environment, 
it becomes difficult to pin them down to a singular function within the firm. More precisely, 
the exclusive allocation of a sustainability issue or topic to a single corporate function (SSCM 
or TC) and its respective organizational structure thus becomes increasingly challenging. This 
leads to blurry boundaries of allocating corporate functions to VCR issues. In fact, in both 
functions of SSCM and TC, a widening to new areas of the 5 P’s can be observed. In particular, 
a convergence trend with regard to social and security aspects can be identified. Here, SSCM 
increasingly adopts peace and security issues whereas TC adopts more and more social issues. 
Or put inversely: Sustainability topics do not differentiate between the two functions, but 
increasingly affect both functions. This can be framed as a challenge for functional assignment. 
This complexity of sustainability topics gets most comprehensible at the content level. One 
particular difficulty of functional assignment occurs with regard to the protection of human 
rights. As a consequence of the sustainability scandals in the textile industry, the topic was 
historically integrated as a matter of social sustainability in SSCM. By this logic, human rights 
issues are traditionally incorporated in management systems, sustainability standards, 
certifications, codes of conduct and alike. Recently, however, human rights issues enter the 
company through new channels. Especially the TC domain of export controls now increasingly 
extends to the protection of human rights as well. As a consequence, human rights issues are 
integrated in security measures like embargos, sanctioned party lists or dual-use controls. In the 
case of sanctions against Syria or Venezuela, the reason for unilateral trade measures are 
violations against democratic and human rights. Another area of trade restrictions are 
prohibitions of items that could cause human rights violations (e.g. torture and execution) 
(European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018). Additionally, there is a growing relevance 
of dual-use items for human rights at a European level (Bromley, 2017; Kanetake, 2019). 
Originally, the control of dual-use items, weapons and ammunition was a clear measure to foster 
primarily peace. Yet, the EU Commission recently proposed to recast the existing dual-use 
regulation No 428/2009 to add a new category of dual-use items in the area of cyber-
surveillance technologies that focuses on human rights. The proposal argues that “certain cyber-
surveillance technologies […] have been misused by persons […] committing serious violations 
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of human rights or international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict or internal 
repression” (European Commission, 2016, p. 12). All presented examples support the argument 
that due to changes in the external environment and overlapping external expectations, a distinct 
assignment of a sustainability topic like human rights to a single corporate function becomes 
increasingly difficult.  
In a similar manner, the assignment of the topic area of hazardous substances and chemicals 
to a distinct corporate function can resemble a difficult endeavor. The TC function is in charge 
of preventing terrorist intrusion and other harmful events. However, the case of dangerous 
substances shows that there are also overlaps of SSCM and TC in this area. Examples are the 
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS), or the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). From a security perspective, the company has to 
prevent the misuse of substances for terroristic and criminal purposes. Yet, dangerous 
substances also have an ecological impact on the planet in form of emissions, effluents and 
waste, and therefore target the SSCM function that is responsible for environmental issues. The 
third area affected is the social component of SSCM: Dangerous substances concern 
occupational and customer health and safety.  
Another example for a VCR issue where increasingly overlapping external requirements 
render the internal functional assignment ever more challenging, are conflict minerals 
(Hofmann et al., 2018; Timmer and Kaufmann, 2017). Their “systemic exploitation and trade 
contribute to human right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas” 
(Hofmann et al., 2018, p. 115). It is difficult to exclusively and clearly assign the issue of 
conflict minerals to the function of SSCM or TC. Due to their human rights aspect of forced 
and child labor, one could locate conflict minerals to the function of SSCM. As the due 
diligence of conflict minerals requires the control of trade flows, however, one could also argue 
that the issue is more suitable for TC, as the function holds expertise in this area.  
To sum up, in the external environment, topical convergence regarding sustainability 
challenges occurs in the dimensions of people (human rights, health and safety) and peace 
(dangerous substances, dual-use goods, conflict minerals) thus challenging a supposedly clear-
cut functional differentiation between TC and SSCM within the firm. 
 
4.2. Increasing overlap of relevant stakeholders and regulatory modes 
As argued above, SSCM and TC were originally characterized by different stakeholder groups 
that primarily drove each function’s development. However, this paper suggests that this clear-
cut distinction of two separate subsets of a company’s stakeholder environment increasingly 
becomes blurry. In the case of SSCM, initially voluntary approaches were primarily driven by 
private stakeholders, consumers, and NGOs. This can be framed with the notion of private 
governance (Merk, 2007; Scherer et al., 2016). In recent years, however, it can be witnessed 
that governmental actors increasingly push for hard law regulation. In fact, there is a certain 
trend towards formalizing formerly voluntary sustainability standards and approaches. 
Examples for the ‘hardening of sustainability soft law’ (Nolan, 2018) are the EU sustainability 
directive 2014/95/EU that lays down the rules on corporate disclosure of non-financial 
information and the RoHS directive 2011/65/EU, which restricts the use of hazardous 
substances in electrical and electronic equipment (EEE). As an additional example, the 
forthcoming EU Conflict Minerals Regulation will provide hard law regulation for a sector that 
is so far characterized by multiple private governance standards. Inversely, private self-
regulation plays an increasingly important role for TC. Following the set of mandatory 
regulations, voluntary business alliances (e.g. Transported Asset Protection Association), 
programs, and standards (e.g. Facility Security Requirements, Trucking Security Requirements) 
evolved in the aftermath of 2001 (Hintsa, 2010). Customers more and more create coercive 
pressure and compliance expectations beyond governmental requirements (e.g. 24 hours 
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accessibility to tracking information) (Williams et al., 2009) and trigger private governance in 
the field of TC. 
For SSCM and TC, these changes in the regulatory environment lead to an increasing 
overlap in terms of the relevant governance environments for SSCM and TC. As a result, the 
function of SSCM needs the competences to increasingly manage compliance with 
governmental requirements as well as to deal with or even proactively shape the formalization 
of previously private governance to tackle value chain relevant sustainability challenges and 
complexity. On the other hand, the function of TC, in turn, needs to include aspects of voluntary 
standards and private self-regulation into its functional logic that is originally rather 
characterized by a compliance logic to meet governmental requirements. 
In sum, there is increasing overlap between external stakeholders and governance modes 
(soft and hard law) that are relevant for SSCM and TC, thus creating a potential for rethinking 
a strict internal separation between these two functions.  
 
4.3. Interconnected supply chain risks, due diligence requirements and need for visibility 
Companies are facing numerous supply chain risks. These risks result from natural 
catastrophes (e.g. floods or earthquakes), man-made accidents (e.g. technological breakdowns), 
or intentional man-made attacks (e.g. theft or terrorism) (Markmann et al., 2013). Therefore, 
supply chain risk management (SCRM) has become a key area of interest (Fan and Stevenson, 
2018). For the purpose of this paper, the focus is set particularly on supply chain risks for VCR. 
In the past, firms used to consider mainly first tier suppliers and direct customers. Now, an 
extension to the concept of the ‘ultimate supply chain’ can be observed, which “includes all the 
organizations involved in all the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, 
finances, and information from the ultimate supplier to the ultimate customer” (Mentzer et al., 
2001, p. 4).  
A key change in the external environment that increases a firm’s internal relevance of the 
‘ultimate supply chain’ stems from the emergence and proliferation of due diligence 
requirements. Due diligence originally refers to a thorough investigation of the financial 
operations of a company prior to mergers and acquisitions (Sinkin and Putney, 2014). Yet, with 
regard to VCR, the concept has been increasingly used as well in other frameworks and 
contexts. In the context of human rights, it describes the steps a company must take to identify, 
prevent, mitigate, and account for averse human rights impacts (Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, 
2017). In the context of conflict minerals, it translates to proactively managing supply chains 
and thereby helps to reduce the likelihood of the use of conflict minerals (Hofmann et al., 2018). 
In the context of export control, due diligence refers to the diligence obligations of the exporter 
(European Parliament and Council, 2011).  
Due diligence requirements thus represent significant changes in stakeholder expectations 
that equally affect TC and SSCM. This goes hand in hand with significant changes in the 
relevant external expectational constraints. To start with, due diligence does not stop with first 
or second tier suppliers, thus defining, in the extreme, a responsibility for the ultimate supply 
chain. What is more, due diligence violations increasingly create the risk for severe sanctions. 
In early 2019, the German Development Ministry drafted a law on mandatory human rights due 
diligence for German companies that sanctions violations with fines of up to five million Euros, 
imprisonment of executives, and exclusion from public procurement procedures in Germany 
(Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2019). Again, it is not the sustainability issues 
(inside-out effects) themselves that directly create the eminent outside-in effects for the firm 
but structural changes in the external environment that make them highly relevant for the firm. 
Note that these external requirements hold the firm as a whole accountable and thus do not 
distinguish between SSCM or TC responsibilities.  
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A further change in companies’ external environment is that social media and ICT can 
easily bring sustainability violations to the attention of a global audience (Aula, 2010). Together 
with expanding due diligence requirements, major VCR issues can thus occur at the weakest 
link of the supply chain (Lummus et al., 1998), yet rapidly fire back to the focal firm. This can 
start at the raw material stage (Mena et al., 2013) or at distant actors beyond the first tier. Many 
VCR risks therefore stem from sustainability-related uncertainty and low supply chain visibility 
(Busse et al., 2017). Not only does visibility decrease with rising supply chain distance, often 
VCR issues are not visible in the end product (Busse et al., 2017, p. 90). Companies are 
confronted with situations where they lack knowledge about supply chain actors and their 
activities and therefore “the supply chain as a system is […] difficult to predict and control” 
(Carter et al. 2015, p. 90).  
Against this background, supply chain visibility becomes a critical prerequisite for 
businesses to fulfill their VCR and to respond to changing external requirements, notably due 
diligence. The concept of visibility reflects that stakeholders for both SSCM and TC topics 
require increasing transparency and traceability throughout all stages of the supply chain (Carter 
and Easton, 2011; Closs et al., 2011; Marucheck et al., 2011; Reefke and Sundaram, 2017). 
While there are different interpretations for supply chain visibility (Garcia-Torres et al., 2019, 
p. 93; Tse and Tan, 2012, p. 51), this paper follows Busse et al. (2017, p. 21), who regard 
increasing supply chain visibility (e.g. of material flows, products, processes, and actors) and 
the “sharing of information between different supply chain stages” as a key factor for 
identifying and assessing supply chain sustainability risks. Thus, for the purpose of this paper, 
the broader concept of supply chain visibility (Timmer and Kaufmann, 2017, p. 346) is regarded 
as the basis for exercising due diligence and other proactive measures fostering VCR and its 
increasing complexity. 
In the literature, scholars emphasize that visibility in upstream and downstream supply 
chain operations requires closing existing communication gaps (Carter and Easton, 2011). Yet, 
so far, the focus lies on reducing VCR complexity through “more collaboration and 
communication along the chain [emphasis added] to ensure more sustainable and responsible 
conduct” (Boström et al., 2015, p. 3). What is also needed, however, are novel “organizational 
practices and learning processes” (Garcia-Torres et al., 2019, p. 87), also within the firm. In 
fact, closing communication gaps not only refers to the alignment of actors along the value 
chain but also to the intra-organizational alignment of corporate functions.  
In sum, the quest for supply chain visibility thus creates a case for aligning the functions of 
SSCM and TC. With regard to potential VCR risks, both functions possess relevant information 
regarding different, yet increasingly overlapping subsets of value chain issues and value chain 
parts. As due diligence requirements spell out more holistic forms of value chain responsibility, 
these changes in the external environment favor exploring the potential for the internal 
alignment of SSCM and TC.  
 
4.4. The potential of functional alignment  
The fact that (corporate) environments are unlikely to remain stable but instead constantly 
evolve, is a sort of conventional wisdom in systems thinking (Child and Rodrigues, 2011; 
Terreberry, 1968). As (Child and Rodrigues, 2011, p. 804) maintain, “as their environments 
become more complex and turbulent, […] organizations have to find appropriate ways of 
coping with these new challenges (Tetenbaum, 1998)”.  
The previous sections argued that the external environment for VCR has changed since 
SSCM and TC had emerged as two originally separate corporate functions. In the external 
sustainability debate, previously more distant stakeholders such as NGOs and governments are 
increasingly connected. The line between legal compliance issues and non-legal stakeholder 
expectations continues to blur. Topics like human rights, hazardous chemicals, or conflict 
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minerals that highlight the interdependencies of different sustainability dimensions have 
become more prominent. Finally, increasingly integrative external requirements such as due 
diligence duties widen the firms’ responsibility for the ultimate supply chain, thus creating 
novel risks and increasing the importance of achieving (more) supply chain visibility. 
This paper argues that these changes in a company’s external complexity favor adaptations 
in its internal complexity. More specifically, a continued strict separation between SSCM and 
TC does not seem to be effective and efficient to address the environmental changes discussed 
above. Rather, adequate forms of aligning SSCM and TC could foster supply chain visibility 
and thereby help the business firm to manage increasing external VCR complexity and 
expectations. 
So, what does alignment mean theoretically? System theory underlines that changes in a 
company’s functions evolve as changes of the underlying organizational structures (Schneider 
et al., 2017). A functional alignment of SSCM and TC thus needs to investigate the underlying 
operational structures and explore how these can be adapted in order to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the operations that build upon them. Seen from this perspective, there can 
be various forms of alignment that fall on a spectrum of structural outcomes (see Figure 1). 
This spectrum ranges from full alignment, where both respective functional structures (e.g. 
departments/teams) merge into one corporate structural unit, to lighter forms of alignment such 
as the use of shared information systems. In the latter case, both functions keep their 
autonomous structures and find other possibilities to cooperate.  
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of structural outcomes of functional alignment 
 
While companies might differ in their optimal form of structural alignment, this article has 
used system theory to argue that there is a conceptual case for some form of internal alignment 
of SSCM and TC. To the authors’ knowledge and personal professional experience in a TC 
department of a world-leading MNE, however, companies have so far abstained from 
systematically exploring this potential. The following section addresses this phenomenon by 
showing that system theory can not only make the case for aligning SSCM and TC. 
Evolutionary system theory perspective can also show why such alignment is likely to face 
structural challenges.  
 
5. The Challenge of Alignment 
From an evolutionary system theory perspective, the key to understanding why companies 
might struggle to explore and realize the potential of aligning the two VCR sub-functions of 
TC and SSCM lies in the conceptual distinction between functions and their underlying 
structures (Worren, 2016). As discussed above, functions describe what is achieved for the 
system while structures refer to the stable components of the system that describe how the 
relevant operations are carried out. This distinction allows highlighting a critical challenge for 
relating a system’s external and internal complexity. While functions significantly respond to 
what is relevant to prosper in the external environmental, structures not only refine but build 
upon the system’s existing internal complexity. As a consequence, when changes in the external 
environment call for changes of what a function does, the system cannot evolve a response from 
scratch but is constrained by how it already works. A key concept that captures this challenge 
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is the notion of organizational path dependencies. The following section serves to discuss this 
concept in more detail and to relate it to the evolutionary system theory perspective on VCR 
developed in in this article.  
 
5.1. Combining organizational path dependency and evolutionary system theory 
Studies in management and organization theory focus on the reasons for organizational inertia 
and provide useful perspectives of the historical imprinting of decision-making (Sydow et al., 
2009). This paper follows an important concept that is often associated with path dependency, 
namely, ‘history matters’ (Nooteboom, 1997; Sewell, 1996). Decisions and events in the past 
determine today’s options and choices for taking action. Companies cannot freely adapt to 
environmental change but instead have a limited freedom of choice. When companies 
internalize and operationalize external changes, most of them will not be able to make changes 
on the green field but within existing organizational structures. 
Another important feature of path dependency theory is a state of ‘lock-in’ (Arthur, 1989). 
“In organizations, path dependence translates into features (e.g. capabilities) that persist over 
time and appear hard to change […]” (Vergne and Durand, 2011, p. 370). In such a state, the 
organization is unable to adopt new ideas (Wagner et al., 2011) or cannot adequately respond 
to “changed internal or external circumstances” (Sydow et al., 2009, p. 695). Instead of 
developing new measures, functions and structural units are bound to existing paths and 
historical solutions (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007). 
Combining path dependency theory with structuration theory, organizational lock-ins may 
be predominantly created by cognitive, normative, or resource-based rigidities (Giddens, 1984; 
Sydow et al., 2009). Thereby, self-reinforcing processes are important mechanisms to stabilize 
paths and eventually lead to an irreversible state of lock-in (David, 1985). Sydow et al. (2009) 
emphasize four mechanisms of self-reinforcing dynamics in an organizational path dependency 
context: coordination effects, complementarity effects, learning effects, and adaptive 
expectation effects. 
The concept of organizational path dependencies can thus be usefully combined with the 
perspective of evolutionary system theory. For the purpose of this paper, these conceptual 
reflections allow analyzing to what extent the functional alignment of SSCM and TC is always 
constrained by both functions previous history within the firm – and the respective structures, 
which have already emerged in this history, including the existing organizational settings, 
hierarchies, organizational units, mechanisms and responsibilities in place. As SSCM and TC 
developed separately, the available options that the company can choose in the future depend 
on the accumulated knowledge and investment in one of the two functions (Vergne and Durand, 
2011). Historic events in the environment (e.g. regulatory changes) and within an organization 
(e.g. corporate scandals) foster the process of further specialization of both functions.  
Applying this sort of thinking to the more general debate on CSR, Tang et al. (2012) 
describe the development of complementary assets in different CSR dimensions. If for example, 
the SSCM function has learned necessary skills for an environmentally friendly manufacturing 
process, it might specialize in waste reduction, or the use of non-toxic chemicals. As the issues 
are related, it is likely that the organization is able to transfer this knowledge to product safety 
and quality issues to fulfill other stakeholders’ expectations. New stakeholder expectations, like 
the integration of human rights into the manufacturing process, require the development of 
additional skills, knowledge, and resources. When organizations have accumulated knowledge 
and efficiency in one dimension (Covin and Hull, 2010; Sydow et al., 2009), it is more difficult 
to develop new capabilities for unrelated dimensions (Tang et al., 2012). However, “[w]ithout 
such complementary capabilities and resources, a firm’s ability to diversify among different 
CSR aspects will be limited” (Tang et al., 2012, p. 1280), which, in path-dependency terms, 
“lock the [organization] into an inferior solution” (Sydow et al., 2009, p. 691). 
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5.2. Organizational barriers as system structures 
Further exploring the link between system theory and the path-dependency literature, this 
section serves to shortly discuss three types of system structures that can create organizational 
barriers for the internal alignment of already existing functions, namely institutional, 
normative/professional, as well as cultural structures. 
First, institutional structures refer to rule-guided behavior within the firm and its functions. 
Such structures can lead to ambivalent coordination effects. While coordination within one 
function (e.g. in the form of organizational rules or routines), facilitates efficient interaction 
among actors within that function (Sydow et al., 2009), such rule-guided behavior might cause 
difficulties when interacting with another function, which is characterized by different routines. 
In the case of SSCM and TC, different organizational routines can hinder a joint approach of 
external risks and challenges (Andreu and Ciborra, 1996). Therefore, the lack of flexibility, 
different formal processes, missing aligned documentation and reporting, as well as separated 
relationships with business partners can be considered manifestations of coordination barriers 
of alignment. 
Note, however, that institutional arrangements need not necessarily create barriers for 
cross-functional alignment but can also facilitate processes of interaction and joint problem 
solving (van Bueren et al., 2014). Existing patterns and cross-functional networks, like regular 
meetings and communication platforms, help to foster collaboration between SSCM and TC. 
Additionally, consistent documentation requirements and shared reporting channels encourage 
communication and regular interaction. From a system theory perspective, such jointly used 
structures can serve as “structural couplings” (Baralou et al., 2012; Seidl and Becker, 2006) 
that connect separate (sub-)systems. Such institutional arrangements or routines can be reflected 
within the organizational structure or within internal processes. Yet, the more SSCM and TC 
are divided within the organizational structure, the more difficulties they are facing in their 
future collaboration.  
Related to institutional arrangements is the second structural category of normative and 
professional barriers. SSCM and TC are highly specialized functions. Over time, they 
accumulated expertise and knowledge within a specific area. Such a development can be created 
by learning effects (Sydow et al., 2009): “The more often an operation is performed, the more 
efficiency will be gained with subsequent iterations [and] the operation becomes more skillfully 
performed (faster, more reliable, and with less errors)” (Sydow et al., 2009, p. 700). 
Furthermore, specialization within functions consists of employees with a particular 
professional background and education. While SSCM may require engineers to create more 
environmentally friendly production processes, lawyers or customs experts may fulfill TC 
export control requirements. Depending on the necessary capabilities to fulfill different tasks 
within the functions, a range of different personnel ranging from logisticians to IT specialists 
is required. People with “different skills from different functional disciplines, occupations or 
roles” (Oliveira et al., 2016, p. 406) might have a different mindset and work culture. Therefore, 
not all employees might be willing to contribute to some forms of alignment. Joint projects or 
teams are confronted with different thought worlds, communication barriers, and failures of 
interpretation and incorrect attribution (Majchrzak et al., 2012). This may result in “poorly 
defined or misunderstood functional strategies and/or misaligned functional objectives” 
(Oliveira et al., 2016, p. 406). Therefore, most likely, in their joint activities (e.g. 
transdisciplinary projects), conflicts arise (Moses and Åhlström, 2008) and they are neither 
unable to work in a collaborative manner , nor exploit complementary capabilities (Daspit et 
al., 2013). Such barriers can hinder the transfer of knowledge and expertise between different 
functions like SSCM and TC.  
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A third type of barriers relates to the organizational culture within the firm and different 
functions which, in turn, reflects past experiences (Schein, 1984). Oftentimes, organizational 
sensitivity to VCR issues depends on how powerful external pressures by different stakeholders 
are and have been before. Legal requirements are often the basis for VCR activities, but not all 
business sectors are equally strong regulated. There are other drivers to not only fulfill the 
regulatory minimum, but apply a beyond-compliance approach (Foerstl et al., 2015; Kurzrok 
and Hund, 2013; Lee and Kashmanian, 2013). Some organizations are concerned about 
reputational damage (Salisbury, 2013). This plays a bigger role when in the past an organization 
was subject to a corporate scandal (Salisbury, 2013). In other cases, VCR is reflected from a 
moral perspective. Such organizations respond to “societal pressure” with an increased “sense 
of duty” (Salisbury, 2013, p. 543). In any case, the behavior of top management is decisive, as 
it creates internal management support (Hofmann et al., 2018) for VCR activities and promotes 
an internal culture of VCR sensitivity. On the contrary, the lack of organizational VCR 
awareness and management support is an important organizational barrier for aligning SSCM 
and TC. 
 
6. Discussion: Mapping a Research Agenda 
So far, this article used evolutionary system theory to explain not only the co-evolution of two 
distinct VCR functions (SSCM and TC) but also the potential and challenges for their future 
alignment. The authors argue that changes in companies’ external value chain environments 
increasingly create the potential for an internal alignment of SSCM and TC to increase VCR 
effectiveness. At the same time, evolutionary system theory suggests that such alignment might 
face organizational barriers because of structural path dependencies. Building upon these 
previous reflections, this section uses system theory to discuss the boundary conditions and 
further research questions regarding the potential alignment of SSCM and TC in a firm’s VCR 
management. 
From a system theory perspective, three questions deserve particular attention in future 
research. First, how does a company’s environment influence the case for aligning SSCM and 
TC? Second, coming to the system side of the equation, to what extent do a firm’s existing 
structures create barriers for functional alignment? Third, what are structural options for 
aligning the SSCM and TC function within the business system? To address these questions, 
this section formulates three environment-related, three system-related, and three alignment-
related propositions that can be useful in guiding future research. 
 
6.1. Investigating the role of the external environment 
From a system theory perspective, functions serve to fulfill specific purposes that allow a 
system to survive and prosper in its environment. Against this background, the environment 
significantly defines what system functions need to achieve. The case for aligning SSCM and 
TC thus derives to a large degree from the extent to which the relevant external environments 
of the two functions overlap and raise shared or similar external requirements of what the 
systems needs to achieve. 
Seen from this perspective, a precondition for aligning SSCM and TC is that both 
functions exist independently in the first place, thus creating potential areas of overlap in terms 
of issues, stakeholders, and external expectations. In this regard, the relevance of both functions 
is likely to increase with the degree to which a company’s products are complex and the degree 
to which its value chain operates across regulatory areas. On the one hand, more complex 
products are typically based on more complex inputs and tend to have a deeper supply chain, 
thus being often closer to issues like conflict minerals or child labor etc. upstream (Kim and 
Davis, 2016). On the other hand, more complex products (e.g. turbines, machinery) are more 
likely to be dual-use goods with regard to their downstream evaluation. At the same time, these 
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issues typically arise when corporate value chains operate outside a firm’s domestic regulatory 
area. Value chain operations between, say, the USA and Canada (within NAFTA) or between 
Austria and Portugal (within the EU) raise fewer external concerns than when firms source from 
or sell to countries outside their domestic regulatory area. By this logic, SSCM and TC might 
play a bigger role (and thus have more opportunities to overlap) for an international turbine 
producer than, say, for a domestic brewery.  
Against this background, future research can investigate the influence of industry and 
firm differences in terms of how the complexity of products and value chains as well as 
international cross-border characteristics influence not only the respective significance of the 
SSCM and TC functions but also create areas of overlap between these functions. Proposition 
1a can thus be posited: The more international and complex the value chain, the greater the 
relevance of SSCM and TC issues and thus the greater the potential for areas of overlap 
between the respective external requirements. 
A shared function of both SSCM and TC is to manage and secure important stakeholder 
relationships. As discussed above, however, SSCM and TC originally addressed different 
stakeholder groups. Future research can analyze more closely how external stakeholder 
requirements increasingly overlap and thus favor some forms of SSCM and TC alignment. One 
element in this regard is how stakeholders use a common ‘sustainability’ framing that covers 
previously unconnected issues. To illustrate, take ‘drive sustainability’, an automotive 
partnership of companies such as BMW, Daimler, Ford, Honda, Jaguar Land Rover, Toyota 
Motor Europe, and Volkswagen (Drive Sustainability and CSR Europe, 2018). The aim of this 
initiative is to promote sustainability within the industry through a common supply chain 
approach. The partnership’s self-assessment questionnaire subsumes “export controls and 
economic sanctions” (Drive Sustainability and CSR Europe, 2017, p. 2) as a sub-responsibility 
for “global automotive sustainability (emphasis added)” (ibid., p. 1). Similarly, in the SDGs, 
goal 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) highlights the reduction of “illicit financial and 
arms flows” and the combat of “terrorism and crime” (United Nations General Assembly, 2015, 
pp. 25-26). As important external stakeholders such as the Global Reporting Initiative or 
investors expect companies to report their sustainability performance with regard to the SDGs 
(Betti et al., 2018; GRI et al., 2015), the expanding scope of the sustainability notion thus brings 
previously separate SSCM and TC issues together in a shared framework. Future research can 
thus investigate how such changes in the sustainability framing (expressed in sustainability 
reporting, rating, investor questionnaires, etc.) influence the case for an internal alignment of 
SSCM and TC. Proposition 1b can thus be posited: The greater the overlap in terms of external 
stakeholders and the more external requirements are formulated through a shared 
sustainability frame, the greater the case for aligning SSCM and TC topics internally. 
While more encompassing framings of sustainability can lead to a topical alignment of 
previously distinct issues in the firm’s environment, due diligence requirements increasingly 
attribute responsibility for the ultimate value chain, thus creating overlapping external 
expectations for upstream and downstream parts of the value chain. Future research can 
investigate how such due diligence requirements bring previously separate compliance 
considerations together, thereby increasing the importance of improving supply chain visibility 
and thus influencing the case for aligning SSCM and TC. Proposition 1c can thus be posited: 
The more external requirements call for due diligence for the ultimate supply chain, the greater 
the case for aligning SSCM and TC processes. 
 
6.2. Investigating the role of existing system structures as barriers 
The case for aligning SSCM and TC derives from a changing external environment. Yet, as the 
concept of organizational path dependencies explains, existing structures may hinder the system 
in freely adapting internally to such external change. From a system theory perspective, the 
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conceptual reason for this challenge lies in the difference between functions and structures. 
While functions describe what a system needs to achieve, structures are the basis for how 
system operations are directed to generate specific system achievements (Schneider et al., 
2017). For Luhmann, the structures of a system are not externally given but are themselves the 
product of the system’s own operations (Schneider et al., 2017). This means that the longer 
structures are reproduced within the system, the more stable the structures emerge. Future 
research could thus test how the age of the respective functions influences the rigidity of their 
underlying structures. If history matters (Nooteboom, 1997; Sewell, 1996), a longer history of 
operating separately will matter more than a shorter history. Proposition 2a can thus be posited: 
The longer the two functions of SSCM and TC have existed independently, the more structural 
inertia will inhibit their alignment.  
From a system theory perspective, SSCM and TC can be conceptualized as elements of 
a firm’s functional differentiation (Müller and Powell, 1994; Schneider et al., 2017). As 
specialized sub-systems, both operate in their own logic and represent for each other a part of 
the system’s internal environment (Müller and Powell, 1994). System theory underlines the 
self-referential nature of such (sub-)systems. In other words, each function achieves its specific 
contribution through specific operations. Employees with a legal background will address an 
issue with a different logic than employees with an engineering background. This specialization 
is a double-edged sword. The more specific sub-system operations are, the more focused and 
effective the function can get, yet also at the cost of being operationally closed to everything 
else. Against this background, differences in how the functions work establish structures that 
are productive, yet also create boundaries to others functions. Future research can thus analyze 
how differences in organizational cultures but above all differences in professional standards 
result in underlying structures that favor different – and thus difficult to align – functional 
logics. Proposition 2b can thus be posited: The greater the professional distance between 
employees in the SSCM and TC function, the more difficult will be a functional alignment of 
both functions. 
According to system theory, organizations such as firms are social systems (Seidl and 
Becker, 2006) (with their functions being sub-systems that increase internal complexity through 
functional differentiation). In system theory, these social systems operate and reproduce 
themselves on the basis of communication (Cooren and Seidl, 2019). By this logic, structures 
are particularly relevant in determining how communication unfolds within the system. In 
organizations, some of the structures that channel communication can easily be changed. To 
illustrate, take the hierarchical line of command that structures how supervisor and subordinates 
communicate. Yet, this structure can change overnight when, for example, a company’s 
organizational chart is reorganized. In contrast, spatial structures, including in which building 
or location a functional team or department is based, also largely influence communication, yet 
cannot be changed as easily. To illustrate, take a major MNE where the TC department is 
located in one campus whereas the SSCM department is based in a different part of the city. 
Future research can thus investigate how the existing spatial structures, including office space, 
foster or hinder the functional alignment of SSCM and TC. Proposition 2c can thus be posited: 
The greater the spatial distance between SSCM and TC teams, the less likely is functional 
alignment of both functions to emerge. 
 
6.3. Investigating structural options for functional alignment  
Functional differentiation means that functions evolve as sub-systems that operate with their 
own, self-referential logic. As already alluded to above, this creates an interesting challenge. 
On the one hand, operational closure gives a sub-system its effectiveness and allows it to fulfill 
a specific function. On the other hand, this operational closure makes the sub-system blind to 
everything else outside its own logic, including the existence and contribution of other corporate 
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functions. As a consequence, overarching issues like VCR may affect the entire firm, yet SSCM 
and TC ‘see’ and address only parts of it and operate in silos without exchanging information 
or collaboration. 
Against this backdrop, system theory underlines the importance of the concept of 
structural couplings. Structural couplings provide some form of meaningful connection 
between a system and its environment (which may consist of other systems). Take again the 
example of the moth discussed earlier. The hearing apparatus represents system structures 
(stable components of the moth system) that couple relevant environmental events (sound) into 
internal system operations (nervous activity) (see Roeder, 1965).  
A special form of structural couplings occurs when two systems are structurally coupled 
to each other. If “an autopoietic system presupposes the complex achievements of the 
autopoiesis of another system and can treat them as if they were parts of the own system’ 
(Luhmann, 1995b, p. 153) [translation by Seidl and Becker]” (Seidl and Becker, 2006, p. 21). 
Luhmann calls this “interpenetration” (Seidl and Becker, 2006, p. 21). In other words, 
interpenetration allows two systems to ‘use’ the output of another system internally. For the 
purpose of this article, structural couplings and interpenetration thus describe the theoretical 
options for how the functions of SSCM and TC can exist as independent functions on the one 
hand and nevertheless align their operations on the other hand.  
Like any organization or sub-system of it, SSCM and TC represent, according to system 
theory, social systems that operate on the basis of communication (Cooren and Seidl, 2019). 
Structural couplings that align both system’s operations are therefore above all to be searched 
in a firm’s system structures that channel communication. In this regard, future research can 
investigate how shared information systems allow aligning SSCM and TC through the sharing 
of data such as supplier information, country and issue risk assessment, stakeholder contacts 
and so forth. The joint use of modern ICT technologies including novel form of increasing 
supply chain visibility such as blockchain technologies, can serve to exchange information and 
align decision-making processes. Proposition 3a can thus be posited: The more SSCM and TC 
use joint information systems, the more likely functional alignment between both functions can 
be developed. 
While business information systems and internal office ICT can foster communication 
between SSCM and TC, a system theory perspective maintains that the alignment of functional 
operations is not merely a matter of technological solutions. According to the concept of 
functional differentiation, functions and sub-systems specialize by evolving their own form of 
communication – by developing their own specialized language so to speak. These differences 
in communicative operations can lead to operational closure and functional self-referentiality. 
Against this background, ICT solutions that allow different functions to use the same 
communication channels do not guarantee that the functions actually understand each other. 
What is needed, therefore, are structural couplings that translate information in a 
commonly understood language. A helpful conceptual distinction in this regard is Luhmann’s 
distinction between “codes” and “programs” (Luhmann, 1989). For Luhmann, communication 
systems operate by processing different binary “codes” that are operationalized through more 
elaborate “programs”. To illustrate, for the TC function, the binary distinction guiding decisions 
regarding business transactions could be the code “compliant/not compliant”. The “program” 
then refers to the criteria, protocols, methods etc. that are applied to resolve how a specific 
transaction is coded. 
Seen from this perspective, an important structural coupling for aligning SSCM and TC 
could lie in the use of shared “programs” in the sense of categorizations, protocols, etc. that 
guide internal decision-making. One example of a mandatory international product 
nomenclature that can serve as a shared program and facilitate integrated information 
management is the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) originally 
developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO) in 1988. The HS classifies goods in a 
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structured and universally applicable manner with about 98% of international merchandise 
being categorized by a six-digit code, which allows to allocate each product in an exact 
commodity group. Originally designed to apply the correct customs tariff (WCO, 2017a), the 
HS has proven to be a ‘multi-purpose tool’ (WCO, 2017b) that serves in TC to monitor and 
control trade of dangerous goods. For SSCM, the HS could provide a useful common language 
as it nowadays enables governments to enforce regulation on goods, which have a social and 
environmental impact. In fact, environmental and social amendments were major features in 
the sixth edition of the HS Nomenclature, which entered into force on January 1, 2017 (WCO, 
2015). Future research can thus investigate how shared programs such as common protocols 
like the HS can foster communication and alignment between SSCM and TC. Proposition 3b 
can thus be posited: The more SSCM and TC use shared protocols or ‘programs’, the more 
likely they establish structures that enable functional alignment between both functions. 
Though counterintuitive for everyday thinking (Seidl and Becker, 2006), Luhmannian 
system theory does not conceptualize human beings as part of business systems but as psychic 
systems that populate an organization’s environment (Luhmann, 2018). Language, however, is 
a structural coupling that connects what is going on in people’s head (psychic operations) and 
in social systems (communicative operations).[2] This has an interesting consequence. Psychic 
systems can store in their minds information that stems from one communication context and 
then insert that information in a different communication context. Put differently, if the same 
psychic system (e.g. manager) is coupled to various communication systems (e.g. different team 
communications) it can indirectly connect communicative systems that are operationally closed 
from each other. 
For future research, this perspective invites investigating how the bringing together of 
people from different functions can occur in a structured way that, indirectly, opens up options 
for information flow and ultimately functional alignment. One example could be a form of job 
rotation like in the case of BMW (Avery, 2005, p. 45). Here, BMW deliberately encourages 
employees to regularly rotate to other roles. This could be used to structure the experience 
sharing between related functions. A second approach that enjoys prominence is the idea of 
communities of practice (CoP). CoPs are “groups of people who share a concern, a set of 
problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area 
by interacting on an ongoing basis” (Wenger et al., 2002, p. 4). For the joint management of 
VCR, CoPs could be a particularly promising approach, as they inter alia focus on the internal 
identification, exchange, storage and management of knowledge between structurally separated 
organizational functions or ‘silos’ (Corso et al., 2009; Forsten-Astikainen et al., 2017; Hemmasi 
and Csanda, 2009; see Manuti et al., 2017; Probst and Borzillo, 2008). The ability of CoP to 
enable exchange of knowledge, information, expertise and (best) practices thus represents a 
promising tool to break existing organizational path dependencies (see Forsten-Astikainen et 
al., 2017; Li et al., 2009; Sydow et al., 2009). 
From a Luhmannian perspective, CoPs do not represent sub-systems of the firm as they 
do not follow the organizational logic of generating decisions. CoPs rather typically generate 
‘interactions’, that is episodic, often face-to-face communications through joint theme-days, 
workshops, projects, or conferences. Future research can investigate how firms can organize 
and structure such issue-specific communication as an incubator for new inter-functional 
projects, e.g. addressing a common VCR issue such as conflict minerals. Action research could 
contribute to by establishing regular CoP workshops where internal stakeholders from different 
VCR-related functions present key achievements, milestones, and challenges, thus allowing 
mutual learning and knowledge creation and sharing. Proposition 3c can thus be posited: The 
more structures like job rotation or communities of practice bring employees from different 
functions together, the more likely functional alignment between both functions can be 
developed. 
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6.4. Further research 
The authors presented further research areas content-wise, but the question remains how to 
address these method-wise. To explore and test how the company’s environment influences the 
case for aligning SSCM and TC, the authors propose a multiple case study approach. By 
comparing e.g. different industries, comparative case studies can analyze differences in product 
complexity, international cross-border characteristics, or specific external stakeholder 
requirements.  
For testing system-related propositions, the authors propose an empirical explorative 
approach. Particularly qualitative research in the form of expert interviews is suitable to ‘talk 
with the field’ and learn more about existing structures and barriers for functional alignment. 
This is the basis to find out what is happening in the various involved departments and develop 
tailored solutions for alignment. 
As there are multiple options for the firm to create structural couplings, a research approach 
should be adapted to the evolutionary character of the business system. Particularly with regard 
to the further evolution of different functions, Delphi studies and other forms of scenario 
techniques are suitable to address alignment-related propositions. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In 1973, BMW was the first automotive company to establish a dedicated ‘environmental 
management’ unit as the firm responded to the increasing pressures from local stakeholders 
such as neighbors or the municipality who were concerned about local pollution (BMW AG, 
2019). Other stakeholders such as trade-unions voiced expectations regarding social issues, 
leading to dedicated, yet separate structural units such as occupational health & safety. Over 
time, however, societal expectations within the business environment have embraced 
‘sustainability’ as a more comprehensive concept that includes both environmental and social 
issues. As these issues became more aligned in the external environment, companies have 
developed integrated CSR or sustainability departments that reflect various forms of functional 
alignment internally. 
This paper seeks to bring attention to a similar phenomenon that might be unfolding 
with regard to the discussion about corporate value chain responsibility (VCR). In practice, the 
two functions of sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) and trade compliance (TC) 
already tackle different aspects of VCR, without being necessarily aware of each other’s 
activities and processes. Yet, real-life challenges along global value chains do not care about 
the different functional logics within a firm.  
Against this background, this paper promotes a more encompassing perspective of 
sustainable development and a holistic concept of corporate value chain responsibility. In order 
to do so, this paper answers the following research question: How can evolutionary system 
theory explain not only the co-evolution of two distinct VCR functions (SSCM and TC) but also 
the potential and challenges for their future alignment? Bringing system theory to this debate, 
the authors have explained how both SSCM and TC emerged as responses of the business 
system to specific stakeholder requirements. In the more recent past, however, previously 
separate stakeholder requirements increasingly overlap in the external environment, thus 
creating a case for some form of internally aligning SSCM and TC. Yet, as the concept of 
organizational path dependencies suggests, existing system structures may inhibit such 
functional alignment.  
In spelling out this argument, the article has made four contributions. First, it introduces 
evolutionary system theory as a powerful explanatory perspective to the field of VCR, SSCM, 
and TC. Second, this study aims to add the often overlooked, yet empirically relevant function 
of TC to the wider discussion on SSCM and corporate responsibility along the supply chain. 
By applying evolutionary system theory to the VCR debate, it, third, analyzes the potential and 
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challenges for aligning both functions. Forth, it spells out a research agenda and formulates 
testable propositions for further investigating the interplay of environment and system as well 
as the structural options for a functional alignment of SSCM and TC.  
 
Notes: 
1. Within the EU, the Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of May 5, 2009 sets a 
common legal framework for dual-use export controls. Following Art. 2, dual-use items 
are goods, software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military 
purposes, and can thus potentially be misused by customers. 
2. In fact, the intense structural coupling between psychic systems and social systems 
through language is an example for the phenomenon of system interpenetration 
discussed above.  
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